Appendix: JSON and Web APIs#
In Files and Exceptions we saw how to read data from files. In this part, we will look at how to read data directly from web APIs. Web APIs are machine-readable online data sources. We will look at two different web APIs.
ECHR-OD API
The European Court of Human Rights Open Data (ECHR-OD) project provides data about ECHR cases. ECHR-OD provides machine-readable data for download, but also a public ECHR-OD API for online use. Here is the ECHR-OD API documentation.
Harvard’s Caselaw Access Project
We will also use data from Harvard’s Caselaw Access Project (CAP). CAP aims to make all published US courts decisions freely available in a standard, machine-readable format. CAP and the data format is documented here.
Reading JSON from file#
JSON
JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) is a machine-readable data format. Machine-readable data makes it easy to read and process the information with a computer. JSON data is usually tree structured, with multiple levels containing information.
In Python, JSON data is stored as lists and dictionaries. The top level can be either a list or a dictionary.
First, let’s look at how we can read JSON data from a local file. Here we read a file containing a few cases from ECHR-OD.
import json
def read_json_file(filename):
with open(filename, 'r') as file:
text_data = file.read()
return json.loads(text_data)
cases = read_json_file('cases-5.json')
However, this approach has some drawbacks. Firstly, we must manually download the data set. Secondly, we must keep the data set updated. Case law databases are updated regularly, and we probably want to include the latest data. Therefore, using online data directly is sometimes preferable. For example, if we are developing a mobile app, the full data set might be too large to fit on the device.
Reading JSON from a web API#
To fetch data from the web, we can use a library called requests that makes this task quite easy. First, we import this:
import requests
First, we will look at the ECHR-OD API. This API has a function of getting statistics about the number of cases. We need to specify the URL:
URL = 'https://echr-opendata.eu/api/v1/stats'
Now, we can get the data.
We use the request library’s .get() function to fetch the data,
and then the method .json() to parse the results into Python lists and dictionaries.
request = requests.get(URL)
data = request.json()
The result is a list of dictionaries with statistics about the numbers of violations and non-violations for different articles of the ECHR. We can display the first few articles:
display(data[:5])
[{'article': 'p1-1', 'count': 2, 'type': 'other'},
{'article': '10', 'count': 197, 'type': 'no-violation'},
{'article': '10', 'count': 668, 'type': 'violation'},
{'article': '11', 'count': 55, 'type': 'no-violation'},
{'article': '11', 'count': 428, 'type': 'violation'}]
Let’s try to get some cases. This query has a different URL:
URL = 'https://echr-opendata.eu/api/v1/cases'
This query will result in all the cases in ECHR-OD, which are several thousand.
Therefore, the query results are split into several “pages” of results.
We must specify the page size, called limit.
We usually start with page number 1.
We specify both these parameters in a dictionary.
parameters = {'page': 1,
'limit': 3}
Now, we can get the results.
We include the parameters in the query as a parameter to the .get() function.
cases = requests.get(URL, params=parameters).json()
Tip
We can fetch the results and parse the JSON in two steps or in one line. Both are fine, and this is a matter of preference.
