Appendix: JSON and Web APIs#

In Files and Exceptions we saw how to read data from files. In this part, we will look at how to read data directly from web APIs. Web APIs are machine-readable online data sources. We will look at two different web APIs.

ECHR-OD API

The European Court of Human Rights Open Data (ECHR-OD) project provides data about ECHR cases. ECHR-OD provides machine-readable data for download, but also a public ECHR-OD API for online use. Here is the ECHR-OD API documentation.

Harvard’s Caselaw Access Project

We will also use data from Harvard’s Caselaw Access Project (CAP). CAP aims to make all published US courts decisions freely available in a standard, machine-readable format. CAP and the data format is documented here.

Reading JSON from file#

JSON

JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) is a machine-readable data format. Machine-readable data makes it easy to read and process the information with a computer. JSON data is usually tree structured, with multiple levels containing information.

In Python, JSON data is stored as lists and dictionaries. The top level can be either a list or a dictionary.

First, let’s look at how we can read JSON data from a local file. Here we read a file containing a few cases from ECHR-OD.

import json

def read_json_file(filename):
    with open(filename, 'r') as file:
        text_data = file.read()
        return json.loads(text_data)
    
cases = read_json_file('cases-5.json')

However, this approach has some drawbacks. Firstly, we must manually download the data set. Secondly, we must keep the data set updated. Case law databases are updated regularly, and we probably want to include the latest data. Therefore, using online data directly is sometimes preferable. For example, if we are developing a mobile app, the full data set might be too large to fit on the device.

Reading JSON from a web API#

To fetch data from the web, we can use a library called requests that makes this task quite easy. First, we import this:

import requests

First, we will look at the ECHR-OD API. This API has a function of getting statistics about the number of cases. We need to specify the URL:

URL = 'https://echr-opendata.eu/api/v1/stats'

Now, we can get the data. We use the request library’s .get() function to fetch the data, and then the method .json() to parse the results into Python lists and dictionaries.

request = requests.get(URL)
data = request.json()
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
JSONDecodeError                           Traceback (most recent call last)
File /opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/site-packages/requests/models.py:974, in Response.json(self, **kwargs)
    973 try:
--> 974     return complexjson.loads(self.text, **kwargs)
    975 except JSONDecodeError as e:
    976     # Catch JSON-related errors and raise as requests.JSONDecodeError
    977     # This aliases json.JSONDecodeError and simplejson.JSONDecodeError

File /opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/json/__init__.py:346, in loads(s, cls, object_hook, parse_float, parse_int, parse_constant, object_pairs_hook, **kw)
    343 if (cls is None and object_hook is None and
    344         parse_int is None and parse_float is None and
    345         parse_constant is None and object_pairs_hook is None and not kw):
--> 346     return _default_decoder.decode(s)
    347 if cls is None:

File /opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/json/decoder.py:337, in JSONDecoder.decode(self, s, _w)
    333 """Return the Python representation of ``s`` (a ``str`` instance
    334 containing a JSON document).
    335 
    336 """
--> 337 obj, end = self.raw_decode(s, idx=_w(s, 0).end())
    338 end = _w(s, end).end()

File /opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/json/decoder.py:355, in JSONDecoder.raw_decode(self, s, idx)
    354 except StopIteration as err:
--> 355     raise JSONDecodeError("Expecting value", s, err.value) from None
    356 return obj, end

JSONDecodeError: Expecting value: line 1 column 1 (char 0)

During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:

JSONDecodeError                           Traceback (most recent call last)
Cell In[4], line 2
      1 request = requests.get(URL)
----> 2 data = request.json()

File /opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/site-packages/requests/models.py:978, in Response.json(self, **kwargs)
    974     return complexjson.loads(self.text, **kwargs)
    975 except JSONDecodeError as e:
    976     # Catch JSON-related errors and raise as requests.JSONDecodeError
    977     # This aliases json.JSONDecodeError and simplejson.JSONDecodeError
--> 978     raise RequestsJSONDecodeError(e.msg, e.doc, e.pos)

JSONDecodeError: Expecting value: line 1 column 1 (char 0)

The result is a list of dictionaries with statistics about the numbers of violations and non-violations for different articles of the ECHR. We can display the first few articles:

display(data[:5])
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NameError                                 Traceback (most recent call last)
Cell In[5], line 1
----> 1 display(data[:5])

NameError: name 'data' is not defined

Let’s try to get some cases. This query has a different URL:

URL = 'https://echr-opendata.eu/api/v1/cases'

This query will result in all the cases in ECHR-OD, which are several thousand. Therefore, the query results are split into several “pages” of results. We must specify the page size, called limit. We usually start with page number 1. We specify both these parameters in a dictionary.

parameters = {'page': 1,
              'limit': 3}

Now, we can get the results. We include the parameters in the query as a parameter to the .get() function.

cases = requests.get(URL, params=parameters).json()
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
JSONDecodeError                           Traceback (most recent call last)
File /opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/site-packages/requests/models.py:974, in Response.json(self, **kwargs)
    973 try:
--> 974     return complexjson.loads(self.text, **kwargs)
    975 except JSONDecodeError as e:
    976     # Catch JSON-related errors and raise as requests.JSONDecodeError
    977     # This aliases json.JSONDecodeError and simplejson.JSONDecodeError

File /opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/json/__init__.py:346, in loads(s, cls, object_hook, parse_float, parse_int, parse_constant, object_pairs_hook, **kw)
    343 if (cls is None and object_hook is None and
    344         parse_int is None and parse_float is None and
    345         parse_constant is None and object_pairs_hook is None and not kw):
--> 346     return _default_decoder.decode(s)
    347 if cls is None:

File /opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/json/decoder.py:337, in JSONDecoder.decode(self, s, _w)
    333 """Return the Python representation of ``s`` (a ``str`` instance
    334 containing a JSON document).
    335 
    336 """
--> 337 obj, end = self.raw_decode(s, idx=_w(s, 0).end())
    338 end = _w(s, end).end()

File /opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/json/decoder.py:355, in JSONDecoder.raw_decode(self, s, idx)
    354 except StopIteration as err:
--> 355     raise JSONDecodeError("Expecting value", s, err.value) from None
    356 return obj, end

JSONDecodeError: Expecting value: line 1 column 1 (char 0)

During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:

JSONDecodeError                           Traceback (most recent call last)
Cell In[8], line 1
----> 1 cases = requests.get(URL, params=parameters).json()

File /opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/site-packages/requests/models.py:978, in Response.json(self, **kwargs)
    974     return complexjson.loads(self.text, **kwargs)
    975 except JSONDecodeError as e:
    976     # Catch JSON-related errors and raise as requests.JSONDecodeError
    977     # This aliases json.JSONDecodeError and simplejson.JSONDecodeError
--> 978     raise RequestsJSONDecodeError(e.msg, e.doc, e.pos)

JSONDecodeError: Expecting value: line 1 column 1 (char 0)

Tip

We can fetch the results and parse the JSON in two steps or in one line. Both are fine, and this is a matter of preference.

Inspecting the Data#

We can display the data, however this is a lot of text:

display(cases)
Hide code cell output
[{'__articles': '3;6;6+6-3-c;6-1;6-3-c',
  '__conclusion': 'No violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment)',
  'applicability': '',
  'application': 'MS WORD',
  'appno': '45498/11',
  'article': ['3', '6'],
  'conclusion': [{'article': '6-3-c',
    'base_article': '6',
    'details': ['Article 6 - Criminal proceedings',
     'Article 6-1 - Fair hearing'],
    'element': 'No violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial',
    'mentions': ['Article 6 - Right to a fair trial',
     'Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance'],
    'type': 'no-violation'},
   {'article': '3',
    'base_article': '3',
    'details': ['Article 3 - Degrading treatment', 'Inhuman treatment'],
    'element': 'Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture',
    'type': 'violation'}],
  'content': {'001-175680.docx': [{'content': 'PROCEDURE',
     'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0The case originated in an application (no. 45498/11) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Sergey Viktorovich Sklyar, on 13 June 2011.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '2.\xa0\xa0The applicant was represented by Ms. E. Efremova, a lawyer practising in Moscow. On 4 June 2013 the applicant was granted legal aid.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '3.\xa0\xa0The Russian Government ("the Government") were represented initially by Mr G. Matyushkin, the Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '4.\xa0\xa0The applicant complained that he had not been provided with a legalaid lawyer during the appeal proceedings in his criminal case and that the conditions of his detention in the correctional colony where he was serving his sentence were inhuman and degrading.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '5.\xa0\xa0On 20 November 2012 the application was communicated to the Government.',
       'elements': []}],
     'section_name': 'procedure'},
    {'content': 'THE FACTS',
     'elements': [{'content': 'I.\xa0\xa0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE',
       'elements': [{'content': '6.\xa0\xa0The applicant was born in 1975 and lived in Novosibirsk before his arrest.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '7.\xa0\xa0On 12 November 2010 the Kalininskiy District Court of Novosibirsk convicted the applicant of aggravated theft and armed robbery and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment. The applicant was represented by a lawyer in these proceedings.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '8.\xa0\xa0On 24 January 2011 an appeal brought by the applicant himself was examined by the Novosibirsk Regional Court in the absence of counsel. The appeal court upheld the applicant’s conviction.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '9.\xa0\xa0The applicant has been serving his sentence in IK-8 in Novosibirsk since 10 February 2011.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '10.\xa0\xa0As regards the conditions of the applicant’s detention in the IK-8 facility, the Government submitted information which can be summarised as follows:',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '11.\xa0\xa0The Government also submitted that all the units where the applicant had been detained had had a sufficient number of sleeping places for all the detainees, they had been ventilated through openings in the windows and had had access to cold water in accordance with up to date sanitary standards. The units were equipped with ten to fifteen kettles to boil water and tanks containing potable water. All the lavatories had individual cabins with doors that were one and a half metres high, opening to the outside. They submitted photographs of the washbasins and lavatories.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '12.\xa0\xa0The applicant acknowledged that he had an individual sleeping place. However, he underlined that the conditions he had to live in were cramped. He further submitted that the units had no access to natural light or had poor artificial lighting, that the ventilation did not work and that the air was damp. The food he was provided was not in accordance with the special diet prescribed for him. Furthermore, inmates with tuberculosis lived in the same dormitory. There were only three lavatories (in units 17 and 7), they had no doors and the applicant had no privacy when using them. They were clogged up most of the time owing to the number of people using them. Prisoners were only allowed one shower a week. The applicant had no access to potable water and only one washbasin out of four had worked. There were only two kettles for boiling water and the electricity was switched off during the day and therefore it was not possible to have boiled water. The applicant further submitted that the buildings where his units were located were in a hazardous condition and that the roof and walls were liable to fall in at any time owing to a lack of repairs. Lastly, the applicant adduced written statements from his four co-detainees who confirmed his account of the conditions of detention in IK-8 in Novosibirsk.',
         'elements': []}]},
      {'content': 'II.\xa0\xa0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE',
       'elements': [{'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Legal representation',
         'elements': [{'content': '13.\xa0\xa0The Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation (in force from 1 July 2002) provides:',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '“1.\xa0\xa0The participation of legal counsel in criminal proceedings is mandatory if:',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '...', 'elements': []},
          {'content': '3.\xa0\xa0In the circumstances as set forth in paragraph 1 above, unless counsel is retained by the suspect or the accused, or his lawful representative, or other persons on the request of, or with the consent of, the suspect or the accused, it is incumbent on the investigator, prosecutor or the court to ensure the participation of legal counsel in the proceedings.”',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '“1.\xa0\xa0The suspect or the accused may refuse legal assistance at any stage of criminal proceedings. Such a waiver may only be accepted if made on the suspect or accused’s own initiative. The waiver must be filed in writing and must be recorded in the official record of the relevant procedural act ...”',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '14.\xa0\xa0The relevant domestic law and case-law governing the presence of lawyers in appeal proceedings in respect of criminal cases is also summed up in the Court’s judgments in the cases of Sakhnovskiy v. Russia [GC], no.\xa021272/03, §§ 31-39, 2 November 2010; Shugayev v. Russia, no.\xa011020/03, §§ 38-43, 14 January 2010; Shumikhin v. Russia, no.\xa07848/06, § 17, 16 July 2015; Volkov and Adamskiy v. Russia, nos.\xa07614/09 and 30863/10, §§ 21-26, 26 March 2015; Eduard Rozhkov v.\xa0Russia, no.\xa011469/05, §§ 11-13, 31 October 2013; and Nefedov v. Russia, no.\xa040962/04, § 17, 13 March 2012.',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Conditions of detention in correctional colonies',
         'elements': [{'content': '15.\xa0\xa0The relevant domestic law concerning conditions of detention in correctional facilities is summed up in the leading case of Butko v. Russia, no. 32036/10, § 17, 12 November 2015.',
           'elements': []}]}]},
      {'content': 'III.\xa0\xa0RELEVANT COUNCIL OF EUROPE MATERIAL',
       'elements': [{'content': '16.\xa0\xa0The relevant information concerning conditions of detention in correctional facilities in Russia is extracted from reports by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CPT) in Butko, cited above, § 20.',
         'elements': []}]}],
     'section_name': 'facts'},
    {'content': 'THE LAW',
     'elements': [{'content': 'I.\xa0\xa0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 §§ 1 AND 3 (c) OF THE CONVENTION',
       'elements': [{'content': '17.\xa0\xa0The applicant complained that the authorities had failed to provide him with legal assistance in the first set of appeal proceedings in his case, contrary to Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention, which reads as follows in the relevant part:',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '“1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '3.\xa0\xa0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '...', 'elements': []},
        {'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Admissibility',
         'elements': [{'content': '18.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Merits',
         'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0Submissions by the parties',
           'elements': [{'content': '19.\xa0\xa0The Government submitted that the applicant had waived his right to be represented by a lawyer in his appeal hearing, in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure. In particular, they submitted that on 12 November 2010, after the text of the judgment in the applicant’s case had been announced, he had signed a written waiver refusing legal representation and indicating that his refusal had not been motivated by financial reasons. On 22 November 2010 the applicant had received a copy of the judgment and had signed another document in which he had stated that he would appeal against his conviction, that he had again refused the services of a lawyer and that the refusal was not for financial reasons. In his statement of appeal the applicant had not requested to have a lawyer appointed for the appeal hearing. The Government submitted copies of the documents of 12 and 22\xa0November 2010 to the Court. The Government further submitted that on 24 January 2011, when the appeal court had examined the applicant’s case, he had not submitted any requests related to a lack of legal representation. Given the above, the applicant’s rights under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention had therefore not been breached.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '20.\xa0\xa0The applicant disagreed and explained that he had never seen the documents submitted by the Government, had never signed them and stated that they had been forged. He acknowledged that he had not requested a lawyer during his appeal hearing. However, the appeal court should have enquired whether he wished to retain one and if so, to appoint a lawyer for him. He further submitted that he had not had the financial means to hire a lawyer at any stage of the criminal proceedings against him. In addition, he had needed qualified legal representation for his appeal because his criminal case had been particularly complex as it had involved charges of aggravated theft and robbery and only a practising lawyer could have effectively represented him.',
             'elements': []}]},
          {'content': '2.\xa0\xa0The Court’s assessment',
           'elements': [{'content': '21.\xa0\xa0The Court notes at the outset that the requirements of Article 6 § 3 are to be seen as particular aspects of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 and therefore the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 should be examined together (see Vacher v. France, 17\xa0December 1996, § 22, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '22.\xa0\xa0The Court further reiterates that neither the letter nor the spirit of Article 6 of the Convention prevents a person from waiving of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly, the entitlement to the guarantees of a fair trial. However, such a waiver must, if it is to be effective for Convention purposes, be established in an unequivocal manner and be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate with its importance. In addition, it must not run counter to any important public interest (see Hermi v. Italy [GC], no.\xa018114/02, § 73 in fine, ECHR 2006XII, and Simeonovi v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 21980/04, § 115, 12 May 2017). The Court has also held in Russian cases that the applicant’s representation on appeal was mandatory under domestic law when the applicant did not waive, explicitly or implicitly and in accordance with Article 51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, his right to be assisted by counsel on appeal (see Volkov and\xa0Adamskiy, cited above, § 53, and Eduard Rozhkov, cited above, §§\xa02324,).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '23.\xa0\xa0The Court has examined the two identical documents dated 12 and 22 November 2010 submitted by the Government. Each of them reads as follows in the relevant part:',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '“... (typed) I, Sklyar Sergey Viktorovich, hereby acknowledge that I have been notified of',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '1.\xa0\xa0the right to participate in the appeal hearing of [my] criminal case through a legal representative. In case of the non-attendance of a lawyer of [my] own choosing, the court can propose within five days ... to ask another lawyer, and in case of refusal – to take steps to appoint a lawyer on its own initiative.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '2.\xa0\xa0the right to refuse legal representation.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': 'The refusal of legal representation ... does not forfeit the right to subsequently ask for the appointment of a lawyer for representation in the criminal proceedings.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '3.\xa0\xa0the right to request a lawyer, including one who is free of charge, in cases provided for by the [Russian Code of Criminal Procedure]',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '(applicant’s handwritten signature)', 'elements': []},
            {'content': 'The convicted person’s petition', 'elements': []},
            {'content': '(handwritten by applicant) [“I wish to appeal”, in the document of 12\xa0November\xa02010; “I will appeal in accordance with the prescribed time-limits”, in the document of 22 November 2010.]',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '[typed] in the appeal court:', 'elements': []},
            {'content': '1)\xa0\xa0I wish to ask a lawyer of my own choosing;',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '2)\xa0\xa0I would like the court to appoint a lawyer;',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '(circled) 3) I refuse legal representation but my refusal is not motivated by financial reasons ...',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '(applicant’s handwritten signature)', 'elements': []},
            {'content': '...”', 'elements': []},
            {'content': '24.\xa0\xa0In the Court’s view, both documents appear to be authentic. They bear the original handwriting and signature of the applicant which are the same on his application to the Court, express his acknowledgment of the contents of the documents and contain his unequivocal waiver of legal aid. Both waivers are marked by the clerk of the [Kalininskiy District] Court of Novosibirsk. The waiver of 22 November 2010 also bears an incoming correspondence number and the stamp of the court in question. Given the above, the Court therefore has no reason to question the authenticity and lawfulness of the two waivers and holds that they were established in a manner compatible with the requirements of domestic law and the Convention reiterated above (see, a contrario, Volkov and Adamskiy, cited above, § 57-59).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '25.\xa0\xa0The Court further notes that the applicant himself stated that he did not ask the appeal court to appoint a lawyer, despite his assertion that legal representation at the appeal stage was paramount to his defence (see paragraph 20 above). The applicant had been duly notified of his rights and, in particular, of the right to request the appeal court to appoint a lawyer for him after signing the waiver. However, he failed to exercise that right. In those circumstances, the Court does not consider that the domestic court was under an obligation to appoint a lawyer for the applicant (see, for similar reasoning, Aleksandr Dementyev v. Russia, no. 43095/05, § 48-50, 28\xa0November 2013, where the applicant was advised, inter alia, of his right to legal representation and did not at any point alert the authorities to any need for further legal advice or clarification, the Court held that the domestic authorities had not been obliged to intervene or take steps to ensure that the applicant was adequately represented). In that regard, the Court observes that nothing in the case file suggests that such a request would have been unduly burdensome for the applicant or required special steps to be taken by him (ibid., § 50).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '26.\xa0\xa0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the applicant lawfully and unequivocally waived his right to be represented by a lawyer in his appeal hearing. There has accordingly been no violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention.',
             'elements': []}]}]}]},
      {'content': 'II.\xa0\xa0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION',
       'elements': [{'content': '27.\xa0\xa0The applicant further complained that the conditions of his detention in IK-8 in Novosibirsk were incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Admissibility',
         'elements': [{'content': '28.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Merits',
         'elements': [{'content': '29.\xa0\xa0The Government submitted that the conditions of the applicant’s detention in IK-8 Novosibirsk had been in full compliance with Article 3 of the Convention.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '30.\xa0\xa0The applicant’s submissions regarding the conditions of his detention on in IK-8 in Novosibirsk are presented in paragraph 12 above.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '31.\xa0\xa0The Court notes at the outset that at any given period the applicant had little more than two square metres of floor space at his disposal. In that regard, the Court reiterates that an extreme lack of space in a prison cell or overcrowding weighs heavily as an aspect to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the impugned detention conditions were “degrading” from the point of view of Article 3 and may disclose a violation, both alone or taken together with other shortcomings (Muršić v.\xa0Croatia [GC], no. 7334/13, §§ 136-37, ECHR 2016, and Ananyev and\xa0Others v. Russia, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, § 139, 10\xa0January 2012).',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '32.\xa0\xa0The Court considers that the personal space available to the applicant was insufficient, given the number of detainees occupying the same unit (see paragraph 10 above). Furthermore, the Court also notes the inevitable lack of privacy endured by the applicant for a prolonged period in such cramped conditions, the inadequate number of sanitary installations (as confirmed even by the Government’s account) and their poor condition, which was plausibly described by the applicant. The Court has already found a violation in respect of issues similar to those in the present case, in the leading case of Butko (cited above). Moreover, the Government did not present any arguments that would rebut the strong presumption of violation of Article 3 when the personal space available to the applicant in multioccupancy accommodation falls below 3 square metres (see Muršić, cited above, § 138).',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '33.\xa0\xa0In the light of the material submitted to it by the parties and having regard to its case-law on the subject cited above, the Court finds that the applicant was detained in conditions which were inhuman and degrading.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '34.\xa0\xa0There has accordingly been violation of Article 3 of the Convention.',
           'elements': []}]}]},
      {'content': 'III.\xa0\xa0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION',
       'elements': [{'content': '35.\xa0\xa0Lastly, the applicant raised additional complaints with reference to various Articles of the Convention, which the Court has also examined. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. It follows that this part of the applications is manifestly illfounded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and\xa04 of the Convention.',
         'elements': []}]},
      {'content': 'IV.\xa0\xa0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION',
       'elements': [{'content': '36.\xa0\xa0Article 41 of the Convention provides:',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Damage',
         'elements': [{'content': '37.\xa0\xa0The applicant claimed 500,000 euros (EUR) in respect of nonpecuniary damage.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '38.\xa0\xa0The Government contested that amount as excessive.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '39.\xa0\xa0Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards EUR\xa08,000 to the applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage for violation of Article 3 of the Convention, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Costs and expenses',
         'elements': [{'content': '40.\xa0\xa0The applicant also claimed EUR 1,320 for the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Court.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '41.\xa0\xa0The Government submitted that the claims should be reduced or denied as manifestly wrong.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '42.\xa0\xa0Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its caselaw and to the fact that the applicant was granted legal aid from the Court (see paragraph 2 above), the Court awards EUR 470 to the applicant in respect of costs and expenses for the proceedings before it.',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'C.\xa0\xa0Default interest',
         'elements': [{'content': '43.\xa0\xa0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.',
           'elements': []}]}]}],
     'section_name': 'law'},
    {'content': 'FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,',
     'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0Declares the complaints concerning the absence of a lawyer from the appeal proceedings and the conditions of detention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '2.\xa0\xa0Holds that there has been no violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention;',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '3.\xa0\xa0Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '4.\xa0\xa0Holds', 'elements': []},
      {'content': '(a)\xa0\xa0that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\xa044\xa0§\xa02 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '(b)\xa0\xa0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '5.\xa0\xa0Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': 'Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 July 2017, pursuant to Rule\xa077\xa0§§\xa02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.',
       'elements': []}],
     'section_name': 'conclusion'}]},
  'country': {'alpha2': 'ru', 'name': 'Russian Federation'},
  'decision_body': [{'name': 'Helena Jäderblom', 'role': 'president'},
   {'name': 'Branko Lubarda', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Helen Keller', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Dmitry Dedov', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Pere Pastor Vilanova', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Georgios A. Serghides', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Jolien Schukking', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Stephen Phillips', 'role': 'section registrar'}],
  'decisiondate': '',
  'docname': 'CASE OF SKLYAR v. RUSSIA',
  'doctypebranch': 'CHAMBER',
  'documentcollectionid': ['CASELAW', 'JUDGMENTS', 'CHAMBER', 'ENG'],
  'documents': ['001-175680.docx'],
  'ecli': 'ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0718JUD004549811',
  'externalsources': [],
  'extractedappno': ['45498/11',
   '21272/03',
   '11020/03',
   '7848/06',
   '7614/09',
   '30863/10',
   '11469/05',
   '40962/04',
   '32036/10',
   '18114/02',
   '21980/04',
   '43095/05',
   '7334/13',
   '42525/07',
   '60800/08'],
  'importance': '4',
  'introductiondate': '',
  'issue': [],
  'itemid': '001-175680',
  'judgementdate': '18/07/2017 00:00:00',
  'kpdate': '18/07/2017 00:00:00',
  'kpthesaurus': ['350', '90', '193', '445', '76', '136', '86'],
  'languageisocode': 'ENG',
  'originatingbody': '6',
  'originatingbody_name': 'Third Section',
  'originatingbody_type': 'Court',
  'paragraphs': ['6-3-c', '3', '6', '6-1'],
  'parties': ['SKLYAR', 'RUSSIA'],
  'rank': '1949.88940429688',
  'representedby': ['EFREMOVA E.'],
  'respondent': 'RUS',
  'respondentOrderEng': '38',
  'scl': [],
  'separateopinion': 'FALSE',
  'sharepointid': '466267',
  'typedescription': '15'},
 {'__articles': 'P1-3',
  '__conclusion': 'Violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Right to free elections-{general} (Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Stand for election);No violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Right to free elections-{general} (Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Vote)',
  'applicability': '',
  'application': 'MS WORD',
  'appno': '18860/07',
  'article': ['p1-3'],
  'conclusion': [{'article': 'p1-3',
    'base_article': 'p1-3',
    'details': ['Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Stand for election'],
    'element': 'Violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Right to free elections-{general}',
    'type': 'violation'},
   {'article': 'p1-3',
    'base_article': 'p1-3',
    'details': ['Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Vote'],
    'element': 'No violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Right to free elections-{general}',
    'type': 'no-violation'}],
  'content': {'001-168352.docx': [{'content': 'PROCEDURE',
     'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0The case originated in an application (no. 18860/07) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by the Karelian regional division of the Yabloko Russian United Democratic Party, a political party registered under the laws of the Russian Federation (“the applicant party”) and three Russian nationals residing in the Republic of Karelia: Ms Irina Vladimirovna Petelyayeva (born in 1959), the chairwoman of the applicant party (“the second applicant”), Mr Aleksandr Ilyich Klimchuk (born in 1949) and Ms Kseniya Vladimirovna Fillipenkova (born in 1981), members of the applicant party (“the third and fourth applicants”).',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '2.\xa0\xa0The applicants were represented by Mr D.P. Holiner, a lawyer practising in London. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '3.\xa0\xa0The applicants alleged that the decision to cancel the registration of the Yabloko lists for elections in Karelia had been in breach of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '4.\xa0\xa0On 7 September 2012 the application was communicated to the Government.',
       'elements': []}],
     'section_name': 'procedure'},
    {'content': 'THE FACTS',
     'elements': [{'content': 'I.\xa0\xa0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE',
       'elements': [{'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Background information',
         'elements': [{'content': '5.\xa0\xa0The Republic of Karelia (“Karelia”) is a subject (constituent region) of the Russian Federation. Under Article 73 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, subjects of the Federation possess the full authority of the Russian State in all matters other than those that come within the sole jurisdiction of the federal government or within the shared jurisdiction of federal subjects and the federal government to the degree of the latter’s scope of authority.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '6.\xa0\xa0At the relevant time, the Legislative Assembly of Karelia (hereinafter “the LA”) had fifty members elected by universal direct suffrage for a five-year term. Twenty-five seats were allocated on a proportional representation basis to registered party lists receiving at least 7% of the region-wide vote, while the remaining seats were allocated to the winners of twenty-five single-mandate constituencies, determined by majority vote. There was no minimum turnout for the election to be valid, and each voter could only vote for one party and one candidate in the electoral constituency in which he or she resided.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '7.\xa0\xa0The regional branch of the Yabloko political party was registered by a competent State authority (at that time the regional department of the Ministry of Justice) in 2002.',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Decision to take part in the election to the regional legislature',
         'elements': [{'content': '8.\xa0\xa0On 26 April 2006 the regional council of the applicant party called for a regional party conference to be held in two sessions on 27 May and 12\xa0August 2006, respectively. The aim was to prepare for the LA elections that were to take place in autumn 2006.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '9.\xa0\xa0Between 27 April 2006 and 26 May 2006 local party branches throughout Karelia held assemblies and conferences in accordance with the Yabloko party’s articles of association (hereinafter, “the charter”) and selected delegates to attend the regional party conference. At the time, the regional party had over 3,800 members, of whom 474 were so-called “registered party members”, that is, members who had specifically asked to be registered with the local party bodies in order to participate more actively in the party’s work, such as regional conferences. As a result, the 474 registered members elected forty-seven delegates to the regional conference.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '10.\xa0\xa0On 27 May 2006 thirty-seven delegates present at the conference expressed their desire to participate in the upcoming LA elections. The nomination of candidates to the party list and electoral circuits was left to the second session scheduled for 12 August 2006.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '11.\xa0\xa0On 10 and 11 June 2006 the Yabloko party at national level held its Thirteenth Party Congress, which adopted several amendments to the party’s charter. The charter maintained the division between party members and registered party members. In accordance with paragraph 9.1.14 of both versions the right to elect and be elected to the party’s governing and controlling bodies was reserved to registered members. The 2006 version specified, additionally, that party members who did not register automatically delegated the right to elect and be elected within the party to the registered party members of the relevant local branch.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '12.\xa0\xa0On 4 July 2006 the LA set an election date of 8 October 2006.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '13.\xa0\xa0On 27 July 2006 the amendments to the Yabloko national party charter were registered with the Federal Registration Service, upon which date they came into force.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '14.\xa0\xa0On 12 August 2006 the regional party conference resumed. Thirty-seven of the forty-seven party delegates were present, and a quorum was declared. In accordance with the party’s charter, the conference nominated a 25-member party list and candidates for three electoral constituencies by secret ballot. The second and third applicants were chosen to run for office in two single-mandate constituencies.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '15.\xa0\xa0The conference was attended by two representatives from the Karelia Directorate of the Federal Registration Service of the Ministry of Justice, and two members of the Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Karelia (“the Electoral Commission”). At that time they did not report any irregularities in the conduct of the regional party conference.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '16.\xa0\xa0On 16 August 2006 the applicant party submitted documents to the Electoral Commission in order to participate in the forthcoming election. On 21 August 2006 it paid the requisite deposits (150,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of the party list and RUB 60,000 in respect of each of the three single-mandate candidates).',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '17.\xa0\xa0On 17 and 22 August 2006, after reviewing the documents, the Electoral Commission issued Orders nos. 65/343-3 and 66/352-3, by which it registered the applicant party’s three candidates, including the second and third applicants, and the party list.',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'C.\xa0\xa0Proceedings to annul the applicant party’s registration',