Inspecting the Data#
We can display the data, however this is a lot of text:
display(cases)
Show code cell output
[{'itemid': '001-91993',
'docname': 'CASE OF WELLER v. HUNGARY',
'doctypebranch': 'CHAMBER',
'ecli': 'ECLI:CE:ECHR:2009:0331JUD004439905',
'importance': 3,
'applicability': '',
'appno': '44399/05',
'decisiondate': None,
'introductiondate': None,
'judgementdate': '2009-03-31T00:00:00',
'kpdate': '2009-03-31T00:00:00',
'languageisocode': 'ENG',
'originatingbody_name': 'Second Section',
'originatingbody_type': 'Court',
'rank': '130.86557',
'respondent': 'HUN',
'separateopinion': True,
'typedescription': 15,
'judgment': [{'content': 'PROCEDURE',
'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0The case originated in an application (no. 44399/05) against the lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Hungarian nationals, Mr Lajos Weller and his twin sons, Dániel and Máté Weller (“the applicants”), on 6 December 2005.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0The applicants, who had been granted legal aid, were represented by Mr T. Kőrösi, a lawyer practising in Cegléd. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr L. Höltzl, Agent, Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '3.\xa0\xa0The applicants alleged that their exclusion from “maternity benefit”, on the ground of the nationality of the mother of the second and third applicants and the first applicant’s parental status, amounted to a violation of Article 14 taken together with Article 8 of the Convention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '4.\xa0\xa0On 20 September 2007 the Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it also decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility.',
'elements': []}],
'section_name': 'procedure'},
{'content': 'THE FACTS',
'elements': [{'content': 'THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE',
'elements': [{'content': '5.\xa0\xa0The first applicant (“the applicant”), was born in 1974 and lives in . The second and the third applicant, Dániel Weller and Máté Weller, the applicant’s twin sons, were born in 2005 and live in .',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0The circumstances of the case',
'elements': [{'content': '6.\xa0\xa0The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '7.\xa0\xa0In 2000 the first applicant married a Romanian citizen, who currently lives in . The couple are raising four children from the previous marriage of the wife and they have successfully claimed numerous allowances on their behalf. On 30 June 2005 the wife gave birth to the second and third applicants. Both of them acquired Hungarian nationality by birth, through their father. At the material time, the mother held a residence permit (tartózkodási engedély). She was granted a settlement permit (letelepedési engedély) in May 2007.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '8.\xa0\xa0On 7 September 2005 the first applicant requested maternity benefit (anyasági támogatás) amounting to 148,000 Hungarian forints (HUF) from the and Pest County Regional Directorate of the Hungarian Treasury in his own name and on behalf of his children.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '9.\xa0\xa0On 8 September 2005 the Regional Directorate refused the applicant’s claim. It pointed out that, in the light of the relevant provisions of Act no.\xa084 of 1998 on Family Support (“the Act”), only mothers, adoptive parents and guardians were entitled to the benefit in question. It also noted that the natural father might only apply for such an allowance if the mother were deceased. The first applicant appealed.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '10.\xa0\xa0On 20 January 2006 the Hungarian Treasury dismissed his appeal. The Treasury established that, pursuant to the Act, only mothers with Hungarian citizenship might apply for maternity benefit. It further observed that the Act applies only to those non-Hungarian citizens who have obtained settlement permits (letelepedési engedély), being either refugees or citizens of another of the European Union. It concluded that, since the applicant’s wife did not fall into either of these categories, the claim had to be rejected, since the natural father was not entitled to such benefits.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '11.\xa0\xa0On 6 March 2006 the first applicant sought judicial review before the . He argued that the legal background of the institution of maternity benefit, as well as the decisions of the competent Hungarian authorities, were discriminatory and contravened the Hungarian Constitution and Article 14 of the Convention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '12.\xa0\xa0On 5 July 2005 the , finding that the administrative authorities’ decisions had been in compliance with the law, dismissed the applicant’s claim. It held, inter alia, that the purpose of maternity benefit was to support the mother and not the entire family or the children, therefore the latter could not be considered to have suffered discrimination.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '13.\xa0\xa0On 7 August 2006 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the . These proceedings are apparently still pending.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Relevant domestic law',
'elements': [{'content': 'Act no. 84 of 1998 on Family Support',
'elements': [{'content': 'Section 2', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'The scope of the Act', 'elements': []},