         'elements': [{'content': '18.\xa0\xa0On 31 August 2006 the Karelia Directorate of the Federal Registration Service wrote to the Electoral Commission and informed it that the party conference of 12 August 2006 had been based on the participation of registered party members, and not party members in general. It referred to the provisions of the legislation on political parties (see below) which guaranteed equal rights of participation in party activities for all members. It argued that the party could not make a distinction between registered and other party members for the purposes of internal activities. As such, the conference of 12 August 2006 had been held in breach of the applicable legislation.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '19.\xa0\xa0On 8 September 2006 the Electoral Commission applied to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Karelia (hereinafter the Karelia Supreme Court) to annul its own decision to register the party list and single-mandate candidates. Referring to the letter of 31 August 2006, the Commission referred to the provision of the Basic Guarantees Act allowing the judicial annulment of the registration of individual candidates and party lists where “new facts” had come to light showing a violation of federal or regional law regulating the nomination of candidates.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '20.\xa0\xa0In the meantime, on 11 September 2006 the Electoral Commission wrote to the head of the Federal Registration Service and informed him of the application lodged with the court. It also enquired which version of the charter should be applicable to the party conference of 12 August 2006 since the party had submitted the 2004 version to the Commission.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '21.\xa0\xa0On 12 September 2006 the Federal Registration Service replied to the Electoral Commission that the new charter had been registered by that service on 27 July 2006 and that on the same day the old version of the document had ceased to be valid. The regional party should therefore have submitted the new version as the one applicable to their conference of 12\xa0August 2006. At the same time, the Service stated that in June 2006 Yabloko had received a warning from it in connection with its differentiating between registered and other party members, and that the new version of the charter had contained provisions designed to correct that. In view of those considerations, the decision of the regional conference of 12 August 2006, which had been based on the previous version and had taken only registered members into account, could be seen as being in breach of the relevant legislation.',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'D.\xa0\xa0Court decisions',
         'elements': [{'content': '22.\xa0\xa0On 15 September 2006 the Karelia Supreme Court allowed the application of the Electoral Commission and annulled the decisions of 17\xa0and 22 August 2006 to register the applicant party’s list and candidates. It referred to the conclusions of the Federal Registration Service and found that the procedure whereby only registered members had taken part in the decision-making process had contradicted the legislation on elections and on political parties. It also noted that the party had submitted an invalid version of its charter.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '23.\xa0\xa0More specifically, the court concluded that the annulment decision was justified because the participation of a minority of the party’s regional membership in the nomination process had thwarted “the will of the majority”, finding as follows:',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '“If one takes a formal approach to the problem it seems that all the requirements governing the nomination of the lists of candidates were observed.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'At the same time the court believes that the procedure for the nomination of the lists of candidates [to the LA] was breached.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'It was established at the court hearing that only so-called ‘registered members of the party’ participated and nominated the lists of candidates [to the LA] at the regional conference.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'What is the difference between ‘registered members of the party’ and ‘unregistered members’? Let us turn to section 7 of the party’s charter...',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'The practice of applying these provisions of the charter in the party’s regional division in the Republic of Karelia is such ... that members of the party determine themselves whether to actively participate in the work of the regional branch of the party or to participate [only] as needed ... Accordingly, they decide whether to register with the regional branch or not. If a party member asks to be registered, one of the local branches, or the regional one, registers him with the [relevant] branch. From that moment the party member obtains the rights provided for by p. 9.1.14 of the charter...',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'It is impossible to agree with applying the party’s charter in such a way. ...',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'Section 8.4 of the [Political Parties Act] states that political parties should provide an equal opportunity for representation in a party’s governing bodies, in election lists and other positions ... Section 23.4 and 5 of the [Political Parties Act] establish that members of political parties take part in its functioning, have rights and bear obligations in line with the charter. Members have the right to elect and be elected to the party’s governing bodies, ... receive information about the party’s activities and the work of its governing bodies. However, this right, under p. 9.1.14 of the [Yabloko] charter, is reserved to a limited number of persons – ‘registered members’ – which in turn breaches the principle of the equality of party members as set out in Section 8.1 of the [Political Parties Act].',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'As a result, while the number of party members in Karelia was 3,824 (1 April 2006), the Conference was attended by 37 delegates who represented 394 registered members (15% of the total number of members). ...',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'A democratic regime is characterised by the wide participation of the population in forming the organs of State authority and a wide spectrum of political rights and freedoms for citizens governed by the rule of law, the protection of the rights and legal interests of citizens and others. One can imagine that those exact same elements should appear in the activities of any democratic party.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation has emphasised the significance of the principle of the mandatory will of the majority, pointing out that ‘...elections as a means of determining the will of the people and forming the corresponding legitimate organs of State authority and local government, on whose behalf they exercise public authority, is based on the priority of the will of the majority of voters taking part in the vote’ (ruling of the Constitutional Court of 5 November 1998...).',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'This principle applies with equal measure to the nomination of lists of candidates to [the legislature], since the basis for forming the representative bodies are the [candidates] nominated by political parties.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'In this specific case the principle of the ‘will of the majority’ was violated.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'In such circumstances, the court believes that the order for submitting electoral lists of candidates to the Karelia LA has been breached.”',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '24.\xa0\xa0The court dismissed the applicant party’s argument that interpreting the law in such a way constituted interference by the State authorities with the party’s internal organisation. The court responded by saying that it had been the conference’s duty to ensure compliance with the applicable legislation.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '25.\xa0\xa0Lastly, the court noted that the party had submitted an invalid version of its charter. As a consequence, the court cancelled the registration orders of 17 and 22 August 2006.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '26.\xa0\xa0The applicant party lodged an appeal against that decision with the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. It stressed that the difference in treatment between registered and other party members could not be regarded as a “newly discovered fact” since it had been based on the party’s charter of 2004, which had been registered with the relevant service. A record of the entire proceedings of the conference had been submitted to the Karelia Registration Service, together with a copy of the charter on which both stages of the conference had been based. The party also pointed out that the Service had had two members present at the conference in August 2006, and therefore should have been fully aware of the procedure applied.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '27.\xa0\xa0On 29 September 2006 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dismissed the applicant party’s appeal, with reasoning that was similar to that of the Karelia Supreme Court.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '28.\xa0\xa0As a result of the annulment order coming into force the applicant party lost its election deposits.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '29.\xa0\xa0On 8 October 2006 elections to the Fourth Legislative Assembly took place. The party list and the single constituency candidates nominated by the applicant party were not present on the ballot. The fourth applicant submitted that she had cast a ballot for the Yabloko party list, but that her choice had not been counted in the election results.',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'E.\xa0\xa0Information about the elections to the Karelia LA',
         'elements': [{'content': '30.\xa0\xa0The Government submitted the following information about the elections which took place on 8 October 2006. Seven parties competed for places in the regional assembly: the Karelia branch of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) (obtained 12.77% of the votes cast), the Party of National Resurrection “People’s Will” (1.58%), the regional branch of the Patriots of Russia party (4.39%), the regional branch of United Russia (38.92%), the regional branch of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) (8.86%), the regional branch of the Russian Party for Life (16.19%) and the regional branch of the Russian Pensioners’ Party (12.06%). The total number of people who voted in the elections was 183,503, or 32.98% of the electorate.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '31.\xa0\xa0The Government also presented information about the subsequent election to the Karelia LA, in which Yabloko candidates had participated. That election took place on 4 December 2011 and had five parties competing. Yabloko obtained 7.13% of the votes and had deputies elected to the LA. A total of 50.03% of voters took part.',
           'elements': []}]}]},
      {'content': 'II.\xa0\xa0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW',
       'elements': [{'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0The Political Parties Act',
         'elements': [{'content': '32.\xa0\xa0The status and activities of political parties were governed by the Political Parties Act (Federal Law no. 95-FZ of 11 July 2001), as in force at the relevant time. Section 8 laid down the basic rules for political party activity and that their functioning should be based on the principles of voluntary participation, equality, self-government, lawfulness and transparency. Political parties were free in the choice of their internal structure, aims, forms and methods of functioning, within the limits of the Act. Their activity was not to breach the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. Political parties were to be transparent, and information about their charters and programmes was to be freely available. Section 8(4) required that political parties should allow equal opportunities for men and women and for Russian nationals of different ethnic backgrounds to be represented in their governing bodies and in the lists of candidates for external posts and positions.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '33.\xa0\xa0Section 21 set requirements for the articles of association (charters) of a political party. Among other requirements, charters were to regulate questions of membership, the rights and obligations of members, the setting up of the party’s governing bodies, and the internal procedure for submitting lists of candidates for elections. They could contain other provisions, which were not to contradict the applicable legislation. The charters and any changes to it had to be registered with the competent State authority.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '34.\xa0\xa0Membership of a political party was to be voluntary and individual. Citizens of the Russian Federation who had attained the age of eighteen could be members of a political party. Admission to membership of a political party was to be decided on the basis of a written application by a citizen of the Russian Federation, in accordance with the procedure set out in the party’s charters. Members of the party were to participate in its work, and had rights and obligations in line with the charters of the party. Members of the party had the right to elect and be elected to its governing bodies, its regional branches and other units, to get information about the work of the party and its governing bodies, and to challenge the actions and decisions of its bodies in line with the party’s charters. A citizen of the Russian Federation was to hold membership of only one political party at once. A member of a political party could be registered in only one regional branch in the region where he was permanently or predominantly resident. Membership of a political party could not be restricted on the grounds of someone’s profession, social group, race, ethnic or religious denomination, nor on the grounds of gender, origin, property status, or place of residence (relevant parts of section 23(1)-(6) and (10) of the Political Parties Act).',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '35.\xa0\xa0A political party’s governing regional bodies were to be re-elected at least every two years (section 24(4)). Management bodies at all levels had to be elected by secret ballot. The election had to be conducted in accordance with the procedure established by the party’s charters and the decision was to be taken by a majority of voting delegates present, members of the regional conference, or members of a permanent collegial governing body. The charters of a party could provide for additional conditions for adopting decisions on the composition of governing bodies and compiling the list of candidates for elections. All other decisions had to be taken in accordance with the party’s charters (relevant parts of section 25(1), (4) and (6)-(8)).',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '36.\xa0\xa0Section 27 set out that a party was obliged to allow officials from the competent authorities to attend its public meetings. The party should inform the relevant electoral commissions in advance when holding conferences where it intended to draw up lists of candidates for elections and to allow them to attend ((1)-(2)).',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0The Basic Guarantees Act',
         'elements': [{'content': '37.\xa0\xa0Elections in general were governed by Federal Law no.\xa067FZ on the basic principles of elections and referendums of 12 June 2002 (the Basic Guarantees Act), as in force at the relevant time. Section 35(2) and (14) stated that political parties had to draw up lists of candidates for elections at their conferences and assemblies, in line with the applicable legislation, in particular the Law on Political Parties. The party submitted a list of candidates for elections to the competent electoral commission, which had three days to approve it.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '38.\xa0\xa0Section 38(24) and (25) provided reasons which would justify a refusal to register candidates. The electoral commission would refuse to register the candidates submitted by a political party if the procedure by which they had been chosen had been in breach of the relevant provisions of the Political Parties Act. An absence of the necessary documents could also be a reason for such a refusal.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '39.\xa0\xa0Section 76(5) empowered the courts to annul the registration of lists of candidates upon requests from the competent electoral commissions if, inter alia, new circumstances had been discovered that could serve as the basis for denying registration under the relevant paragraphs of section 38.',
           'elements': []}]}]},
      {'content': 'III.\xa0\xa0RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS',
       'elements': [{'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Code Of Good Practice in the Field of Political Parties',
         'elements': [{'content': '40.\xa0\xa0The European Commission for Democracy through Law (“the Venice Commission”) has adopted a Code Of Good Practice in the Field of Political Parties (document CDL-AD(2009)002, adopted at its 77th Plenary Session) that reads, in so far as relevant:',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '“III.\xa0\xa0Internal organisation of political parties',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '1.\xa0\xa0Membership', 'elements': []},
          {'content': '...', 'elements': []},
          {'content': '20. Everyone must be free to choose to be a member of a political party or not and to choose which party to join. Whilst this principle is universally acknowledged, it is also very common among European parties that they have specific admission procedures. This serves to secure the necessary congruence between the views of the would-be member and the party. Best practices are those that clearly establish in party statutes the procedures and requirements for joining and which clearly state the criteria to be fulfilled to be members...',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '...', 'elements': []},
          {'content': '24. It is not unusual for parties to establish different forms of involvement of individuals in their activities such as members, recognised sympathisers, collaborators, campaigners, etc. These statuses mark different thresholds of personal commitment. Hence, in order to identify the kind of commitments and to respect personal choices, a good practice is for party statutes to clearly spell out the different rights and duties of each situation. Any person must be able to define freely his or her personal form of relationship with a party...',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '...', 'elements': []},
          {'content': '2.\xa0\xa0Organisation', 'elements': []},
          {'content': '...', 'elements': []},
          {'content': '28. The general principles that inspire this Code also apply to the organisation of a political party. In particular:',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '− Representativeness and receptiveness. Applied within a party, these principles mean that the structure of the party and its procedures should represent the opinion of the members and they should be receptive towards these. Although this commitment may not entail a legally expressed obligation, their breach runs against the basic intuitive concept of democratic organisation.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '− Responsibility and accountability. Organs (both collective and individual) should be held accountable and responsible to party members. Procedures should secure internal (and external) responsibility and rendering account of actions and policies. Although this commitment may not entail a legally expressed obligation, their breach runs against the basic intuitive concept of democratic organisation.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '− Transparency. Parties should make public their statutes and their programme. Publishing financial reports improves transparency and public confidence in political parties. Even though this commitment may not entail a legally expressed obligation, [its] breach runs against the basic intuitive concept of democratic organisation.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '29. The existence of party statutes is a legal requirement for recognising and/or registering them in several countries of the Council of Europe. Statutes must comply with constitutional and legal regulations and reflect the international rules contained in the ECHR. The lack of compliance with party statutes constitutes, in some legal systems, a violation that can be legally challenged in extra-party jurisdictions. To the extent that compliance may be legally required, legal force may be deduced from party statutes.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '30. Party statutes normally regulate the rights and duties of their members, and the organs, organisation and procedures for decision making of the parties. In certain national legal systems, there is a legal requirement that party statutes must establish a procedure for changing them. When this legal requirement is further enriched with the explicit involvement of members aimed at seeking their support through voting procedures, it comes closer to being a paradigm of good practice.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '...', 'elements': []},
          {'content': '32. Wherever required by law, parties must define their national, regional or local organisation in their statutes. Wherever this is not required by law, these specifications contribute to enhance the good governance principles identified above. At each of these levels, bodies involving all members or their representatives, meeting on regular basis, must take the major decisions. Ideally, the supreme body (National congress or assembly) should meet at least once for each legislative term. In the interim periods the governing boards are usually responsible for decision-making. These boards, which are usually made up of members elected by the party membership, must be elected in accordance with the procedures set out in the party statutes.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '33. The procedures for decision-making should be clearly specified in the statutes. When possible (i.e. on the local level), members should take decisions directly; otherwise, decisions should be taken on the basis of democratic delegation.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '34. Party operational procedures should enable the opinions of grassroot members to be heard by party leaders.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '3. Appointment of leaders and candidates for election',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '...', 'elements': []},
          {'content': '35. Whether directly or indirectly, party leaders must be democratically chosen at any given level (local, regional, national and European). This means that members must be able to vote for their selection. Bottom-up practices for the selection of nominees and candidates are a healthy expression of internal democracy which is very positively perceived by citizens.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '36. Equally, whether directly or indirectly, candidates must be democratically chosen for elections at any level (local, regional, national and European).”',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Other relevant documents and opinions',
         'elements': [{'content': '41.\xa0\xa0The Venice Commission also made the following recommendations in its Guidelines and explanatory report on legislation on political parties: some specific issues (document CDL-AD(2004)007rev, adopted at its 58th Plenary Session on 15 April 2004):',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '“B.\xa0\xa0Registration as a necessary step for recognition of an association as a political party, for a party’s participation in general elections or for public financing of a party does not per se amount to a violation of rights protected under Articles 11 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Any requirements in relation to registration, however, must be such as are ‘necessary in a democratic society’ and proportionate to the objective sought to be achieved by the measures in question. Countries applying registration procedures to political parties should refrain from imposing excessive requirements for territorial representation of political parties as well as for minimum membership. The democratic or non-democratic character of the party organization should not in principle be a ground for denying registration of a political party. Registration of political parties should be denied only in cases clearly indicated in the Guidelines on prohibition of political parties and analogous measures, i.e. when the use of violence is advocated or used as a political means to overthrow the democratic constitutional order, thereby undermining the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution. The fact alone that a peaceful change of the Constitution is advocated should not be sufficient for denial of registration.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'C.\xa0\xa0Any activity requirements for political parties, as a prerequisite for maintaining the status as a political party and their control and supervision, have to be assessed by the same yardstick of what is ‘necessary in a democratic society’. Public authorities should refrain from any political or other excessive control over activities of political parties, such as membership, number and frequency of party congresses and meetings, operation of territorial branches and subdivisions.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '...', 'elements': []},
          {'content': 'EXPLANATORY REPORT', 'elements': []},
          {'content': 'b)\xa0\xa0Activity requirements for political parties and their control and supervision',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '...', 'elements': []},
          {'content': '11.\xa0\xa0Similar caution must be applied when it comes to activity requirements for political parties as a prerequisite for maintaining their status as a political party and their control and supervision. Far-reaching autonomy of political parties is a cornerstone of the freedoms of assembly and association and the freedom of expression as protected by the European Convention on Human Rights. ... In particular, control over the statute or statute of a party should be primarily internal, i.e. should be exercised by the members of the party. As regards external control, the members of a party should have access to a court in case they consider that a decision of a party organ violates its statute. In general, judicial control over the parties should be preferred over executive control.”',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '42.\xa0\xa0In their joint Guidelines on Political Party Regulation (document CDL-AD(2010)024, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 84th Plenary Session (Venice, 15-16 October 2010)) OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission recommended:',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '“98. However, as parties contribute to the expression of political opinion and are instruments for the presentation of candidates in elections, some regulation of internal party activities can be considered necessary to ensure the proper functioning of a democratic society. The most commonly accepted regulations are limited to requirements for parties to be transparent concerning their decision making and to seek input from membership when determining party constitutions and candidates.”',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '43.\xa0\xa0The Venice Commission Report on the Participation of Political Parties in Elections (document CDL-AD(2006)025, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 67th plenary session (Venice, 9-10 June 2006))',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '“12. In any case, there are other conditions, derived from the importance of political parties in modern democracies. This implies that the individual right to stand for election may be affected by two different sets of rules: first, by the general rules and requirements adopted by a State to allow parties to run in an election. And, second, by the rules adopted by the parties for nominating their candidates in a given election. The former rules have to be analysed especially with the perspective of pluralism: if, as the European Court of Human Rights has said, “there can be no democracy without pluralism”, the main point is to ascertain that additional requirements imposed on parties are not so heavy that may hurt the expression of social pluralism. The latter rules, which may be fixed by the parties themselves, or imposed by legislation, may affect the idea of intra-party democracy, or to the right of the members of a given (in this case, political) association, to participate in the basic decisions of the association (party).',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '...', 'elements': []},
          {'content': 'b) Procedures adopted by parties for nominating candidates',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '...', 'elements': []},