{'content': '“The Act shall be applied – unless an international treaty regulates otherwise – to those living on the territory of the , who',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'a) are Hungarian nationals,', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'b) have obtained an immigration or settlement permit, and to those who have been recognised as refugees by the Hungarian authorities,',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'c) fall under the scope of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community and – with the exception of the maternity benefit (Chapter IV of the Act) – of the Regulation (EEC) No. 140//71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community, provided that such persons – with the exception of frontier workers – at the time of requesting the allowance have obtained a valid residence permit.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Section 29', 'elements': []},
{'content': '“(1) Persons entitled to maternity benefit after giving birth are:',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'a) women who, during pregnancy, attended at least four times – in case of premature birth, once – prenatal care;',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'b) adoptive parents, if the adoption was finally authorised within 180 days of the birth;',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'c) the guardian, if the child – based on a final decision – was taken into his/her custody within 180 days of the birth.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Section 30', 'elements': []},
{'content': '“If the woman entitled to maternity benefit dies before it is paid, then it shall be paid to the father living under the same roof or, in the absence of such a person, to the guardian of the child.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Section 32', 'elements': []},
{'content': '“A request for maternity benefit may be submitted within 180 days of giving birth.”',
'elements': []}]}]}]}],
'section_name': 'facts'},
{'content': 'THE LAW',
'elements': [{'content': 'I.\xa0\xa0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION',
'elements': [{'content': '14.\xa0\xa0The applicants maintained that, when claiming maternity benefit, they had suffered discrimination because of the nationality of the mother of the second and the third applicants as well as the first applicant’s parental status. They relied on Article 14 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 8, which provide insofar as relevant as follows:',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Article 14 of the Convention', 'elements': []},
{'content': '“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Article 8 of the Convention', 'elements': []},
{'content': '“1.\xa0\xa0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, ...',
'elements': []},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of ... the economic well-being of the country, ... for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Admissibility',
'elements': [{'content': '15.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Merits',
'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0The parties’ submissions',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': '(a) The Government',
'elements': [{'content': '16.\xa0\xa0The Government submitted that the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in respect of welfare policy. Moreover, they pointed out that there was a substantial diversity of social security schemes in the Member States of the Council of Europe, particularly in the regulation of maternity allowances.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '17.\xa0\xa0The Government maintained that the aim of maternity allowances was primarily to facilitate the development of the foetus and for the mother to maintain a healthy life. Had it only been pecuniary assistance, it would have been sufficient to connect such a grant to the birth of the child. This was not the case, since future mothers had to participate in courses on parental care regularly in order to be entitled to the allowance. It is true that in the absence of natural parents, as a subsidiary rule, guardians may be entitled to the allowance, but this special requirement was not met in the present circumstances.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '18.\xa0\xa0Moreover, the Government drew attention to the fact that the mother in the present case had only obtained authorisation to reside in , but not a settlement permit since she most probably did not fulfil the requirements of the latter at the material time. Exclusion from the benefit served the purpose of reducing the number of marriages of convenience and establishing a verifiable allowance system. By acting in this way, the did not overstep the limits of its margin of appreciation.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '19.\xa0\xa0Lastly, the Government underlined that from 1 January 2008 onwards all citizens of the European Union residing in for more than three months are entitled to a maternity allowance under the same conditions as Hungarian citizens. In sum, the Government were of the view that the exclusion of the natural father from the benefit was not an unjustifiable difference in treatment.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': '(b) The applicants',