          {'content': '17. Parties are a specific kind of association. Their status is thus guaranteed under the right of freedom of association, and they can only be subject to restrictions prescribed by law. Therefore, internal party procedures for decision-making should be presided by the principle of self-governing, and in many countries these rules are only set in the Party Statutes. Nevertheless, their relevance for the working of the whole system implies that, as has been previously pointed out, the Constitution or the law may set up some rules, usually requiring parties to respect democratic principles in their internal organisation and working.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '18. However rules may go further: the French Constitution had to be recently reformed to allow the law to impose the principle of equal access of men and women to elective offices, so limiting the free choice of candidates by party organs. In some countries, the Electoral Law contains a procedure of nomination of party candidates, which has logically be respected by the party statutes. This is, for instance, the case in Germany (art. 21) or Ukraine (art. 40). In this respect, it could be asked what is the scope of autonomy and self-governing that should be respected by the law or, in other words, what degree of external –and general constraints are compatible with the very idea of free association. In any case, it seems that the very respect of the democratic principle should suffice to exclude any possibility of changing the order of candidates within a list after voters have cast their ballots, as for instance seems to be possible in some specific countries.”',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '44.\xa0\xa0Another Venice Commission document, Report on the Method of Nomination of Candidates within Political Parties (document CDLD(2015)020, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 103rd Plenary Session (Venice, 19-20 June 2015)), says, where relevant:',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '“5. In contemporary democracies, two main principles are central to the internal functioning of political parties. The first one is the principle of party autonomy, under which political parties are granted associational autonomy in their internal and external functioning. According to this principle, political parties should be free to establish their own organisation and the rules for selecting party leaders and candidates, since this is regarded as integral to the concept of associational autonomy. The second element is the principle of internal democracy, the argument being that because political parties are essential for political participation, they should respect democratic requirements within their internal organisation.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '6. There can be tensions between the principle of party autonomy on the one hand and the principle requiring internal democracy on the other. It is not surprising that the influence of each principle differs in each system. ... What system prevails in a particular country is basically shaped by its history and current circumstances. Much also depends on more detailed specification of the two principal factors set out above and the weight attached to them. Thus, it cannot be assumed that attachment to the principle of associational autonomy precludes per se any regulation of internal party procedure, since such a conclusion is dependent on contestable normative assumptions as to the degree of autonomy that flows from freedom of association. The same is true in relation to the principle of democracy. It is not self-evident what demands flow from attachment to this principle without further inquiry as to the more particular precepts that constitute the democratic principle and the way in which they might be applicable to the nomination of candidates by political parties. ...',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'II. Regulating political parties: the state of the art',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '...', 'elements': []},
          {'content': '11. The European Court of Human Rights has held in its case-law that political parties are a form of association essential to the proper functioning of democracy and that, in view of the importance of democracy in the European Convention on Human Rights system, an association, including a political party, is not excluded from the protection afforded by the Convention.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '12. The Venice Commission Guidelines on Political Party Regulation view political parties as private associations that play a critical role as political actors in the public sphere. Although the document considers that “some regulation of internal party activities can be considered necessary to ensure the proper functioning of a democratic society”, such legislation must be “well–crafted and narrowly tailored” in order not to interfere with the freedom of association. However, the Guidelines recognise that:',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '“As parties contribute to the expression of political opinion and are instruments for the presentation of candidates in elections, some regulation of internal party activities can be considered necessary to ensure the proper functioning of a democratic society. The most commonly accepted regulations are limited to requirements for parties to be transparent concerning their decision making and to seek input from membership when determining party constitutions and candidates”.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '...', 'elements': []},
          {'content': '26. The requirements for candidate nomination are, in most cases, not specifically stated in the laws on political parties. However, they can be deduced from the general rules stated by the legislation on party organisation and proceedings and from the principles that the constitution proclaims, such as the principle of internal democracy, non-discrimination and the recognition of universal suffrage. In other cases, the requirements are stated in the electoral law...',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'C.\xa0\xa0Requirements concerning party members’ rights',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '...', 'elements': []},
          {'content': '38. Finally, the party members’ rights recognised by the laws are also applicable to the nomination procedure; rights such as equality, the right to participate in the activities and organs of the party, the right to vote and the right to run for party offices. ...',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '39. Some of the laws analysed above establish several requirements for internal democracy. In general, laws on political parties are quite respectful of their freedom. For this reason, these laws refer to the statutes of political parties in order to set out in detail the principles and requirements established by the laws themselves.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '...', 'elements': []},
          {'content': 'VI. Conclusions:', 'elements': []},
          {'content': '...', 'elements': []},
          {'content': '81. The possibility of adopting legal measures to foster respect for democratic principles in the selection of candidates is consistent with international standards and principles stated by the Venice Commission. However, legal intervention in the selection of candidates is not always required or suitable. On the one hand, long-established democracies with deep-rooted political parties favour associational freedom, since internal democracy is guaranteed by the political parties themselves. On the other hand, state interference in the selection of candidates in new or transitional democracies might jeopardise political pluralism. There is an increased risk where legal intervention constitutes an imposition of the majority over the minority.”',
           'elements': []}]}]}],
     'section_name': 'facts'},
    {'content': 'THE LAW',
     'elements': [{'content': 'I.\xa0\xa0THE GOVERNMENT’S OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE SECOND APPLICANT’S COMPLAINT',
       'elements': [{'content': '45.\xa0\xa0The Government noted that the second applicant (Mrs Petelyayeva) had failed to submit a valid power of attorney to authorise Mr Holiner to represent her before the Court. They argued that this situation should be considered by the Court as a ground to declare her application inadmissible.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '.\xa0\xa0On 23 April 2013 Mr Holiner informed the Court that he had been unable to obtain a power of attorney from the second applicant.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '47.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that where applicants choose to be represented under Rule 36 § 1 of the Rules of Court rather than lodging the application themselves, Rule 45 § 3 requires them to produce a written authority to act, duly signed. It is essential for representatives to demonstrate that they have received specific and explicit instructions from the alleged victim within the meaning of Article 34 on whose behalf they purport to act before the Court (see N. and M. v. Russia (dec.), nos. 39496/14 and 39727/14, § 53, 26 April 2016; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v.\xa0Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 102, ECHR 2014; and Post v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 21727/08, 20 January 2009). What is important for the Court is that the written authority to act should clearly indicate that the applicant has entrusted his or her representation before the Court to a representative and that the representative has accepted that commission (see Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765/09, § 53, ECHR 2012, and Ryabov v. Russia, no. 3896/04, § 40, 31 January 2008). Failure to do so would result in a finding that the complaint is inadmissible for want of an “applicant” for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention (see N.Z. v.\xa0Croatia (dec.), no.\xa02140/13, 2 June 2015).',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '48.\xa0\xa0In the present case, the second applicant has never been in contact with the Court directly and the application was lodged through her alleged representative, Mr Holiner. Despite reminders to do so, no written authority from her has been submitted to the Court and the application form was not signed. Consequently, the application lodged on behalf of the second applicant must be rejected for being incompatible ratione personae, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.',
         'elements': []}]},
      {'content': 'II.\xa0\xa0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION',
       'elements': [{'content': '49.\xa0\xa0The applicants complained under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the annulment order had arbitrarily excluded them from participation in the election to the Karelia LA, and frustrated the free expression of the opinion of the fourth applicant in her choice of a representative legislature. The Article reads as follows:',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '“The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.”',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '50.\xa0\xa0The Government contested that argument.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Admissibility',
         'elements': [{'content': '51.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Merits',
         'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0The first and third applicants',
           'elements': [{'content': '52.\xa0\xa0The first applicant (the Yabloko Karelia branch) and the third applicant complained that the disqualification of the party list and the individual candidates approved by the regional conference on 12 August 2006 and accepted by the Registration Service on 17 and 22 August 2006 had constituted a breach of the right to free elections. They put forward the following arguments.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '53.\xa0\xa0Firstly, they disputed the suggestion that that the reasons advanced by the Karelia branch of the Federal Registration Service and accepted by the Karelia Electoral Commission and the courts, had constituted “newly discovered circumstances”. The fact that the delegates for the regional party conference held on 12 August 2006 had been elected by only registered party members and that an amended version of the party charter had entered into force on 9 August 2006 had been known to the Federal Registration Service. Both the 2004 and the 2006 versions of the party charter, deposited with the registration bodies, conferred the right on members to participate in internal decision-making by voting from the moment of their registration with one of the local branches. They stated that there was “no reasonable basis to contend that the [Electoral] Commission did not know or could not have known that the delegates to the applicant party’s regional conference had been elected only by those members who had registered to exercise their right to vote under the applicant party’s charter”. As to the registration of the new charter, the applicants stressed that it had been duly registered with the relevant bodies in August 2006, and thus could not have been regarded in September 2006 as a newly discovered fact. In any event, no provisions of either the old or new version had been breached by the procedure in question.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '54.\xa0\xa0Secondly, in so far as the authorities argued that the very procedure under which the candidates had been selected was contrary to the relevant legislation, the applicants submitted that neither the party’s charter nor the practice in question had been in breach of any provisions of the legislation relied upon. Section 8(4) of the Political Parties Act mandated equal opportunities for members, independent of their gender and ethnic background. The right of all members to be registered with the party’s local branches had been guaranteed by the charter and thus the provision allowing members to do so was of a merely procedural character, creating no substantive distinction between members. The remaining legal acts cited had no bearing on the procedure in question.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '55.\xa0\xa0Next, the applicants stressed that no member of the party had ever raised any complaints or challenges to the procedure for electing governing bodies or selecting candidates. The applicants noted that the Government had referred to two complaints lodged with the Electoral Commission by two candidates from the United Russia party. They argued that that supported their suspicion of discrimination against the opposition in favour of the competing ruling party candidates.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '56.\xa0\xa0Summing up their complaints, the two applicants argued that the cancellation of the registration of the applicant party’s candidates’ list had been outside the wide margin of appreciation accorded to States in electoral matters. That measure had been not only “wholly without merit as a matter of domestic law, but ... also appeared to have pursued the illegitimate aim of restricting voter choice at the polls in favour of the ruling party”. They described the authorities’ reference to the submission of the wrong version of the charter with the candidates’ list as a “sanction ... wholly out of proportion to any professed legitimate aim.” They stressed that a new version of the charter had been submitted to the authorities by the time of the hearing at the Karelia Supreme Court and that, in any event, no provision of the new charter had been breached by the proceedings in question (the applicants relied, mutatis mutandis, on the Court’s judgments in The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria, no.\xa059491/00, §§ 67-68, 19 January 2006, and Tsonev v. Bulgaria, no.\xa045963/99, § 55, 13 April 2006).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '57.\xa0\xa0The Government stated that the elections of 8 October 2006 to the Karelia LA had been free, carried out by secret ballot and had respected the free expression of the voters’ will. The dismissal of the applicant party’s list of candidates had been carried out by a court, and had been based on serious breaches of electoral legislation by the applicant party.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '58.\xa0\xa0Firstly, the applicant party had submitted an invalid version of its charter to the Karelia Electoral Commission. That fact had been discovered on 7 September 2006 and had been considered by the Karelia Supreme Court as constituting a newly discovered fact which had justified cancelling the registration of the list of candidates, in line with section 38(24) of the Basic Guarantees Act (and the corresponding provisions of Karelia’s regional legislation). The Government further explained that the Electoral Commission had not been tasked with checking the validity of the documents submitted, but that it had been the regional department of the Federal Registration Service that had drawn its attention to the problem in their letter of 31 August 2006 (received by the Electoral Commission on 4\xa0September 2006).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '59.\xa0\xa0As a separate breach of electoral legislation committed by the applicant party, the Government pointed to the procedure for nominating delegates for the regional party conference and compiling the list of candidates at that meeting. Referring to section 38(25) of the Basic Guarantees Act and sections 8(4), 21(2) and 23(4) and (5) of the Political Parties Act (and the corresponding provisions of the Karelia regional legislation), the Government submitted that the applicable legislation did not allow for a distinction to be made between members of the party on the basis of their “registration” with one of the local branches. Such an approach violated the principle of the equality of party members. The Government stated that the Yabloko party charter, before it had been changed in August 2006 had not per se contained such a violation. However, the practice followed by the applicant party in Karelia in the process of convening the party conference and compiling the list of candidates had infringed the rights of the majority of the regional party’s members. In the Government’s view, over 87% of the regional party’s members had not taken part in the procedure. The conference of 12 August 2006 had been carried out with several violations of the applicable legislation.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '60.\xa0\xa0Pointing to section 38(25)(a) of the Basic Guarantees Act, the Government noted that failure to comply with the provisions of the Law on Political Parties in the course of drawing up lists of candidates constituted a valid ground to dismiss such a list and, in the case of newly discovered facts constituting such an infraction, to annul previously taken registration decisions. The Government referred to complaints lodged by two candidates who had been registered to run in the two constituencies where the second and the third candidates had also been registered.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '61.\xa0\xa0It also stated that the newly discovered fact which had justified the cancellation of the applicants’ registration for the election had been the Karelia Supreme Court’s judgment of 15 September 2006, as upheld on appeal on 29 September 2006 by the Karelia Supreme Court. The courts had established two reasons for the cancellation: (i) breaches of section 8(1) and\xa0(4) and section 23(4) and (5) of the Law on Political Parties by the manner in which the regional party assembly had been formed through the participation of only 15% of the regional party’s members; and (ii) the submission of the invalid version of the party charter to the Karelia Electoral Commission, which had become known to the competent authorities only on 4 September 2006.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '62.\xa0\xa0In addition to the arguments made by the courts in that respect, the Government also relied on the provisions of the Law On Public Associations (No. 82-FZ of 19 May 1995, as in force at the relevant time), concerning non-profit NGOs, which provided that the physical individuals and legal entities constituting a public association should enjoy equal rights and obligations and have the right to elect and be elected to the association’s governing bodies in line with its charter. They further pointed to other provisions of the Law on Political Parties, which in its preamble guaranteed the equality of political parties before the law and which in section 32(1)(c) obliged the State authorities to ensure them equality when participating in elections and referendums. The Basic Guarantees Act, in sections 3 and 5, stated that the equality of all the citizens of the Russian Federation was one of the principles of elections.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '63.\xa0\xa0As to the presence of Electoral Commission officials at the regional party conference in August 2006, the Government submitted that their attendance had been based on the relevant legislative provisions and had not brought about any immediate legal consequences, for example by influencing the decision-making process or its outcome.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '64.\xa0\xa0The Government also referred to the Venice Commission’s documents CDL-AD(2004)007rev and CDL-AD(2006)025 (see paragraphs 41 and 43 above). Those documents stated that the principles of necessity in a democratic society guided the procedure for registering political parties and that legislation on the nomination of candidates for election within parties could require ensuring democratic principles within them. They then noted the Court’s position in respect of the regulatory regime governing the creation of political parties (the Government cited The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden – PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), nos. 41561/07 and 20972/08, § 72, 18 October 2011, with further references). In the case at hand, they argued, the decision to cancel the registration of the list of candidates had pursued aims that were compatible with the principle of the rule of law and the general objectives of the Convention, in particular the protection of democracy (they cited Etxeberria and Others v. Spain, nos.\xa035579/03, 35613/03, 35626/03 and 35634/03, § 52, 30 June 2009). The restriction had also been proportionate since the measure in question had not been as far-reaching as the dissolution of the political party in question and it had been open to the applicant party to re-apply for registration, provided that it complied with all the formal requirements of the law (the Government referred to The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden – PIRIN and Others, cited above, § 94).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '65.\xa0\xa0To start with, the Court reiterates that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention differs from other rights guaranteed by the Convention and its Protocols as it is phrased in terms of the obligation of the High Contracting Party to hold elections which ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people, rather than in terms of a particular right or freedom. However, having regard to the preparatory work to Article 3 of Protocol No.\xa01 to the Convention and the interpretation of the provision in the context of the Convention as a whole, the Court has established that this provision also implies individual rights, including the right to vote and to stand for election (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, §§ 46-51, Series A no. 113, and Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no.\xa058278/00, § 102, ECHR 2006-IV).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '.\xa0\xa0The words “free expression of the opinion of the people” mean that elections cannot be conducted under any form of pressure in the choice of one or more candidates, and that in this choice the elector must not be unduly induced to vote for one party or another. The word “choice” means that the different political parties must be ensured a reasonable opportunity to present their candidates at elections (see Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey [GC], no. 10226/03, § 108, ECHR 2008). The Court reiterates that, under its case-law, the notion of “individual rights” to stand for election under Article\xa03 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention is applicable to the party, independently of its candidates, where it presents a list in order to participate in the elections (see Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, no.\xa09103/04, §§ 72-74, ECHR 2008).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '67.\xa0\xa0As noted in the Preamble to the Convention, the rights guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention are crucial to establishing and maintaining the foundations of an effective and meaningful democracy governed by the rule of law. Nonetheless, these rights are not absolute. There is room for “implied limitations”, and Contracting States must be given a margin of appreciation in this sphere. The Court reaffirms that the margin in this area is wide (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52; Podkolzina v. Latvia, no. 46726/99, § 33, ECHR 2002-II; and Yumak and Sadak, cited above, § 109 (ii)). There are numerous ways of organising and running electoral systems and a wealth of differences, inter alia, in historical development, cultural diversity and political thought within Europe, which it is for each Contracting State to mould into its own democratic vision (see Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], no.\xa074025/01, § 61, ECHR 2005IX, and Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) [GC], no.\xa0126/05, § 83, 22 May 2012).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '68.\xa0\xa0The concept of “implied limitations” under Article 3 of Protocol No.\xa01 to the Convention is of major importance for the determination of the relevance of the aims pursued by restrictions on the rights guaranteed by this provision. Given that Article 3 of Protocol No.\xa01 to the Convention is not limited by a specific list of “legitimate aims” such as those enumerated in Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention, the Contracting States are therefore free to rely on an aim not contained in that list to justify a restriction, provided that the compatibility of that aim with the principle of the rule of law and the general objectives of the Convention is proved in the particular circumstances of a case. It also means that the Court does not apply the traditional tests of “necessity” or “pressing social need” which are used in the context of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. In examining compliance with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the Court has focused mainly on two criteria: whether there has been arbitrariness or a lack of proportionality, and whether the restriction has interfered with the free expression of the opinion of the people (see Yumak and Sadak, cited above, §\xa0109 (iii), and Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece [GC], no.\xa042202/07, §§ 63-64, ECHR 2012).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '.\xa0\xa0It is, however, for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention have been complied with. It has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, loc. cit.). In particular, any conditions imposed must not thwart the free expression of the people in the choice of the legislature – in other words, they must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage (see Hirst, cited above, § 62; Yumak and Sadak, cited above, § 109 (iv); and Scoppola, cited above, § 84).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '70.\xa0\xa0The Court has also emphasised that it is important for the authorities in charge of electoral administration to function in a transparent manner and to maintain impartiality and independence from political manipulation (see Georgian Labour Party, cited above, § 101) and that their decisions must be sufficiently reasoned (see Namat Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 18705/06, §§\xa08190, 8 April 2010).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '71.\xa0\xa0The Court has also confirmed on a number of occasions the essential role played in a democratic regime by political parties enjoying the rights and freedoms enshrined in Article 11 and also in Article 10 of the Convention. Political parties are a form of association essential to the proper functioning of democracy. In view of the role played by political parties, any measure taken against them affects both freedom of association and, consequently, democracy in the State concerned (see Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, §\xa087, ECHR 2003II, and United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, § 25, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998I). At the same time, the Court accepts that, in certain cases, the States’ margin of appreciation may include a right to interfere – subject to the condition of proportionality – with an association’s internal organisation and functioning in the event of non-compliance with reasonable legal formalities applying to its establishment, functioning or internal organisational structure (see, for example, Ertan and Others v.\xa0Turkey (dec.), no. 57898/00, 21 March 2006) or in the event of a serious and prolonged internal conflict within the association (see Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and Others v.\xa0Bulgaria, nos. 412/03 and 35677/04, § 131, 22 January 2009).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '72.\xa0\xa0The first and third applicants’ arguments can be summed up as follows: (i) no new facts were discovered after the decisions of the Electoral Commission of 17 and 22 August 2006 that could warrant their revision; (ii) the procedure for the selection of candidates was not in breach of any legal provisions; and (iii) the sanction of cancelling the decisions to register candidates was out of proportion to the breaches alleged.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '73.\xa0\xa0The Government disputed each of those arguments.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '74.\xa0\xa0The Court first observes that cancelling the registration of the party list and its individual candidates constituted a restriction of the first and third applicants’ rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. As to the aim of that restriction, the Court must ensure its compatibility with the principle of the rule of law and the general objectives of the Convention in the particular circumstances of the case (see paragraph 68 above).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '75.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that, unlike other provisions of the Convention, such as Article 5, Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention, or Article 1 of Protocol No.\xa01 to the Convention, the text of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention does not contain an express reference to the “lawfulness” of any measures taken by the State. However, the rule of law, one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society, is inherent in all the Articles of the Convention and its Protocols (see, among many other authorities, Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, § 50, Reports 1996III). This principle entails a duty on the part of the State to put in place a framework of legislation and, as appropriate, subordinate legislation, for securing its obligations under the Convention in general and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in particular. The interpretation of this legislative framework by the competent national authorities – in the first place, the courts – should not be arbitrary or marked by a lack of proportionality; such decisions must be sufficiently reasoned (see paragraphs 68 in fine and 70 above).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '76.\xa0\xa0The first and third applicants’ registration to run for elections was cancelled by the Karelia Supreme Court’s judgment of 15 September 2006 (upheld by the Supreme Court). The judgment was based on two main propositions. First, the Karelia Supreme Court concluded that the procedure for the selection of candidates for the regional party’s assembly had violated the ground rules of democratic representation and majority rule, and second, that the party had submitted invalid version of its charter. Concerning the first conclusion, the Karelia Supreme Court could not rely directly on any provision of domestic legislation since the domestic legislation did not govern internal party procedures to such an extent. Rather, it interpreted the provisions of the Political Parties Act and the Basic Guarantees Act as seen in their entirety. It applied the general principles of electoral legislation, such as the characteristics of a democratic regime, the will of the majority and the general principles of elections, to an internal party procedure. That procedure had conferred the right to participate in the selection of the party’s governing bodies only to those members who had chosen to register with the local bodies (see paragraph 24 above). Even though the court acknowledged that the practice had been based on the party’s charter, which had provided for similar rules in both the 2004 and 2006 versions, it failed to respond to the party’s argument that that fact could not be considered a new fact since the procedure had been known to the Electoral Commission on 17 and 22 August 2006, when it had ruled to register the lists. The Court agrees that such an interpretation of the law, both in respect of the contents of the applicable legislation and whether new facts had arisen, did not appear to be foreseeable.