'elements': [{'content': '20.\xa0\xa0The applicants submitted that the maternity benefit – although its name was misleading – did not aim at reducing the hardship of giving birth but at promoting the social security of families and diminishing the financial burdens ensuing from bringing up children, since not only mothers but adoptive parents and guardians were entitled to it. In their view, the primarily financial character of the allowance was also supported by the fact that it could only be claimed within 180 days of the birth.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '21.\xa0\xa0The applicants drew attention to the fact that the benefit was payable after birth when the responsibilities of the father and mother concerning the child became equal. The first applicant’s exclusion from the benefit therefore constituted an unjustifiable difference in treatment on the ground of his parental status.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '22.\xa0\xa0The applicants also submitted that section 29 of the Act was in itself discriminatory against all fathers, taking into consideration Article 5 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention, since men with foreign spouses were treated less favourably in the enjoyment of the benefit than those with Hungarian wives. The applicants also maintained that any reluctance on the part of the mother to participate in the obligatory courses on parental care may justify different treatment in respect of her alone, but not in respect of the father, who may have shown that he cared for the unborn child in many other ways. In any event, the applicant’s wife attended the parental care courses, accompanied and assisted by the first applicant. Therefore the aim of protecting the foetus could not serve as a basis for the refusal to grant the allowance in the present case.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '23.\xa0\xa0Moreover, the applicants were of the view that the argument of Government concerning the legitimate aim of protecting the system of social welfare from abuse by immigrants was irrelevant, since all three of them have Hungarian citizenship. They drew attention to the fact, in this connection, that the mother had four children from her previous marriage and that the first applicant could claim, since the couple were also raising these children together, various social allowances on their behalf. The did not raise the issue of abuse concerning those benefits; therefore it was illogical to use this argument in connection with maternity benefit, the amount of which was in any event rather small.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '24.\xa0\xa0The applicants also pointed out that, although it is true that the Member States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation when regulating such matters, the equality of the sexes is a major goal of Council of Europe. Therefore, there must be a compelling reason advanced before a difference in treatment on grounds of sex could be regarded as being compatible with the Convention. In their view, the Government had failed to put forward such an argument.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '25.\xa0\xa0Lastly, they argued that the exclusion of the second and third applicants from the benefit, although both of them were Hungarian nationals by birth, on account of their mother’s foreign nationality constituted an unjustified difference in treatment compared with other Hungarian children. In sum, they concluded that they had suffered discrimination in breach of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0The Court’s assessment', 'elements': []}]},
{'content': '(a) General principles',
'elements': [{'content': '27.\xa0\xa0The Court has also held that not every difference in treatment will amount to a violation of Article 14. It must be established that other persons in an analogous or relevantly similar situation enjoy preferential treatment and that this distinction is discriminatory (Unal Tekeli v. Turkey, no.\xa029865/96, § 49, 16 November 2004). A difference in treatment is discriminatory within the meaning of Article 14 if it has no objective and reasonable justification. The existence of such a justification must be assessed in relation to the principles which normally prevail in democratic societies. A difference in treatment in the exercise of a right laid down by the Convention must not only pursue a legitimate aim: Article 14 is likewise violated when it is clearly established that there is no “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised” (see, for example, Petrovic, cited above, §\xa030, and Lithgow and Others v.\xa0the United Kingdom, judgment of 8\xa0July\xa01986, Series\xa0A no.\xa0102, §\xa0177).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '28.\xa0\xa0The Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a difference in treatment (Gaygusuz v. Austria, judgment of 16\xa0September 1996, Reports 1996IV, §\xa042). The scope of the margin of appreciation will vary according to the circumstances, the subject matter and its background (see Rasmussen v.\xa0Denmark, judgment of 28\xa0November 1984, Series\xa0A no.\xa087, §\xa040, and Inze v.\xa0Austria, judgment of 28\xa0October 1987, Series\xa0A no.\xa0126, §\xa041), but the final decision as to observance of the Convention’s requirements rests with the Court. Since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, the Court must however have regard to the changing conditions in Contracting States and respond, for example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved (see Unal Tekeli, judgment cited above, § 54, and, mutatis mutandis, Stafford v.\xa0the United Kingdom [GC], no.\xa046295/99, § 68, ECHR 2002IV).',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': '(b) Application of these principles to the present case',