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '77.\xa0\xa0Moreover, such an interpretation directly affected the internal organisation of the applicant party and thus interfered with its autonomy. The Court has previously held in cases brought under Article 11 of the Convention that State authorities should not interfere with associations’ internal matters too much: it should be up to an association itself to determine the manner in which its conferences are organised. Likewise, it should primarily be up to the association itself and its members, and not the public authorities, to ensure that detailed formalities are observed in the manner specified in its articles of association (see Tebieti Mühafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov v. Azerbaijan, no. 37083/03, §\xa078, ECHR 2009, and Republican Party of Russia v. Russia, no. 12976/07, § 88, 12 April 2011).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '78.\xa0\xa0Having said that, the Court does not question the obligation per se for political parties to comply with existing legislative requirements for their internal organisation and the selection of candidates for elections. Nor does it question the corresponding powers of the authorities – in the present case, the competent electoral commissions – to ensure such compliance in practice (see the relevant provisions of the Basic Guarantees Act, cited above in paragraphs 38-40). The existence and enforcement of such requirements are not incompatible with the State’s obligations under the Convention and the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in setting the “implied limitations”, determined by their “own democratic vision” (see the case-law cited above in paragraph 67). The question that remains is where the boundaries of those limitations lie, so that they do not become arbitrary and disproportionate.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '79.\xa0\xa0Helpful guidance can be obtained from the research codified by the Venice Commission, an expert body in matters of democratic governance (see, on the interpretative role of non-binding Council of Europe instruments, Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97, §§ 74-75, ECHR 2008; and Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos, cited above, § 71). The Commission acknowledges a certain dichotomy between the principles of party autonomy and that of internal democracy within the parties (see paragraph 5 of the Report on the Method of Nomination of Candidates within Political Parties, cited above in paragraph 44). The Guidelines on Political Party Regulation set the limit for State interference with the internal party activities as “the requirements for parties to be transparent concerning their decision-making and to seek input from membership when determining party constitutions and candidates” (see paragraph 98 of the Guidelines on Political Party Regulation, cited above in paragraph 42). In its other documents, the Venice Commission recognises the difficulties of regulating questions of internal party democracy too closely (see, for example, paragraph 6 of the Report on the Method of Nomination of Candidates within Political Parties, paragraph 44 above). Nevertheless, it is apparent from those documents that the Venice Commission recognises that both “direct and indirect decision-making” are permissible for members of political parties in issues of internal organisation and the nomination of candidates for elections, so long as the parties guarantee some form of representation for grass-roots party members, responsibility and accountability towards them and transparency in those procedures (see paragraphs 28, 33 and 35 of the Code of Good Practice in the Field of Political Parties, cited above in paragraph 40). The same Code in paragraph\xa024 speaks of a “not uncommon” practice to establish “different forms of involvement of individuals in [parties’] activities such as members, recognised sympathisers, collaborators, campaigners etc.,” and accepts it, as long as the party charter clearly spells out the rights and duties of each situation (ibid.).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '80.\xa0\xa0Concerning this second argument of the Karelia Supreme Court, that the party had relied on an invalid version of its charter, the Court notes that in the present case the difference in the rights and obligations between members and registered members in so far as it concerned their participation in the party’s internal organisation and the nomination of candidates for elections was clearly spelled out in the applicant party’s charter, both in its 2004 and 2006 versions (see paragraph 11 above). The procedure was sufficiently transparent to ensure that every party member could determine the scope of his or her participation in its work by choosing whether or not to register with the local offices. The party charter was applicable at the time of the selection procedure; the applicant party has been registered with the Karelia Registration Service since 2002 and both versions of the charter had been deposited with and accepted by the Federal Registration Authority (see paragraphs 7, 9, 11, 13 and 21 above). Lastly, no complaints have been made by members of the party, and the authorities acted upon their own initiative (compare with Republican Party of Russia, cited above, § 88). As a consequence, taking into account the similar regulations in both versions of the charter of the rules of candidates’ nomination, as well as the fact that the new version had been known to the authorities before the submission of the relevant documents to the Electoral Commission, the decision to annul the Party list of candidates and the individual candidacies for a formalistic reason appears clearly disproportionate.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '81.\xa0\xa0Summing up the above arguments, the Court finds that the decision of the Karelia Supreme Court to annul the lists of candidates, as confirmed by the Supreme Court, resulted in an unforeseeable interpretation of the applicable law, both as regards the alleged breach of the legislation in question and the reference to a newly discovered fact. Moreover, it interfered disproportionately with the party’s own internal organisation, which followed the principles of transparency and representation, and resulted in its inability to participate in the regional elections. In those circumstances, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in respect of the first and third applicants by the authorities’ decision to annul the lists of candidates.',
             'elements': []}]},
          {'content': '2.\xa0\xa0The fourth applicant',
           'elements': [{'content': '82.\xa0\xa0The fourth applicant submitted that “the free expression of the opinion of the people is inconceivable without the participation of a plurality of political parties representing the different shades of opinion to be found within a country’s population, and therefore regard must be had to the broader context in which the right to vote is exercised” (citing the Russian Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs and Others v. Russia, nos. \xa055066/00 and 55638/00, § 79, 11 January 2007). She pointed to the significant level of support for the applicant party (one poll result had placed Yabloko second after United Russia, with 14% of respondents intending to vote for them) and the absence of any other genuine democratic alternative in the election of October 2006. She stressed that the other parties running for elections had either supported President Vladimir Putin or were hard-line communists and nationalists. The removal from the race of Yabloko – one of the strongest regional parties – one month before the elections had made it impossible to have any viable democratic alternative to take its place. The situation had been aggravated by the set-up of the election system which: (i) did not allow voters to add a party or a candidate to the list; (ii) did not permit a vote against all candidates; and (iii) had no requirement for a minimum turnout, so abstention of even a large part of the electorate would have had no impact on the election results. By way of comparison, the applicant pointed to a low turnout in the 2006 elections to the LA and noted that in 2011, when Yabloko had been allowed to run, it had increased significantly (see paragraphs 30 and 31 above).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '83.\xa0\xa0Summing up her arguments, the fourth applicant asked the Court to conclude that, “in the light of the broader context, the removal of the applicant party from the elections, notwithstanding evidence of its strong support among the electorate, as well as a legislative framework that only permitted voting for parties that either supported the ruling regime or which were at the extreme margins of the political spectrum, when all taken together, demonstrate that the Karelian elections of 2006 lacked sufficient conditions to ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people, in breach of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1”.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '84.\xa0\xa0The Government were of the opinion that the fourth applicant had had the possibility to exercise her active right to free elections without any hindrance. The fact that it had not been possible to add new names to the electoral bulletin or to vote against all the candidates could not be regarded as a failure by the State to guarantee free and fair elections, and such requirements were absent in many European countries. The Government observed that the legislation and the Constitutional Court’s practice established that members of the legislature were representatives of the people, and that therefore people who had not voted or had voted for another candidate could not be seen as having been deprived of representation in elected bodies. The Government referred to the position expressed by the Court in the Russian Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs and Others (cited above, §§\xa075-79), essentially emphasising that “the right to vote cannot be construed as laying down a general guarantee that every voter should be able to find on the ballot paper the candidate or the party he had intended to vote for”. Lastly, the Government noted that the fourth applicant had never appealed to any authority about the alleged violation of her right to free elections and had thus failed to take any steps to obtain a remedy for the violations alleged at the national level.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '85.\xa0\xa0As to the general context of the elections, the Government pointed to the fact that seven political parties had taken part in the elections of 2006, and that voters could have chosen to vote for any of them. Voters had also been able to make their ballot invalid, as the fourth applicant stated she had done, by leaving all the lines blank, or by other means. Such a ballot would not have been attributed to any candidate. Subsequent regional elections in 2011 had proven the absence of prejudice towards any party: the applicant party had complied with all the procedural requirements and had successfully competed for mandates in the LA.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '86.\xa0\xa0The Court recalls its findings on a similar complaint in the Russian Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs and Others case (cited above):',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '“75. ... The thrust of [the third applicant’s] grievance was not that his right to vote had been taken away but rather that it had been impossible for him to cast his vote for a party of his choosing – the applicant party – which had been denied registration for the election.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '76. The Court, however, does not consider that an allegedly frustrated voting intention is capable, by itself, of grounding an arguable claim of a violation of the right to vote. It notes, firstly, the obvious problem of laying down a sufficient evidentiary basis for demonstrating the nature and seriousness of such an intention. An intention to vote for a specific party is essentially a thought confined to the forum internum of an individual. Its existence cannot be proved or disproved until and unless it has manifested itself through the act of voting or handing in a blank or spoiled paper (see X v. Austria, Commission decision of 22 March 1972, Yearbook 15, p. 474). Moreover, a voter’s preference is not static but may evolve in time, influenced by political events and electoral campaigning. A sudden and sweeping change in voters’ intentions is a well-documented political and social phenomenon.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '77. The Court reiterates that an individual applicant should be able to claim to be actually affected by the measure of which he complains and that Article 34 may not be used to found an action in the nature of an actio popularis (see, among other authorities, Norris v. Ireland, judgment of 26 October 1988, Series A no. 142, § 30)...',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '78. On a more general level, the Court is mindful of the ramifications of accepting the claim of a frustrated voting intention as an indication of an interference with the right to vote. Such acceptance would confer standing on a virtually unlimited number of individuals to claim that their right to vote had been interfered with solely because they had not voted in accordance with their initial voting intention.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '79. In the light of the above considerations, the Court finds that the right to vote cannot be construed as laying down a general guarantee that every voter should be able to find on the ballot paper the candidate or the party he had intended to vote for. It reiterates, nevertheless, that the free expression of the opinion of the people is inconceivable without the participation of a plurality of political parties representing the different shades of opinion to be found within a country’s population (see Federación Nacionalista Canaria v. Spain (dec.), no. 56618/00, ECHR 2001-VI). Accordingly, it must have regard to the broader context in which the right to vote could be exercised by the third applicant.”',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '87.\xa0\xa0For the same reasons as summarised above, the Court confirms the general rule that the absence of a particular party or name on a voting ballot cannot by itself lead to a finding of a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No.\xa01 to the Convention for an allegedly frustrated voter, even where the procedure for the disqualification raises issues under this provision. In other words, a breach of the right to stand for elections for a political party or a candidate does not necessarily result in a violation of the rights of a voter who had intended to cast his ballot for that political actor. A situation such as the fourth applicant complains of could give rise to a finding of a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention only if the restrictions on the free expression of the will of the people had been so serious as to have effectively curbed the very essence of the right in question.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '88.\xa0\xa0It is inevitable that by placing barriers aimed at excluding certain parties or candidates from elections the State limits the range of choices for the voter. However, that in itself does not necessarily lead to a finding of a violation of the provision in question. Given the wide margin of appreciation accorded to the States in moulding their democratic institutions, various restrictions of that kind have been found to be permissible, even though as a result they limited voters’ choice. By means of comparison, the Court has previously rejected complaints about alleged violations of the right to free elections resulting from restrictions on the voting of nationals residing abroad for independent candidates, while in-country nationals could vote both for parties and for independents (see Oran v. Turkey, nos.\xa028881/07 and 37920/07, §§ 66-67, 15 April 2014); refusing to lower the registration criteria for minority parties (see Partei Die Friesen v. Germany, no. 65480/10, § 43, 28 January 2016), or excluding certain candidates on account of their political affiliation or other status (see Ždanoka, cited above).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '89.\xa0\xa0In so far as the fourth applicant claims that the political spectrum of the parties present during the elections of October 2006 was so narrow that it had the effect of denying her the possibility to express her electoral will altogether, the Court notes that the elections were contested by seven parties. They pursued a number of different political programs and enjoyed a varying rate of success among the voters. Without any particularly weighty evidence to the contrary, that appears to be sufficient grounds to accept the view that the applicant had a reasonable possibility to give her vote to one of the political forces present at the elections, or to choose an available means of expressing her dissatisfaction with the choice, as she claimed she did by rendering her ballot paper invalid. The absence of a formal possibility to vote against all candidates or to add candidates to the ballot could also not be seen as an absence of an electoral choice.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '90.\xa0\xa0In those circumstances, the Court finds that there has been no violation of the fourth applicant’s right guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.',
             'elements': []}]}]}]},
      {'content': 'III.\xa0\xa0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 3 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 AND OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION',
       'elements': [{'content': '91.\xa0\xa0The applicants complained of a violation of Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in that they had been discriminated against in comparison with other political parties. They also alleged that the lack of a refund of the electoral deposit constituted a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '92.\xa0\xa0However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. Accordingly, this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.',
         'elements': []}]},
      {'content': 'IV.\xa0\xa0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION',
       'elements': [{'content': '93.\xa0\xa0Article 41 of the Convention provides:',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '94.\xa0\xa0The applicants did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award them any sum on that account.',
         'elements': []}]}],
     'section_name': 'law'},
    {'content': 'FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,',
     'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0Declares the complaints lodged by the first, third and fourth applicants under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '2.\xa0\xa0Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in respect of the first and the third applicants;',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '3.\xa0\xa0Holds that there has been no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in respect of the fourth applicant.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': 'Done in English, and notified in writing on 8 November 2016, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.',
       'elements': []}],
     'section_name': 'conclusion'}]},
  'country': {'alpha2': 'ru', 'name': 'Russian Federation'},
  'decision_body': [{'name': 'Luis López Guerra', 'role': 'president'},
   {'name': 'Helena Jäderblom', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Helen Keller', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Dmitry Dedov', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Branko Lubarda', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Pere Pastor Vilanova', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Georgios A. Serghides', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Stephen Phillips', 'role': 'section registrar'}],
  'decisiondate': '',
  'docname': 'CASE OF YABLOKO RUSSIAN UNITED DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA',
  'doctypebranch': 'CHAMBER',
  'documentcollectionid': ['CASELAW', 'JUDGMENTS', 'CHAMBER', 'ENG'],
  'documents': ['001-168352.docx'],
  'ecli': 'ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1108JUD001886007',
  'externalsources': [],
  'extractedappno': ['18860/07',
   '39496/14',
   '39727/14',
   '47848/08',
   '21727/08',
   '27765/09',
   '3896/04',
   '2140/13',
   '59491/00',
   '45963/99',
   '41561/07',
   '20972/08',
   '35579/03',
   '35613/03',
   '35626/03',
   '35634/03',
   '58278/00',
   '10226/03',
   '9103/04',
   '46726/99',
   '74025/01',
   '126/05',
   '42202/07',
   '18705/06',
   '41340/98',
   '41342/98',
   '41343/98',
   '41344/98',
   '57898/00',
   '412/03',
   '35677/04',
   '37083/03',
   '12976/07',
   '34503/97',
   '55066/00',
   '55638/00',
   '56618/00',
   '28881/07',
   '37920/07',
   '65480/10'],
  'importance': '4',
  'introductiondate': '',
  'issue': [],
  'itemid': '001-168352',
  'judgementdate': '08/11/2016 00:00:00',
  'kpdate': '08/11/2016 00:00:00',
  'kpthesaurus': ['574', '476', '499'],
  'languageisocode': 'ENG',
  'originatingbody': '6',
  'originatingbody_name': 'Third Section',
  'originatingbody_type': 'Court',
  'paragraphs': ['P1-3'],
  'parties': ['YABLOKO RUSSIAN UNITED DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND OTHERS', 'RUSSIA'],
  'rank': '1677.8408203125',
  'representedby': ['HOLINER D. P.'],
  'respondent': 'RUS',
  'respondentOrderEng': '38',
  'scl': [],
  'separateopinion': 'FALSE',
  'sharepointid': '458067',
  'typedescription': '15'},
 {'__articles': '6;6-1',
  '__conclusion': 'Violation of Art. 6-1',
  'applicability': '',
  'application': 'MS WORD',
  'appno': '75567/01',
  'article': ['6'],
  'conclusion': [{'article': '6-1',
    'base_article': '6',
    'element': 'Violation of Art. 6-1',
    'type': 'violation'}],
  'content': {'001-79133.docx': [{'content': 'PROCEDURE',
     'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0The case originated in an application (no. 75567/01) against the  lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Slovenian nationals, Mr Jože Oberwalder, Mr\xa0Jože Oberwalder junior (“jr.”) and Mr Andrej Oberwalder (“the applicants”), on 10 February 2000.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '2.\xa0\xa0The Slovenian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr L. Bembič, State Attorney-General.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '3.\xa0\xa0The applicants alleged inter alia under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the length of the civil proceedings before the domestic courts to which they were a party was excessive.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '4.\xa0\xa0On 24 March 2005 the Court decided to communicate the complaint concerning the length of the second set of proceedings to the Government and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible. Under Article\xa029 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the remaining complaint at the same time as its admissibility.',
       'elements': []}],
     'section_name': 'procedure'},
    {'content': 'THE FACTS',
     'elements': [{'content': '5.\xa0\xa0The applicants were born in 1931, 1959 and 1967 respectively and live in Domžale.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '6.\xa0\xa0The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '7.\xa0\xa0On 8 July 1970 and 11 March 1971 respectively, four plots of land were sold to the Municipality by H.O., the late wife of the first applicant J.O. and the mother of the second and third applicants, J.O. jr. and A.O.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '8.\xa0\xa0On 5 July 1973 and 4 June 1974, respectively, three plots of land were sold to the Municipality by the second applicant (J.O. jr.) and his brother (A.O.), the third applicant.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '9.\xa0\xa0On 23 November 1973 and 10 September 1976 two plots of land were sold to the Municipality by J.O.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '10.\xa0\xa0On 6 May 1992 the applicants lodged a request for the return of nine plots of land with the Domžale Administrative Unit on the basis of the 1991\xa0Denationalisation Act, claiming that they had signed the contracts of sale under duress which was tantamount to expropriation.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '11.\xa0\xa0On 7 June 1993 the Administrative Unit transferred their request to the  (Okrajno sodišče v Domžalah) as the competent authority.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '12.\xa0\xa0On 13 July 1994 a hearing was held. The court requested the applicants to complete their request and submit further documents.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': "13.\xa0\xa0On 28 September and 29 November 1994, 16 February 1995, 23\xa0March, 23 May and 17 July 1995 the court sent a letter to the applicants' lawyer, reiterating its request. The court also informed the new lawyer representing the applicants that it had received no reply.",
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '14.\xa0\xa0On 18 September 1997 the court summoned the applicants to complete their request within 30 days, or else it would reject it or consider it withdrawn.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '15.\xa0\xa0On 3 November 1997 the applicants filed the requested document through their representative and enlarged their claim, directing it also against the Slovenian Compensation Corporation (the “SCC”). On 20\xa0January 1998 the latter replied to the applicants.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '16.\xa0\xa0Further to their reply, on 10 December 1998, 11 February and 26\xa0April 1999 the court requested the lawyer to submit further documents.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '17.\xa0\xa0On 14 May 1999 the applicants through their representative filed the requested documents which were forwarded to the SCC. The latter replied on 5 July 1999.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '18.\xa0\xa0On 7 February 2001 the applicants specified the amount of compensation claimed.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': "On 14 February 2001 a hearing was held. Since some of the requested documents were still missing, the applicants' representative obliged himself to reply to the SCC's statements.",
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '19.\xa0\xa0On 20 February 2001 the  filed a reply.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': "On 14 September 2001, further to the court's additional request, the applicants' representative filed submissions.",
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '20.\xa0\xa0On 13 December 2001, after a hearing, the  rejected the claim.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '21.\xa0\xa0On 28 January 2001 the applicants lodged an appeal with the  (Višje sodišče).',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '22.\xa0\xa0On 15 January 2003 the  rejected their appeal. On 6 February 2003 the decision was served on the applicants. That decision became final.',
       'elements': []}],
     'section_name': 'facts'},
    {'content': 'THE LAW',
     'elements': [{'content': 'I.\xa0\xa0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION',
       'elements': [{'content': '23.\xa0\xa0The applicants complained about the excessive length of the civil proceedings. They relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Admissibility',
         'elements': [{'content': '24.\xa0\xa0The Government pleaded non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '25.\xa0\xa0The applicants contested that argument, claiming that the remedies available were not effective.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': "26.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that the present application is similar to the cases of Belinger and Lukenda (see Belinger v. Slovenia (dec.), no. 42320/98, 2\xa0October 2001 and Lukenda v. Slovenia, no. 23032/02, 6 October 2005). In those cases the Court dismissed the Government's objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies because it found that the legal remedies at the applicants' disposal were ineffective. The Court recalls its findings in the Lukenda judgment that the violation of the right to a trial within a reasonable time is a systemic problem resulting from inadequate legislation and inefficiency in the administration of justice.",
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '27.\xa0\xa0As regards the instant case, the Court finds that the Government have not submitted any convincing arguments which would require the Court to distinguish it from its established case-law.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '28.\xa0\xa0The Court further notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. Nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Merits',
         'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0Article 6 § 1',
           'elements': [{'content': "29.\xa0\xa0The period to be taken into consideration began on 28 June 1994, the day when the Convention entered into force with respect to , and ended on 6 February 2003, the day the 's decision was served on the applicants. It therefore lasted about 8 years and 7 months for 2 levels of jurisdiction.",
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '30.\xa0\xa0The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicants in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': "31.\xa0\xa0In the Government's view, the proceedings at stake were rather complex, since denationalisation claims are professionally demanding for a judge. The applicants themselves also contributed to their complexity, course and duration because they belatedly replied to the court's requests to submit the documents. In addition, in 1998 they enlarged their claim. The domestic courts could not be reproached negligence in dealing with the proceedings in question. Moreover, the second-instance judge treated the case with priority. Delays in examining the case occurred primarily for the reasons for which the applicants were responsible. The Government contend that a decision on the restitution of ownership rights is undoubtedly of great importance to the applicants. However, they should have exercised their procedural rights with greater care",
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '32.\xa0\xa0The applicants contested those arguments.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': "33. The Court notes that the period after 28 June 1994, when the Convention entered into force for , until 3 November 1997 when the applicants finally replied to the court's repeated requests is entirely incumbent on the applicants. Similarly, the periods between 10\xa0December\xa01998 and 14 May 1999 and between 14 February and 14\xa0September 2001 are also attributable to the applicants. Therefore, the period which could be attributed to the domestic courts amounts to approximately 4 years and 2 months.",