'elements': [{'content': '29.\xa0\xa0The Court observes at the outset that it was not disputed between the parties that the applicant could rely on Article 14 of the Convention. Since, by granting the allowances in question, the Hungarian State was supporting the right to respect for family life within the meaning of Article 8 (see Petrovic, cited above, § 29), the Court sees no reason to hold otherwise. Moreover, it was not disputed that the applicants’ exclusion from the benefit amounted to a difference in treatment on grounds of the first applicant’s parental status and the nationality of the mother of the second and the third applicants. However, the Government argued that these differences pursued a legitimate aim and have been applied in a proportionate manner.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '30.\xa0\xa0The starting point of the Court’s assessment is the nature of the maternity benefit, since it is the key element when defining the group with which the applicants’ situation should be compared. The Court observes that this allowance related to the period after giving birth. For the Court, the primarily financial character of the benefit is well shown by the fact that adoptive parents and guardians and, in special circumstances, fathers may also claim it.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '31.\xa0\xa0The Court is of the view that this wide range of entitled persons proves that the allowance is aimed at supporting newborn children and the whole family raising them, and not only at reducing the hardship of giving birth sustained by the mother. The Government’s counter-argument, namely that the entitlement to the benefit was conditional on participation in parental care courses, cannot be decisive, since this requirement had to be fulfilled only by the mother. Adoptive parents or guardians were obviously exempt from that requirement.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '32.\xa0\xa0The applicants’ situation can therefore be compared to those families and their members enjoying maternity benefits.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '33.\xa0\xa0The Court reiterates that, while differences may exist between mother and father in their relationship with the child, both parents are “similarly placed” in taking care of the unborn child (see Petrovic, cited above, §\xa036). It further draws attention to the fact that not only mothers but also adoptive parents and guardians were entitled to the benefit in dispute, while the first applicant was not. He was therefore differently treated on the grounds of his parental status compared with other persons who are similarly responsible for bringing up newborn children. However, the Court is of the view that this difference in treatment is not connected to the applicant’s sex, since adoptive parents or guardians, irrespective of their sex, were not excluded from the benefit.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '34.\xa0\xa0The Court recognises that the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify different treatment under the law. Moreover, the Court notes that widely different social security systems exist in the Member States. However, the lack of a common standard does not absolve those States which adopt family allowance schemes from making such grants without discrimination.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '35.\xa0\xa0The Court observes that neither the domestic authorities nor the Government have put forward any objective and reasonable ground to justify the general exclusion of natural fathers from a benefit aimed at supporting all those who are raising newborn children, when mothers, adoptive parents and guardians are entitled to it. It therefore concludes that the first applicant suffered discrimination on the ground of his parental status in the exercise of his right to respect his family life.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '36.\xa0\xa0Concerning the second and the third applicants, the Court notes that there is no indication in the case file that the applicants’ mother abused or at least intended to misuse the Hungarian social security system. It is true that at the time of the events she only had a residence permit, but later she received a settlement permit (see paragraph 7), which shows that her situation in was lawful and fully regulated by the authorities.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '37.\xa0\xa0The Court observes that, flowing from the relevant provisions of the Act, a family with children of a Hungarian mother and a foreign father are entitled to maternity benefits. However, this was not the situation of the second and the third applicants as their father is Hungarian and their mother a foreigner. They were therefore prevented from benefitting from such an allowance on the basis of this difference.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '38.\xa0\xa0The Court finds no reasonable justification for this practice. It considers that the entitlement to an allowance due to a family under sections\xa01 and 2 of the Act cannot be dependent on which of the two biological parents of the children is a Hungarian national. The Court would add that it is irrelevant that, as of 1 January 2008, the applicants’ mother became entitled to the allowance under the same conditions as Hungarian nationals, because by then she was barred from claiming it as the request had to be made within 180 days of the children’s birth and could not be made retroactively.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '39.\xa0\xa0In sum, since the Government have failed to put forward any convincing argument to justify the second and third applicants’ exclusion from the benefit of the allowance in question, the Court concludes that this difference in treatment amounted to discrimination.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '40.\xa0\xa0Having regard to the above considerations, the Court concludes that there has been a violation in the instant case of Article 14 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 8, as regards each of the applicants.',
'elements': []}]}]},
{'content': 'II.\xa0\xa0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION',
'elements': [{'content': '41.\xa0\xa0Article 41 of the Convention provides:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Damage',
'elements': [{'content': '42.\xa0\xa0The applicants claimed, jointly, HUF 179,719 (approximately EUR\xa0720) in pecuniary damages, which sum corresponds to the actual loss originating from the refusal of maternity benefits, plus interest. Moreover, they claimed 4,000 euros (EUR), jointly, in respect of non-pecuniary damage.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '43.\xa0\xa0The Government considered the applicants’ claim excessive.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '44.\xa0\xa0The Court finds that the applicants have sustained pecuniary damage from the refusal to grant them this allowance. The Court therefore awards the applicants the entirety of the sum requested under this head. The Court also considers that the applicants can reasonably be deemed to have suffered some non-pecuniary damage in the circumstances. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court finds it reasonable to award them, jointly, EUR 1,500 under this head.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Costs and expenses',
'elements': [{'content': '45.\xa0\xa0The applicant claimed, jointly, EUR 1,500 plus 20% VAT, for the legal fees incurred before the domestic courts and the Court. They submitted the agreement concluded with their lawyer, according to which they would only be billed if the case ended successfully.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '46.\xa0\xa0According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court finds it reasonable to award the sum claimed in its entirety, less the sum of EUR 850 which the applicants have already been paid under the legal-aid scheme of the Council of Europe, making an overall award of EUR 950 (including provision for 20% VAT).',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'C.\xa0\xa0Default interest',
'elements': [{'content': '47.\xa0\xa0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.',
'elements': []}]}]}],
'section_name': 'law'},
{'content': 'FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY',
'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0Declares the application admissible;',
'elements': []},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0Holds that there has been a violation of Article\xa014 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention;',
'elements': []},
{'content': '3.\xa0\xa0Holds', 'elements': []},
{'content': '(b)\xa0\xa0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Done in English, and notified in writing on 31 March 2009, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the concurring opinion of Judge Tulkens is annexed to this judgment.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'I fully agree with the absolute necessity and Convention obligation of abolishing all forms of discrimination, including on grounds of sex, in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the Convention. However, in the present case the relatively artificial nature of the application troubles me for two reasons.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Firstly, as the benefit in question is expressly called maternity benefit, the main purpose of which is to allow mothers to recover after pregnancy and giving birth and to breastfeed their child, I think that the mother is the first “victim” of the refusal to award the benefit. The situation we have here is therefore not the same, it appears to me, as the one in Petrovic v. Austria of 27 March 1998, which concerned parental leave and in which the benefit in question, the provision for which was made under the unemployment insurance scheme, compensated the loss of salary. What was at stake in that case was the financial assistance for young parents that allowed them to take time out from work in order to look after their newborn child and in respect of which, in my view, there is no justification for treating fathers and mothers differently (see the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Bernhardt and Spielmann).',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Secondly, if the children’s mother had herself lodged an application with the Court, the refusal to award her maternity benefit on the basis of nationality could certainly have been challenged, on the basis of our case-law, as being contrary to Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 8, construed, inter alia, in the light of Article\xa012\xa0§\xa04 of the European Social Charter, which provides that domestic law cannot reserve social-security rights to their own nationals.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Secondly, if the children’s mother had herself lodged an application with the Court, the refusal to award her maternity benefit on the basis of nationality could certainly have been challenged, on the basis of our case-law, as being contrary to Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 8, construed, inter alia, in the light of Article\xa012\xa0§\xa04 of the European Social Charter, which provides that domestic law cannot reserve social-security rights to their own nationals.',