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '34.\xa0\xa0Nevertheless, having examined all the material submitted to it, and having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable-time” requirement.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '35.\xa0\xa0There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.',
             'elements': []}]}]}]},
      {'content': 'II.\xa0\xa0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION',
       'elements': [{'content': '36.\xa0\xa0Article 41 of the Convention provides:',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Damage',
         'elements': [{'content': "37.\xa0\xa0The applicants claimed non-pecuniary damage for the suffering sustained in the course of the proceedings, but left the matter to the Court's discretion.",
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '38.\xa0\xa0In addition, they claimed compensation for the material loss amounting to 57,200 DEM, which would be the value of the bonds of the Slovenian Compensation Corporation for the expropriated land, plus the interest, in respect of non-pecuniary damage.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '39.\xa0\xa0The Government contested these claims.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '40.\xa0The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand,\xa0the Court considers that the applicants must have sustained non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards them EUR\xa02,000 under that head.',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Costs and expenses',
         'elements': [{'content': '41.\xa0\xa0The applicants also claimed reimbursement of the costs of their attorney, without specifying the amount.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '42.\xa0\xa0The Government contested their claim.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': "43.\xa0\xa0According to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. Accordingly, in the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicants the sum of EUR 200 for the proceedings before the Court.",
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'C.\xa0\xa0Default interest',
         'elements': [{'content': '44.\xa0\xa0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.',
           'elements': []}]}]}],
     'section_name': 'law'},
    {'content': 'FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY',
     'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0Declares the remainder of the application admissible;',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '2.\xa0\xa0Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '3.\xa0\xa0Holds', 'elements': []},
      {'content': '(a)\xa0\xa0that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\xa044\xa0§\xa02 of the Convention, EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 200 (two hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable;',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '(b)\xa0\xa0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': "4.\xa0\xa0Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim for just satisfaction.",
       'elements': []},
      {'content': 'Done in English, and notified in writing on 18 January 2007 pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.',
       'elements': []}],
     'section_name': 'conclusion'}]},
  'country': {'alpha2': 'si', 'name': 'Slovenia'},
  'decision_body': [{'name': 'MrJ. Hedigan', 'role': 'president'},
   {'name': 'MrB.M. Zupančič', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'MrC. Bîrsan', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'MrV. Zagrebelsky', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'MrsA. Gyulumyan', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'MrDavid Thór Björgvinsson', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'MrsI. Ziemele', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Mr V. Berger', 'role': 'section registrar'}],
  'decisiondate': '',
  'docname': 'CASE OF OBERWALDER v. SLOVENIA',
  'doctypebranch': 'CHAMBER',
  'documentcollectionid': ['CASELAW', 'JUDGMENTS', 'CHAMBER', 'ENG'],
  'documents': ['001-79133.docx'],
  'ecli': 'ECLI:CE:ECHR:2007:0118JUD007556701',
  'externalsources': [],
  'extractedappno': ['75567/01', '42320/98', '23032/02', '30979/96'],
  'importance': '4',
  'introductiondate': '',
  'issue': [],
  'itemid': '001-79133',
  'judgementdate': '18/01/2007 00:00:00',
  'kpdate': '18/01/2007 00:00:00',
  'kpthesaurus': ['445'],
  'languageisocode': 'ENG',
  'originatingbody': '6',
  'originatingbody_name': 'Third Section',
  'originatingbody_type': 'Court',
  'paragraphs': ['6', '6-1'],
  'parties': ['OBERWALDER', 'SLOVENIA'],
  'rank': '571.727294921875',
  'representedby': ['N/A'],
  'respondent': 'SVN',
  'respondentOrderEng': '43',
  'scl': [],
  'separateopinion': 'FALSE',
  'sharepointid': '340339',
  'typedescription': '15'},
 {'__articles': '5;5-1',
  '__conclusion': 'Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention)',
  'applicability': '',
  'application': 'MS WORD',
  'appno': '50031/11',
  'article': ['5'],
  'conclusion': [{'article': '5',
    'base_article': '5',
    'details': ['Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention'],
    'element': 'Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security',
    'type': 'violation'}],
  'content': {'001-113718.docx': [{'content': 'PROCEDURE',
     'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0The case originated in an application (no. 50031/11) against the  lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Uzbekistani national, Mr Abdusami Abdusamatovich Rakhmonov (“the applicant”), on 10 August 2011.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '2.\xa0\xa0The applicant was represented by Ms R. Magomedova, a lawyer practising in . The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G.\xa0Matyushkin, Representative of the  at the European Court of Human Rights.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '3.\xa0\xa0On 11\xa0August 2011 the President of the First Section, acting upon a request by the applicant of 10\xa0August 2011, decided to apply Rules\xa039 and\xa041 of the Rules of the Court, indicating an interim measure to the Government under which the applicant should not be extradited to Uzbekistan until further notice and granting priority to the application.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '4.\xa0\xa0On 14 November 2011 the application was communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).',
       'elements': []}],
     'section_name': 'procedure'},
    {'content': 'THE FACTS',
     'elements': [{'content': 'I.\xa0\xa0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE',
       'elements': [{'content': '5.\xa0\xa0The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in .',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '6.\xa0\xa0According to the applicant, on 19\xa0July 2010 he arrived in Moscow from  with a view to finding a seasonal job and marrying. He soon learnt that his brothers had been arrested and charged with participation in an extremist religious organisation. He also learnt that he was suspected by the Uzbekistani authorities of having founded an extremist religious organisation himself.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Application for asylum and refugee status',
         'elements': [{'content': '7.\xa0\xa0On 18\xa0October 2010 the applicant lodged a request with the Moscow Division of the Federal Migration Service (the FMS) seeking refugee status in . On 21\xa0January 2011 the FMS refused to grant refugee status to the applicant. The applicant appealed.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '8.\xa0\xa0On 14\xa0April 2011 the FMS quashed the decision of 21\xa0January 2011 and remitted the matter for fresh consideration to its division in .',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '9.\xa0\xa0On 6\xa0July 2011 the FMS refused by a de novo decision to grant the applicant refugee status. The applicant appealed. It appears that the appeal proceedings are still pending.',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Arrest and detention pending extradition',
         'elements': [{'content': '10.\xa0\xa0On 16\xa0September 2010 the Bukhara Town Court of the  ordered the applicant’s arrest pending the criminal investigation against him.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '11.\xa0\xa0On 3\xa0February 2011 the applicant was arrested at the FMS’s office where he had gone to receive the copy of the decision in his case. The  police informed the Uzbekistani authorities of the applicant’s arrest. On the same day they received a copy of the arrest order of 16\xa0September 2010 and documents confirming that the applicant had been put on the wanted persons’ list.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '12.\xa0\xa0On 4\xa0February 2011 the Izmailovskiy District Court of Moscow authorised the applicant’s detention pending extradition. The applicant was also advised of his right to appeal against the extension of his detention within three days of the adoption of the relevant decision. In particular, the court noted as follows:',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '“Having heard the parties to the proceedings, and having studied the extradition materials submitted in respect of [the applicant], the court finds that the [prosecutor’s] request should be granted. The court has established that [the applicant’s] detention is lawful and justified under international treaties and the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure. [The applicant’s] name is on the wanted persons’ list in connection with a crime he committed in the . He has not been recognised as a refugee. Nor have any other circumstances preventing [the applicant’s] extradition been identified.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'The court has received a decision by the  dated 16\xa0September 2010 authorising the [applicant’s] remand in custody which mentions that [the applicant] has absconded.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'Regard being had to the fact that the documents submitted to the court are in compliance with the requirements set forth in the rules of criminal procedure, the court finds that the [prosecutor’s] request should be granted. In view of the evidence submitted (the documents from the Republic of Uzbekistan) confirming that [the applicant] was charged with serious offences ... that his name was on the wanted persons’ list and that he had been remanded in custody, the court believes that if released, [the applicant] might continue his criminal activities or abscond, or otherwise interfere with administration of justice.”',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '13.\xa0\xa0On 5\xa0February 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of 4\xa0February 2011. He addressed it to the Moscow City Court, which received it on 21\xa0February 2011. On 22\xa0February 2011 the City Court forwarded the applicant’s appeal to the District Court for processing. The District Court received the appeal statement on 28\xa0February 2011. On 1\xa0March 2011 the District Court fixed the appeal hearing for 16\xa0March 2011 and informed the applicant and his counsel accordingly.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '14.\xa0\xa0On 11\xa0March 2011 the General Prosecutor’s Office of the  requested the applicant’s extradition.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '15.\xa0\xa0On 16\xa0March 2011 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision of 4\xa0February 2011 on appeal.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '16.\xa0\xa0On 24\xa0March 2011 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 3\xa0August 2011, noting as follows:',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '“[The applicant’s] detention should be extended given that he is charged with [serious offences] committed on the territory of the .',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'These offences ... carry a custodial sentence exceeding one year. [The applicant] is not a refugee. There are no circumstances preventing his extradition [to ].',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'Regard being had to the above, the court finds that the request should be granted given that the information in respect of the [applicant’s] character leads the court to consider that, if released, he might abscond or interfere with the establishment of the truth.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'The court takes into account that the applicant’s remand in custody was lawful and justified. There are no new circumstances in favour of its change or annulment.”',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '17.\xa0\xa0On 3\xa0August 2011 the Izmailovskiy Inter-District Prosecutor ordered the applicant’s release on account of the expiry of the maximum period of detention pending extradition and under his undertaking not to abscond. On the same day he was arrested for his alleged failure to comply with the administrative rules governing residence of foreigners in .',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '18.\xa0\xa0On 17\xa0August 2011 the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian\xa0Federation gave a decision refusing to extradite the applicant to .',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'C.\xa0\xa0Arrest and detention with view to expulsion',
         'elements': [{'content': '19.\xa0\xa0On 5\xa0August 2011 the District Court found the applicant’s stay in  to be in contravention of the Russian Administrative Code and ordered his expulsion. The applicant was to remain in custody pending the execution of the judgment. The applicant appealed.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '20.\xa0\xa0On 14\xa0September 2011 the City Court quashed the decision of 5\xa0August 2011 and ordered the applicant’s release.',
           'elements': []}]}]},
      {'content': 'II.\xa0\xa0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE',
       'elements': [{'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0The Russian Constitution',
         'elements': [{'content': '21.\xa0\xa0The Constitution guarantees the right to liberty (Article 22):',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '“1.\xa0\xa0Everyone has the right to liberty and personal integrity.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '2.\xa0\xa0Arrest, placement in custody and detention are permitted only on the basis of a judicial decision. Prior to a judicial decision, an individual may not be detained for longer than forty-eight hours.”',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0The European Convention on Extradition',
         'elements': [{'content': '22.\xa0\xa0Article 16 of the European Convention on Extradition of 13\xa0December 1957 (CETS no. 024), to which  is a party, provides as follows:',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '“1.\xa0\xa0In case of urgency the competent authorities of the requesting Party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought. The competent authorities of the requested Party shall decide the matter in accordance with its law.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '...', 'elements': []},
          {'content': '4.\xa0\xa0Provisional arrest may be terminated if, within eighteen days of arrest, the requested Party has not received the request for extradition and the documents mentioned in Article 12. It shall not, in any event, exceed forty days from the date of that arrest. The possibility of provisional release at any time is not excluded, but the requested Party shall take any measures which it considers necessary to prevent the escape of the person sought.”',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'C.\xa0\xa0The 1993  Convention',
         'elements': [{'content': '23.\xa0\xa0The CIS Convention on legal aid and legal relations in civil, family and criminal matters (the 1993 Minsk Convention), to which both Russia and  are parties, provides that a request for extradition must be accompanied by a detention order (Article 58 § 2).',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '24.\xa0\xa0A person whose extradition is sought may be arrested before receipt of the request for his or her extradition. In such cases a special request for arrest, containing a reference to the detention order and indicating that a request for extradition will follow, must be sent. A person may also be arrested in the absence of such a request if there are reasons to suspect that he or she has committed, on the territory of the other Contracting Party, an extraditable offence. The other Contracting Party must be immediately informed of the arrest (Article 61).',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '25.\xa0\xa0A person arrested under Article 61 must be released if no request for extradition is received within forty days of the arrest (Article 62 § 1).',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'D.\xa0\xa0The Code of Criminal Procedure (the “CCrP”)',
         'elements': [{'content': '26.\xa0\xa0Chapter 13 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure (“Preventive Measures”) governs the use of preventive measures (меры пресечения), which include, in particular, placement in custody. Custody may be ordered by a court on an application by an investigator or a prosecutor if the person is charged with an offence carrying a sentence of at least two years’ imprisonment, provided that a less restrictive preventive measure cannot be used (Article 108 §§ 1 and 3). The period of detention pending investigation may not exceed two months (Article 109 § 1). A judge may extend that period to six months (Article 109 § 2). Further extensions to twelve months, or in exceptional circumstances eighteen months, may be granted only if the person is charged with serious or particularly serious criminal offences (Article 109 § 3). Beyond eighteen months no extension is permissible and the detainee must be released immediately (Article 109 § 4). The detention order is amenable to appeal within three days following its adoption (Article\xa0108\xa0§\xa011). The statement of appeal must be lodged with the court which delivered the decision subject to appeal (Article\xa0355\xa0§\xa01).',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '27.\xa0\xa0Chapter 54 (“Extradition of a person for criminal prosecution or execution of sentence”) regulates extradition procedures. On receipt of a request for extradition not accompanied by an arrest warrant issued by a foreign court, a prosecutor must decide on the preventive measure to be applied to the person whose extradition is sought. The measure must be applied in accordance with the established procedure (Article 466 § 1). A person who has been granted asylum in  because of possible political persecution in the State seeking his extradition may not be extradited to that State (Article 464 § 1 (2)).',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '28.\xa0\xa0An extradition decision made by the Prosecutor General may be challenged before a court. Issues of guilt or innocence are not within the scope of judicial review, which is limited to an assessment of whether the extradition order was made in accordance with the procedure set out in the relevant international and domestic law (Article 463 §§ 1 and 6).',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'E.\xa0\xa0Ruling no.\xa022 of 29 October 2009 by the Supreme Court of the ',
         'elements': [{'content': '29.\xa0\xa0Ruling No.\xa022, adopted by the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 29 October 2009 (“the directive decision of 29\xa0October 2009”), stated that, pursuant to Article 466 § 1 of the CCrP, only a court could order the placement in custody of a person in respect of whom an extradition request was pending and the authorities of the country requesting extradition had not submitted a court decision to place him or her in custody. The judicial authorisation of placement in custody in that situation was to be carried out in accordance with Article 108 of the CCrP and following a prosecutor’s request to place that person in custody. In deciding to remand a person in custody, a court was to examine if there existed factual and legal grounds for applying that preventive measure. If the extradition request was accompanied by a detention order of a foreign court, a prosecutor could remand the person in custody without a Russian court’s authorisation (Article 466 § 2 of the CCrP) for a period not exceeding two months, and the prosecutor’s decision could be challenged in the courts under Article 125 of the CCrP. In extending a person’s detention with a view to extradition a court was to apply Article 109 of the CCrP.',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'F.\xa0\xa0Ruling no. 245-O-O of 20 March 2008 by the Constitutional Court of the ',
         'elements': [{'content': '30.\xa0\xa0In ruling no.\xa0245-O-O of 20 March 2008, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation noted that it had reiterated on several occasions (rulings nos. 14-P, 4-P, 417-O and 330-O of 13 June 1996, 22 March 2005, 4 December 2003 and 12 July 2005 respectively) that a court, when taking a decision under Articles 100, 108, 109 and 255 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure on the placement of an individual into detention or on the extension of a period of an individual’s detention, was under an obligation, inter alia, to calculate and specify a time-limit for such detention.',
           'elements': []}]}]}],
     'section_name': 'facts'},
    {'content': 'THE LAW',
     'elements': [{'content': 'I.\xa0\xa0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION',
       'elements': [{'content': '31.\xa0\xa0The applicant complained that, because of his religious beliefs, his extradition/expulsion to  would expose him to a real risk of torture and ill-treatment in contravention of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '32.\xa0\xa0The Government contested that argument. With reference to the General Prosecutor’s decision of 17\xa0August 2011 refusing the applicant’s extradition to , they considered that the applicant was not at any risk of ill-treatment.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '33.\xa0\xa0The applicant considered that the Russian authorities had failed to duly consider his claim and that he continued to be exposed to a risk of illtreatment in the event of his extradition or expulsion to .',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '34.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that on 17\xa0August 2011 the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation refused the request for the applicant’s extradition to . It further notes that on 14\xa0September 2011 the City Court quashed the lower court’s decision ordering the applicant’s arrest with a view to expulsion, and ordered his release.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '35.\xa0\xa0It appears that the above-mentioned decisions remain in effect at present, and that the applicant is no longer subject to an extradition or expulsion order which can be executed. Thus, it must be concluded that the factual and legal circumstances which were at the heart of the applicant’s grievance before the Court are no longer operative. Therefore, the Court considers that the applicant is no longer subjected to the risk of removal to  and, accordingly, is no longer at risk of treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '36.\xa0\xa0It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '37.\xa0\xa0The above findings do not prevent the applicant from lodging a new application before the Court and from making use of the available procedures, including the one under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in respect of any new circumstances, in compliance with the requirements of Articles 34 and 35 of the Convention (see Dobrov v. Ukraine (dec.), no.\xa042409/09, 14 June 2011).',
         'elements': []}]},
      {'content': 'II.\xa0\xa0RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT',
       'elements': [{'content': '38.\xa0\xa0The Court considers that the interim measure indicated to the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 3 above) must be lifted.',
         'elements': []}]},
      {'content': 'III.\xa0\xa0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE\xa05\xa0§\xa01 OF THE CONVENTION',
       'elements': [{'content': '39.\xa0\xa0The applicant complained that his remand in custody on 4\xa0February 2011 and the extension of his detention pending extradition on 24\xa0March 2011 had not been lawful. In particular, he submitted that the court order of 4\xa0February 2011 had failed to specify a time-limit for his detention pending extradition, and that the subsequent extension of his detention had not rectified the situation. He relied on Article\xa05\xa0§\xa01\xa0(f), which reads as follows:',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '“1.\xa0\xa0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '...', 'elements': []},
        {'content': '(f)\xa0\xa0the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.”',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '40.\xa0\xa0The Government considered that the applicant’s detention pending extradition had been carried out in strict compliance with the law. The applicant’s detention and its extension had been duly authorised by the court orders of 4\xa0February and 24\xa0March 2011 respectively. The applicant had been represented by counsel and advised of his rights. In their view, initially the applicant had been remanded in custody for two months and his detention had subsequently been extended for another four months, that is, in strict compliance with the procedure prescribed by domestic law, in particular Article\xa0109\xa0§\xa01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As regards the extension of the applicant’s detention on 24\xa0March 2011, the Government pointed out that the applicant had not appealed against the relevant court order and, accordingly, had failed to exhaust the effective domestic remedies, as required by Article\xa035\xa0§\xa01 of the Convention.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '41.\xa0\xa0The applicant maintained that his detention had not been in accordance with the procedure set out in domestic law.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Admissibility',
         'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0Detention from 4\xa0February to 24\xa0March 2011',
           'elements': [{'content': '42.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.',
             'elements': []}]},
          {'content': '2.\xa0\xa0Detention from 24\xa0March to 3\xa0August 2011',
           'elements': [{'content': '43.\xa0\xa0As regards the Government’s argument that the applicant failed to exhaust effective domestic remedies in respect of his detention from 24\xa0March to 3\xa0August 2011, that is, he did not appeal against the court order of 24\xa0March 2011, the Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies obliges those seeking to bring their case against the State before an international judicial or arbitral organ to use first the remedies provided by the national legal system. The rule is based on the assumption that there is an effective remedy available in respect of the alleged breach in the domestic system whether or not the provisions of the Convention are incorporated in national law. In this way, it is an important aspect of the principle that the machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights (see Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, § 48, Series A no.\xa024). At the same time, it is incumbent on the Government claiming nonexhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one available in theory and in practice at the relevant time, that is to say, that it was accessible, capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant’s complaints and offered reasonable prospects of success (see Selmouni v.\xa0France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 76, ECHR 1999-V, and Mifsud v. France (dec.), no. 57220/00, § 15, ECHR 2002-VIII).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '44.\xa0\xa0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that, unlike in some other previous Russian cases concerning detention with a view to extradition (see, for example, Dzhurayev v. , no. 38124/07, §\xa068, 17 December 2009), the applicant’s detention was ordered by a Russian court rather than a foreign court or a non-judicial authority. The applicant was represented by professional counsel whose competence was not questioned by the applicant either in the domestic proceedings or before the Court. Both the applicant and his counsel were advised of the right to appeal against the court order extending the applicant’s detention.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '45.\xa0\xa0The Court also notes that the general procedure governing the lodging and consideration of appeals against detention orders is clearly defined in domestic law and that the applicant did not claim otherwise. The Court further notes that the applicant, indeed, followed the prescribed procedure and appealed against the initial detention order of 4\xa0February 2011. He did not furnish any argument as to why he did not do so in respect of the second detention order of 24\xa0March 2011.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '46.\xa0\xa0Having regard to the above, the Court accepts the Government’s objection that the applicant did not appeal against the court order of 24\xa0March 2011 and therefore did not afford the Russian authorities an opportunity to address the issue and, if appropriate, remedy the situation.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '47.\xa0\xa0It follows that this part of the application must be rejected for nonexhaustion of domestic remedies pursuant to Article\xa035\xa0§§\xa01 and 4 of the Convention.',
             'elements': []}]}]},
        {'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Merits',
         'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0General principles',
           'elements': [{'content': '48.\xa0\xa0The Court reiterates at the outset that Article 5 enshrines a fundamental human right, namely, the protection of the individual against arbitrary interference by the State with his or her right to liberty (see Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, § 76, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI). The text of Article 5 makes it clear that the guarantees it contains apply to “everyone” (see A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\xa03455/05, § 162, ECHR 2009). Sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5 § 1 contain an exhaustive list of permissible grounds on which persons may be deprived of their liberty, and no deprivation of liberty will be lawful unless it falls within one of those grounds (ibid, § 163).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '49.\xa0\xa0The Court also reiterates that the expressions “lawful” and “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” in Article 5 § 1 essentially refer back to national law and state the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules thereof. It is in the first place for the national authorities, and notably the courts, to interpret domestic law, and in particular, rules of a procedural nature (see Toshev v. Bulgaria, no.\xa056308/00, § 58, 10 August 2006). However, the words “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” in Article 5 § 1 do not merely refer back to domestic law; they also relate to the quality of this law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law, a concept inherent in all Articles of the Convention (see Stafford v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 46295/99, §\xa063, ECHR 2002-IV). Quality in this sense implies that where a national law authorises deprivation of liberty, it must be sufficiently accessible and precise, in order to avoid all risk of arbitrariness (see, among others, Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907/98, § 55, ECHR 2001-II).',
             'elements': []}]},
          {'content': '2.\xa0\xa0Application of the principles in the present case',
           'elements': [{'content': '50.\xa0\xa0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that on 4\xa0February 2011 the District Court authorised the applicant’s detention with a view to extradition. Its decision was subject to review by the City Court.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '51.\xa0\xa0The Court accepts that on 4\xa0February 2011 the District Court acted within its powers in deciding to remand the applicant in custody pending extradition proceedings. However, the Court cannot but notice that the District Court failed to indicate a time-limit for the applicant’s detention. The Government argued that a time-limit was indicated implicitly and that the applicant was to be detained for two months, that is, the maximum period of initial placement in custody provided for in Article 109 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court observes that this argument contradicts the interpretation of the relevant national legislation given by the Russian Constitutional Court, which has emphasised on several occasions that the national courts are under an obligation to set a time-limit when ordering an individual’s placement in, or extending the period of, pre-trial detention at any stage of criminal proceedings (see paragraph 30 above). It is therefore clear that, by omitting to specify such a time-limit, the District Court failed to comply with the applicable rules of domestic criminal procedure.',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '52.\xa0\xa0The Court further reiterates that defects in a detention order do not necessarily render the underlying detention as such “unlawful” for the purposes of Article 5 § 1; the Court has to examine whether the flaw in the order against an applicant amounted to a “gross and obvious irregularity” such as to render the underlying period of detention unlawful (see Mooren v.  [GC], no. 11364/03, §\xa084, 9 July 2009, and Kolevi v. Bulgaria, no. 1108/02, § 177, 5 November 2009).',
             'elements': []},
            {'content': '53.\xa0\xa0In the present case, the court order of 4\xa0February 2011 was deficient because of a failure to specify the period during which the applicant’s custodial measure should remain in place. The Court notes the Government’s argument that the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure clearly provides that an initial period of pre-trial detention may not exceed two months. It also takes into account the fact that the applicant did not claim that he had not been aware of that provision. The Court, however, is not persuaded that the maximum time-limit provided for in Article 109 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure should be applied implicitly each time an individual’s placement in custody is authorised by a domestic court. It is true that this period, in itself, does not appear unreasonably long and can be justified by the need for the authorities to ensure the proper conduct of various investigative actions. Nevertheless, the Court notes that the  ruled that the period of one’s detention should be clearly defined by a domestic court, this being an essential guarantee against arbitrariness. With this in mind, the Court considers that the absence of any specific time-limit in the District Court’s decision of 4\xa0February 2011 amounted to a “gross and obvious irregularity” capable of rendering the applicant’s detention pursuant to that order arbitrary and therefore “unlawful” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1. Accordingly, there has been a violation of that provision as regards the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention from 4\xa0February to 24\xa0March 2011.',
             'elements': []}]}]}]},
      {'content': 'IV.\xa0\xa0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5\xa0§\xa04 OF THE CONVENTION',
       'elements': [{'content': '54.\xa0\xa0The applicant complained that he had not been able to obtain a speedy review of his detention pending extradition authorised by the court order of 4\xa0February 2011. He relied on Article 5\xa0§\xa04 of the Convention, which reads as follows:',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '55.\xa0\xa0The Government contested that argument. They submitted that the delay in the appeal proceedings was attributable to the applicant, who had been required to lodge his statement of appeal with the District Court. Instead, he had submitted the statement of appeal to the City Court, which had to forward it to the District Court for processing purposes.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '56.\xa0\xa0The applicant maintained his complaint. In his view, no delay in the appeal proceedings was attributable to him.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Admissibility',
         'elements': [{'content': '57.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Merits',
         'elements': [{'content': '58.\xa0\xa0The Court reiterates that Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, in guaranteeing to persons detained a right to institute proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of their detention, also proclaims their right, following the institution of such proceedings, to a speedy judicial decision concerning the lawfulness of the detention and ordering its termination if it proves unlawful (see Baranowski v. Poland, no. 28358/95, § 68, ECHR 2000-III). The question whether the right to a speedy decision has been respected must be determined in the light of the circumstances of each case (see Rehbock v.\xa0Slovenia, no. 29462/95, § 84, ECHR 2000-XII).',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '59.\xa0\xa0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that on 4\xa0February 2011 the District Court authorised the applicant’s detention with a view to extradition on grounds of the gravity of the charges against him and the danger of his absconding. In the appeal lodged on 5\xa0February 2011 the applicant contested those grounds. In the Court’s opinion, this was a straightforward matter, and it has not been argued by the Government that the case in itself disclosed any complex features.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '60.\xa0\xa0The Court further observes that the appeal hearing took place on 16\xa0March 2011, that is, thirty-nine days after the appeal was lodged. In this connection, the Court takes into account the Government’s argument that the applicant contributed to a certain extent to the length of the appeal proceedings. He sent his statement of appeal to the appeal court while he was required by law to send it to the court of first instance for processing purposes. The appeal court had to resend the document to the court of first instance, which, undoubtedly, caused a delay in the scheduling and preparing of the appeal hearing. Nevertheless, despite that omission on the applicant’s part, the Court is not convinced that the review of the applicant’s detention was speedy. The Government have not provided any explanation as to the length of time it took for the delivery of correspondence between courts located within the boundaries of the same city. It notes that it took the authorities sixteen days on one occasion and six days on another to deliver documentation from one court to the other and back. In the Court’s view, it was those delays that significantly protracted the appeal proceedings. The fact that the correspondence delivery system between the courts did not function effectively cannot serve to justify the deprivation of the applicant of his rights under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention: it is for the State to organise its judicial system in such a way as to enable its courts to comply with the requirements of that provision (see Hutchison Reid v.\xa0the\xa0United\xa0Kingdom, no. 50272/99, §\xa078, ECHR\xa02003IV).',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '61.\xa0\xa0Having regard to the above, the Court considers that the time taken to review the applicant’s detention cannot be considered compatible with the “speediness” requirement of Article 5 § 4. There has therefore been a violation of that provision.',
           'elements': []}]}]},
      {'content': 'V.\xa0\xa0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION',
       'elements': [{'content': '62.\xa0\xa0Article 41 of the Convention provides:',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Damage',
         'elements': [{'content': '63.\xa0\xa0The applicant claimed to have incurred non-pecuniary damage as a result of the violation of his rights set out in the Convention, leaving the amount of the award to the Court’s discretion.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '64.\xa0\xa0The Government submitted that there had been no violation of the applicant’s rights and considered that no award should be made to the applicant. Alternatively, they suggested that a finding of a violation would constitute in itself sufficient just satisfaction.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '65.\xa0\xa0The Court considers that the applicant must have sustained anguish and suffering resulting from his unlawful detention and the lack of a speedy review in this regard, and that this would not be adequately compensated by the finding of a violation alone. Making its assessment on an equitable basis and having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, it awards him 1,000 euros (EUR) under that head, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Costs and expenses',
         'elements': [{'content': '66.\xa0\xa0The applicant did not submit a claim for costs and expenses. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'C.\xa0\xa0Default interest',
         'elements': [{'content': '67.\xa0\xa0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.',
           'elements': []}]}]}],
     'section_name': 'law'},
    {'content': 'FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY',
     'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0Declares the complaints concerning the lawfulness and review of the applicant’s detention with a view to extradition as authorised by the court order of 4\xa0February 2011 admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '2.\xa0\xa0Decides to lift the interim measure indicated to the Government under Rule\xa039 of the Rules of the Court;',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '3.\xa0\xa0Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5\xa0§\xa01 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s detention from 4\xa0February to 24\xa0March 2011;',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '4.\xa0\xa0Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5\xa0§\xa04 of the Convention on account of the lack of a speedy review of the applicant’s detention as authorised by the court order of 4\xa0February 2011;',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '5.\xa0\xa0Holds', 'elements': []},
      {'content': '(a)\xa0\xa0that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months of the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\xa044\xa0§\xa02 of the Convention, EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable on the date of settlement;',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '(b)\xa0\xa0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': 'Done in English, and notified in writing on 16 October 2012, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.',
       'elements': []}],
     'section_name': 'conclusion'}]},
  'country': {'alpha2': 'ru', 'name': 'Russian Federation'},
  'decision_body': [{'name': 'Nina Vajić', 'role': 'president'},
   {'name': 'Anatoly Kovler', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Khanlar Hajiyev', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Julia Laffranque', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Erik Møse', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Søren Nielsen', 'role': 'section registrar'}],
  'decisiondate': '',
  'docname': 'CASE OF RAKHMONOV v. RUSSIA',
  'doctypebranch': 'CHAMBER',
  'documentcollectionid': ['CASELAW', 'JUDGMENTS', 'CHAMBER', 'ENG'],
  'documents': ['001-113718.docx'],
  'ecli': 'ECLI:CE:ECHR:2012:1016JUD005003111',
  'externalsources': [],
  'extractedappno': ['50031/11',
   '42409/09',
   '25803/94',
   '57220/00',
   '38124/07',
   '3455/05',
   '56308/00',
   '46295/99',
   '40907/98',
   '11364/03',
   '1108/02',
   '28358/95',
   '29462/95',
   '50272/99'],
  'importance': '4',
  'introductiondate': '',
  'issue': [],
  'itemid': '001-113718',
  'judgementdate': '16/10/2012 00:00:00',
  'kpdate': '16/10/2012 00:00:00',
  'kpthesaurus': ['448', '220'],
  'languageisocode': 'ENG',
  'originatingbody': '4',
  'originatingbody_name': 'First Section',
  'originatingbody_type': 'Court',
  'paragraphs': ['5-1', '5'],
  'parties': ['RAKHMONOV', 'RUSSIA'],
  'rank': '926.949890136719',
  'representedby': ['MAGOMEDOVA R.'],
  'respondent': 'RUS',
  'respondentOrderEng': '38',
  'scl': [],
  'separateopinion': 'FALSE',
  'sharepointid': '366570',
  'typedescription': '15'},
 {'__articles': '6;P1-1',
  '__conclusion': 'Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property',
  'applicability': '',
  'application': 'MS WORD',
  'appno': '42894/04;42904/04;42905/04;42906/04;42907/04;42908/04;42909/04;42910/04',
  'article': ['6', 'p1-1'],
  'conclusion': [{'article': '6',
    'base_article': '6',
    'element': 'Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial',
    'type': 'violation'},
   {'article': 'p1-1',
    'base_article': 'p1-1',
    'element': 'Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property',
    'type': 'violation'}],
  'content': {'001-90583.docx': [{'content': 'PROCEDURE',
     'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0The case originated in eight applications (nos. 42894/04, 42904/04, 42905/04, 42906/04, 42907/04, 42908/04, 42909/04 and 42910/04) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by eight Turkish nationals, Messrs Mehmet Arat, Haci\xa0Atsız, Mehmet Atsız (son of Hakim), Edip Çelik, Ramazan Alaca, Erdal Güneş, Mehmet Atsız and Mehmet Can (“the applicants”), on 6\xa0September 2004.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '2.\xa0\xa0The applicants were represented by Mr Fırat Üger, a lawyer practising in . The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '3.\xa0\xa0The applicants alleged that the non-enforcement of a number of court decisions in their favour had given rise to a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '4.\xa0\xa0On 21 January 2008 the President of the Second Section decided to give notice of the applications to the Government. It was also decided to examine the merits of the applications at the same time as their admissibility (Article 29 § 3).',
       'elements': []}],
     'section_name': 'procedure'},
    {'content': 'THE FACTS',
     'elements': [{'content': 'I.\xa0\xa0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE',
       'elements': [{'content': '5.\xa0\xa0The applicants were born in 1975, 1970, 1972, 1967, 1963, 1972, 1961 and 1972 respectively, and live in the town of Şölen.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '6.\xa0\xa0The applicants were all employed as manual workers by the Şölen Town Council (hereafter “the Town Council”) until their contracts of employment were terminated by the Town Council on 29 April 1999.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '7.\xa0\xa0On various dates in 1999 the applicants brought proceedings before the Ergani Civil Court of First Instance against the Town Council and claimed their unpaid salaries and other pecuniary rights to which they were entitled under the applicable legislation.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': "8.\xa0\xa0The applicants' claims were partly accepted by the  in its decisions adopted on 3 November 1999 and 30 December 1999.",
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '9.\xa0\xa0Between December 1999 and March 2000 the applicants initiated enforcement proceedings against the Town Council and sought to obtain the sums awarded to them by the  together with statutory interest.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '10.\xa0\xa0The sums claimed by the applicants were as follows:',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': "11.\xa0\xa0In the course of the enforcement proceedings, the applicants unsuccessfully attempted to recover their monies from the Town Council's bank accounts at the State owned Ziraat Bank. The bank refused to make the payments on the ground that the monies deposited there by the Town Council had been allocated to a special fund earmarked for public services. Following this, the Town Council transferred all their monetary assets to the special fund to circumvent the Ergani Civil Court's decisions.",
         'elements': []},
        {'content': "12.\xa0\xa0At the time of the adoption of the present judgment the applicants' attempts at recovering their monies were still continuing.",
         'elements': []}]},
      {'content': 'II.\xa0\xa0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE',
       'elements': [{'content': '13.\xa0\xa0For a summary of the relevant domestic law and practice, see Demirhan and Others v. , nos.\xa028152/02, 28155/02 and 28156/02, §§\xa016-18, 5\xa0June 2007.',
         'elements': []}]}],
     'section_name': 'facts'},
    {'content': 'THE LAW',
     'elements': [{'content': '14.\xa0\xa0Given the similarity of the applications, both as regards fact and law, the Court deems it appropriate to join them.',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': 'I.\xa0\xa0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION',
       'elements': [{'content': "15.\xa0\xa0The applicants complained that the Town Council's refusal to comply with the Ergani Civil Court's decisions had deprived them of their property within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:",
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.”',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': "16.\xa0\xa0The Government contested that argument and submitted that the reason behind the non-payment of the applicants' monies had been the financial problems faced by the Town Council. As the Ergani Civil Court's decisions remained valid, the applicants had not been deprived of their property.",
         'elements': []},
        {'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Admissibility',
         'elements': [{'content': '17.\xa0\xa0The Government argued that the applicants had not complied with the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies because the enforcement proceedings instigated by them to recover their monies were still continuing. The Government further submitted that the applicants had failed to raise their Convention complaints, even in substance, before the domestic courts.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '18.\xa0\xa0The applicants maintained that they had complied with the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies and that their efforts at the national level were still continuing. The Town Council was doing everything in its power to circumvent the decisions of the domestic courts.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '19.\xa0\xa0The Court reiterates that a person who has obtained an enforceable judgment against the State as a result of successful litigation cannot be required to resort to additional proceedings, such as enforcement proceedings, in order to have it executed (see Demirhan and Others, cited above, § 34; see also Metaxas v. Greece, no. 8415/02, § 19, 27 May 2004). In any event, the remedies which the applicants have been making use of since December 1999 have not been capable of offering them any prospect of success in forcing the national authorities to pay the due amounts.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': "20.\xa0\xa0The Court consequently dismisses the Government's objection regarding the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies.",
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '21.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.',
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Merits',
         'elements': [{'content': '22.\xa0\xa0The Court reiterates that a “claim” can constitute a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention if it is sufficiently established to be enforceable (see Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no.\xa0301-B, § 59).',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': "23.\xa0\xa0The Ergani Civil Court's decisions adopted in 1999 provided the applicants with enforceable claims and, indeed, enforcement proceedings were instituted by the applicants in 1999 and 2000. It follows that the applicants' inability to have the decisions enforced constituted an interference with their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, as set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.",
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '24.\xa0\xa0By failing to comply with the judgments of the , the national authorities prevented the applicants from receiving the monies to which they were entitled. The Government have not advanced any justification for this interference and the Court considers that a lack of funds cannot justify such an omission (see, mutatis mutandis, Ambruosi v. Italy, no. 31227/96, §§ 28-34, 19 October 2000).',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '25.\xa0\xa0It follows that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.\xa01 to the Convention in respect of all the applicants.',
           'elements': []}]}]},
      {'content': 'II.\xa0\xa0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION',
       'elements': [{'content': '26.\xa0\xa0The applicants complained that the non-enforcement of the decisions of the  had also given rise to a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide as follows:',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '27.\xa0\xa0The Government contested that argument.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '28.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one examined above and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': "29.\xa0\xa0The Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal; in this way it embodies the “right to a court”, of which the right of access, that is the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters, constitutes one aspect. However, that right would be illusory if a Contracting State's domestic legal system allowed a final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party. It would be inconceivable that Article 6 § 1 should describe in detail procedural guarantees afforded to litigants – proceedings that are fair, public and expeditious – without protecting the implementation of judicial decisions; to construe Article 6 as being concerned exclusively with access to a court and the conduct of proceedings would be likely to lead to situations incompatible with the principle of the rule of law which the Contracting States undertook to respect when they ratified the Convention. Execution of a judgment given by any court must therefore be regarded as an integral part of the “trial” for the purposes of Article 6 (see Hornsby v. Greece, judgment of 19 March 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-II, § 40).",
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '30.\xa0\xa0It is not open to a State authority to cite lack of funds as an excuse for not honouring a debt. Whilst a delay in the execution of a judgment may be justified in particular circumstances, it may not be such as to impair the essence of the right protected under Article\xa06\xa0§\xa01 (see Immobiliare Saffi v.\xa0Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, § 74, ECHR 1999-V). In the instant case, the applicants should not have been prevented from benefiting from the success of the litigation on the ground of alleged financial difficulties experienced by the Town Council.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': "31.\xa0\xa0However, as pointed out above, the Ergani Civil Court's decisions adopted in 1999 remain wholly unenforced.",
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '32.\xa0\xa0In view of the above, the Court considers that, by failing for nine years to take the necessary measures to comply with the final judicial decisions in the present case, the authorities deprived the provisions of Article 6 § 1 of all useful effect.',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '33.\xa0\xa0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of all of the applicants.',
         'elements': []}]},
      {'content': 'III.\xa0\xa0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION',
       'elements': [{'content': '34.\xa0\xa0Article 41 of the Convention provides:',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': '“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”',
         'elements': []},
        {'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Damage',
         'elements': [{'content': "35.\xa0\xa0In respect of pecuniary damage the applicants claimed the amounts below. These amounts were converted to euros from the national currency of the respondent State on the basis of the currency exchange rate of 3 July 2008, that is the date of the applicants' submissions of their claims to the Court.",
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '36.\xa0\xa0According to the applicants, these sums included the amounts awarded to them by the , statutory interest, the fees of their lawyers who represented them before the domestic authorities and other expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings:',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'Mehmet Arat: 2,322 euros (EUR)', 'elements': []},
          {'content': 'Haci Atsız: EUR 6,164', 'elements': []},
          {'content': 'Mehmet Atsız (son of Hakim): EUR 13,589',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': 'Edip Çelik: EUR 11,161', 'elements': []},
          {'content': 'Ramazan Alaca: EUR 10,474', 'elements': []},
          {'content': 'Erdal Güneş: EUR 2,943', 'elements': []},
          {'content': 'Mehmet Atsız: EUR 9,024', 'elements': []},
          {'content': 'Mehmet Can: EUR 5,714', 'elements': []},
          {'content': '37.\xa0\xa0Each applicant also claimed the sum of EUR 50,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '38.\xa0\xa0The Government contested the sums claimed by the applicants in respect of pecuniary damage, alleging that the claims were not supported with any evidence and were based on speculative calculations. They also submitted that the claims made in respect of non-pecuniary damage were excessive and baseless.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': "39.\xa0\xa0The Court considers that, in accordance with its finding of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraph 25 above), the applicants are entitled to pecuniary damages. Bearing in mind that the applicants' complaint related to the non-payment of the monies owed to them by the Town Council, the Court considers that the payment by the Government of these outstanding amounts, together with interest applicable under domestic law for late payment, would satisfy the applicants' claims for pecuniary damage.",
           'elements': []},
          {'content': "40.\xa0\xa0Given its finding of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the significant period of time during which the domestic decisions remained unenforced (see paragraph 33 above), the Court considers that the applicants' prejudice cannot be sufficiently compensated by the finding of a violation alone. Taking into account the circumstances of the case and having regard to its case-law (see Demirhan and Others, cited above, § 54; Aygün and Others v. Turkey, no. 5325/02, 5353/02 and 27608/02, § 45, 20 November 2007; Çiçek and Öztemel and Others v.\xa0Turkey, nos.\xa074069/01, 74703/01, 76380/01, 16809/02, 25710/02, 25714/02 and 30383/02, §\xa054, 3\xa0May 2007), the Court awards each applicant EUR\xa05,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.",
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Costs and expenses',
         'elements': [{'content': '41.\xa0\xa0Each of the eight applicants also claimed EUR 2,934 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. In support of their claims the applicants submitted fee agreements signed by them and their lawyers.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': '42.\xa0\xa0The Government contested the claims.',
           'elements': []},
          {'content': "43.\xa0\xa0According to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award each applicant the sum of EUR 500 covering costs under all heads.",
           'elements': []}]},
        {'content': 'C.\xa0\xa0Default interest',
         'elements': [{'content': '44.\xa0\xa0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.',
           'elements': []}]}]}],
     'section_name': 'law'},
    {'content': 'FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY',
     'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0Decides to join the applications;',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '2.\xa0\xa0Declares the applications admissible;',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '3.\xa0\xa0Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '4.\xa0\xa0Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '5.\xa0\xa0Holds', 'elements': []},
      {'content': '(a)\xa0\xa0that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\xa044\xa0§\xa02 of the Convention, the sums awarded to them by the Ergani Civil Court together with statutory interest applicable under domestic law for late payment. Within the same period the respondent State is also to pay each applicant the following amounts, to be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': '(b)\xa0\xa0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;',
       'elements': []},
      {'content': "6.\xa0\xa0Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim for just satisfaction.",
       'elements': []},
      {'content': 'Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 January 2009, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.',
       'elements': []}],
     'section_name': 'conclusion'}]},
  'country': {'alpha2': 'tr', 'name': 'Turkey'},
  'decision_body': [{'name': 'Françoise Tulkens', 'role': 'president'},
   {'name': 'Ireneu Cabral Barreto', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Vladimiro Zagrebelsky', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Danutė Jočienė', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'András Sajó', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Nona Tsotsoria', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Işıl Karakaş', 'role': 'judges'},
   {'name': 'Sally Dollé', 'role': 'section registrar'}],
  'decisiondate': '',
  'docname': 'CASE OF ARAT AND OTHERSv. TURKEY',
  'doctypebranch': 'CHAMBER',
  'documentcollectionid': ['CASELAW', 'JUDGMENTS', 'CHAMBER', 'ENG'],
  'documents': ['001-90583.docx'],
  'ecli': 'ECLI:CE:ECHR:2009:0113JUD004289404',
  'externalsources': [],
  'extractedappno': ['42894/04',
   '42904/04',
   '42905/04',
   '42906/04',
   '42907/04',
   '42908/04',
   '42909/04',
   '42910/04',
   '28152/02',
   '28155/02',
   '28156/02',
   '8415/02',
   '31227/96',
   '22774/93',
   '5325/02',
   '5353/02',
   '27608/02',
   '74069/01',
   '74703/01',
   '76380/01',
   '16809/02',
   '25710/02',
   '25714/02',
   '30383/02'],
  'importance': '4',
  'introductiondate': '',
  'issue': [],
  'itemid': '001-90583',
  'judgementdate': '13/01/2009 00:00:00',
  'kpdate': '13/01/2009 00:00:00',
  'kpthesaurus': ['445', '369'],
  'languageisocode': 'ENG',
  'originatingbody': '5',
  'originatingbody_name': 'Second Section',
  'originatingbody_type': 'Court',
  'paragraphs': ['P1-1', '6'],
  'parties': ['ARAT AND OTHERSv. TURKEY'],
  'rank': '658.45068359375',
  'representedby': ['UGER F.'],
  'respondent': 'TUR',
  'respondentOrderEng': '47',
  'scl': [],
  'separateopinion': 'FALSE',
  'sharepointid': '348625',
  'typedescription': '15'}]