'elements': []}],
'section_name': 'conclusion'}],
'parties': ['WELLER', 'HUNGARY']},
{'itemid': '001-138579',
'docname': 'CASE OF DVORSKI v. CROATIA',
'doctypebranch': 'CHAMBER',
'ecli': 'ECLI:CE:ECHR:2013:1128JUD002570311',
'importance': 3,
'applicability': '',
'appno': '25703/11',
'decisiondate': None,
'introductiondate': None,
'judgementdate': '2013-11-28T00:00:00',
'kpdate': '2013-11-28T00:00:00',
'languageisocode': 'ENG',
'originatingbody_name': 'First Section',
'originatingbody_type': 'Court',
'rank': '131.37413',
'respondent': 'HRV',
'separateopinion': True,
'typedescription': 15,
'judgment': [{'content': 'PROCEDURE',
'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0The case originated in an application (no. 25703/11) against the lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Croatian national, Mr Ivan Dvorski (“the applicant”), on 16 April 2011.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0The applicant was represented by Ms S. Maroševac Čapko, a lawyer practising in . The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '3.\xa0\xa0The applicant in particular alleged that his right to a fair trial including the right to legal assistance of his own choosing and his right not to incriminate himself, under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention, had been violated.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '4.\xa0\xa0On 28 June 2011 the applicant’s complaints were communicated to the Government.',
'elements': []}],
'section_name': 'procedure'},
{'content': 'THE FACTS',
'elements': [{'content': 'I.\xa0\xa0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE',
'elements': [{'content': '5.\xa0\xa0The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in .',
'elements': []},
{'content': '6.\xa0\xa0On 13 March 2007 between 2 and 3.30 a.m. in Vežica, a residential neighbourhood of , three murders, an armed robbery and an arson attack were committed.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '7.\xa0\xa0During the same day, a number of people from Vežica were brought in for questioning at the Rijeka Third Police Station of the Primorsko-Goranska Police Department (Policijska uprava Primorsko-goranska, Treća policijska postaja Rijeka; hereinafter “Rijeka Police Station”).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '8.\xa0\xa0Around 1.00 p.m. the same day, the applicant was brought to the Rijeka Police Station for an interview. Blood samples were taken from him for DNA analysis and the police searched his flat and mobile phone and seized a number of his personal items.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '9.\xa0\xa0The applicant was kept at Rijeka Police Station until his arrest on 14\xa0March 2007 at 9.50 a.m. in connection with the above offences.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '10.\xa0\xa0According to the applicant, from the moment he was brought to Rijeka Police Station, he was put in a windowless cell with no light and kept without food and water until about 6 p.m. on 14 March 2007.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '11.\xa0\xa0According to the Government, the applicant had been kept in a detention room, although he had spent most of the time in an interview room. The detention room had been under video surveillance. In the interview room the applicant had been under the constant guard of a police officer and therefore could have asked for food or drink or to go to the toilet at any time. The detention room had been equipped with sanitary facilities and artificial light, but it had also had a window which had been secured with metal bars. There had also been a bed and a number of blankets to ensure rest. The applicant had been provided with hot meals and drinks and the Government submitted receipts for orders made in that respect.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '12.\xa0\xa0Meanwhile, on 14 March 2007 the applicant’s parents hired a lawyer, G.M., to represent the applicant. However, the police denied him access to the applicant (see paragraph 21 below).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '13.\xa0\xa0On the same date at 6 p.m. the applicant agreed to be represented by a lawyer, M.R. who arrived at Rijeka Police Station at around 7.45 p.m. The questioning of the applicant began at 8.10 p.m. According to the record of the applicant’s questioning, the police warned him of his right not to incriminate himself and to remain silent and he expressly stated that his lawyer was M.R.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '14.\xa0\xa0In the presence of M.R., three police officers and the Rijeka County State Attorney (Županijski državni odvjetnik u Rijeci), the applicant confessed that he had, together with L.O. and R.L.J., gone to Đ.V.’s flat in Vežica on the night of 13 March 2007, where he had taken a certain amount of money from Đ.V. and had then shot and killed him, his girlfriend and his father, after which he had set their flat on fire in order to destroy any trace of him having been there. He also stated that he had promised L.O. and R.LJ. that he would confess to the crimes and take the blame on him if they would be arrested. The applicant further stated that he had confessed to the crimes of his own free will and that he had not been under any form of pressure or coercion. By signing the record of the statement he also attested that he had been warned of his right not to incriminate himself. The questioning of the applicant ended at 11 p.m., with a short break in between in which the applicant had used the toilet.