JSON data can be contained in a list or dictionary at the top level. Let’s check which type we got:

type(cases)
list

Our data is a list of cases. Let’s check the type of case 0:

type(cases[0])
dict

The data about each case is in a dictionary. We can print the keys using list():

keys = list(cases[0])
print(keys)
['__articles', '__conclusion', 'applicability', 'application', 'appno', 'article', 'conclusion', 'content', 'country', 'decision_body', 'decisiondate', 'docname', 'doctypebranch', 'documentcollectionid', 'documents', 'ecli', 'externalsources', 'extractedappno', 'importance', 'introductiondate', 'issue', 'itemid', 'judgementdate', 'kpdate', 'kpthesaurus', 'languageisocode', 'originatingbody', 'originatingbody_name', 'originatingbody_type', 'paragraphs', 'parties', 'rank', 'representedby', 'respondent', 'respondentOrderEng', 'scl', 'separateopinion', 'sharepointid', 'typedescription']

We can loop over the list to get the title of each case:

for case in cases:
    print(case['docname'])
CASE OF SKLYAR v. RUSSIA
CASE OF YABLOKO RUSSIAN UNITED DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA
CASE OF OBERWALDER v. SLOVENIA
CASE OF RAKHMONOV v. RUSSIA
CASE OF ARAT AND OTHERSv. TURKEY

Each case has a decision or judgment date.

for case in cases:
    print(case['docname'])
    print(case.get('decisiondate'))
    print(case.get('judgementdate'))
    print()
CASE OF SKLYAR v. RUSSIA

18/07/2017 00:00:00

CASE OF YABLOKO RUSSIAN UNITED DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA

08/11/2016 00:00:00

CASE OF OBERWALDER v. SLOVENIA

18/01/2007 00:00:00

CASE OF RAKHMONOV v. RUSSIA

16/10/2012 00:00:00

CASE OF ARAT AND OTHERSv. TURKEY

13/01/2009 00:00:00

Using Harvard’s CAP API#

Again, we need to specify the URL to the data we want to fetch.

URL = "https://api.case.law/v1/cases/"

We include some parameters that specifies which cases we want to load:

parameters = {'jurisdiction': 'ill',
              'full_case': 'true',
              'decision_date_min': '2011-01-01',
              'page_size': 3}
  • jurisdiction is Illinois in this example

  • full_case include the full text of each case

  • decision_date_min is the minimum date, we only want decisions later than this date

  • page_size is the number of items

More parameters are listed in the CAP documentation.

Now, let’s fetch the data.

request = requests.get(URL, params=parameters)
data = request.json()
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
JSONDecodeError                           Traceback (most recent call last)
File /opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/site-packages/requests/models.py:974, in Response.json(self, **kwargs)
    973 try:
--> 974     return complexjson.loads(self.text, **kwargs)
    975 except JSONDecodeError as e:
    976     # Catch JSON-related errors and raise as requests.JSONDecodeError
    977     # This aliases json.JSONDecodeError and simplejson.JSONDecodeError

File /opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/json/__init__.py:346, in loads(s, cls, object_hook, parse_float, parse_int, parse_constant, object_pairs_hook, **kw)
    343 if (cls is None and object_hook is None and
    344         parse_int is None and parse_float is None and
    345         parse_constant is None and object_pairs_hook is None and not kw):
--> 346     return _default_decoder.decode(s)
    347 if cls is None:

File /opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/json/decoder.py:337, in JSONDecoder.decode(self, s, _w)
    333 """Return the Python representation of ``s`` (a ``str`` instance
    334 containing a JSON document).
    335 
    336 """
--> 337 obj, end = self.raw_decode(s, idx=_w(s, 0).end())
    338 end = _w(s, end).end()

File /opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/json/decoder.py:355, in JSONDecoder.raw_decode(self, s, idx)
    354 except StopIteration as err:
--> 355     raise JSONDecodeError("Expecting value", s, err.value) from None
    356 return obj, end

JSONDecodeError: Expecting value: line 1 column 1 (char 0)

During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:

JSONDecodeError                           Traceback (most recent call last)
Cell In[17], line 2
      1 request = requests.get(URL, params=parameters)
----> 2 data = request.json()

File /opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/site-packages/requests/models.py:978, in Response.json(self, **kwargs)
    974     return complexjson.loads(self.text, **kwargs)
    975 except JSONDecodeError as e:
    976     # Catch JSON-related errors and raise as requests.JSONDecodeError
    977     # This aliases json.JSONDecodeError and simplejson.JSONDecodeError
--> 978     raise RequestsJSONDecodeError(e.msg, e.doc, e.pos)

JSONDecodeError: Expecting value: line 1 column 1 (char 0)

Inspecting the Data#

JSON data can be contained in a list or dictionary at the top level. Let’s check which type we got:

type(data)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NameError                                 Traceback (most recent call last)
Cell In[18], line 1
----> 1 type(data)

NameError: name 'data' is not defined

Since our data is in a dictionary, we can print the keys using list():

keys = list(data)
print(keys)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NameError                                 Traceback (most recent call last)
Cell In[19], line 1
----> 1 keys = list(data)
      2 print(keys)

NameError: name 'data' is not defined

The field count contains the number of hits in the database. This is usually different from the number of items we requested. If the count is zero, we don’t have any results and need to check the URL and the parameters.

print(data["count"])
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NameError                                 Traceback (most recent call last)
Cell In[20], line 1
----> 1 print(data["count"])

NameError: name 'data' is not defined

That looks good. Let’s fetch the list of cases, which are located in results:

cases = data["results"]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NameError                                 Traceback (most recent call last)
Cell In[21], line 1
----> 1 cases = data["results"]

NameError: name 'data' is not defined

Now we can inspect each case. Let’s loop over the cases and get some of the information. The data contains various metadata about each case, such as the case name and the abbreviated case name.

for case in cases:
    print("Case name:", case["name_abbreviation"])
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
KeyError                                  Traceback (most recent call last)
Cell In[22], line 2
      1 for case in cases:
----> 2     print("Case name:", case["name_abbreviation"])

KeyError: 'name_abbreviation'

It’s often useful to look at the data in a web browser to get an overview. We can do that by opening the full URL, including the parameters:

print(request.url)
https://case.law/docs/