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '15.\xa0\xa0The lawyer hired by the applicant’s parents, G.M., lodged an action in the (Županijski sud u Rijeci) on 15 March 2007 asking that he be allowed to contact the applicant.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '16.\xa0\xa0On 15 March 2007 the Rijeka Police lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant and L.O. and R.L.J. with the Rijeka County State Attorney’s Office (Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Rijeci) concerning the above-mentioned three murders, armed robbery, and arson.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '17.\xa0\xa0On the same date, the applicant was brought before an investigating judge of the Rijeka County Court. When asked by the investigating judge whether his lawyer was M.R., who had been present during his police questioning, or G.M., who had a power of attorney signed by the applicant’s parents, the applicant stated that he was revoking the power of attorney to M.R. and granting it to G.M. by signing it himself.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '18.\xa0\xa0During questioning before the investigating judge the applicant complained that he had never hired M.R. and that he had expressly asked the police officers to call lawyer G.M. However, he had never been informed that G.M. had come to the police station. He also complained that he had been deprived of food until after he had given his statement and that during arrest he had been under the influence of drugs and alcohol.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '19.\xa0\xa0On 16 March 2007 the Rijeka County State Attorney’s Office asked the investigating judge of the Rijeka County Court to open an investigation against the applicant, L.O. and R.L.J., on the suspicion that on 13 March 2007 they had committed three aggravated murders and arson in Vežica.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '20.\xa0\xa0The investigating judge again heard the applicant on 16 March 2007 in the presence of G.M. The applicant remained silent and refused to answer any questions put to him by the investigating judge or the prosecution.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '21.\xa0\xa0On the same date, G.M. lodged a request for disqualification of the Rijeka County State Attorney and all his Deputies with the investigating judge. The investigating judge forwarded the request to the Rijeka County State Attorney’s Office. The relevant part of the request reads:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“About thirty minutes ago the defence lawyer learned that the Rijeka County State Attorney, D.H., had been present during the questioning of Ivan Dvorski as a suspect by police officers of Rijeka Police Station on 14 March 2007 at around 7 p.m., and in presence of ‘defence lawyer’ M.R.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'On the same date at around 10.40 a.m. the mother of Ivan Dvorski, L.J.D., who lives and works in Italy, called [G.M.] and asked him to defend her son Ivan, who was suspected of the offence of aggravated murder. Around 10.45 a.m. the defence lawyer came to Rijeka Police Station but the police officers refused to let him see Ivan Dvorski and they also did not tell [Ivan Dvorski] that his mother had hired a lawyer. The defence lawyer stayed in Rijeka Police Station until 12.00 p.m. He wanted to file a criminal complaint against an unknown person for abuse of power and extracting a confession, but the police officers refused to take his complaint on the grounds that he had no power of attorney and pushed him out of the police station. The defence lawyer immediately informed the Rijeka Attorneys, D.K. and I.B., about the incident and they made an official note in their case file.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Therefore, at around 12.30 p.m. the Rijeka State Attorney already knew that [G.M.] had been hired by [Ivan Dvorski’s] mother and that he could not contact his client.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'The [] County Court was also immediately informed.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'At around 1.30 p.m. Ivan Dvorski’s father signed a power of attorney for the defence of his son. A legal trainee, B.P., [then] tried to submit this power of attorney to the police but was told to ‘fuck off with that power of attorney’ and therefore it was not submitted.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'At around 3.00-3.30 p.m. defence lawyer [G.] M. again tried to contact his client in Rijeka Police Station but was denied access to him ... However, the defendant was never informed that a defence lawyer had been hired and that he had come to Rijeka Police Station.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Around 3.30 p.m. the defence lawyer informed the Chief of the Primorsko-Goranska Police Department ... Mr. V., who apparently made an official note concerning their conversation. However, the defendant was never informed that a defence lawyer had been hired and also never asked whether he wanted to be represented by the lawyer hired by his family.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Besides that, ever since he was brought to Rijeka Police Station [Ivan Dvorski] asked on a number of occasions that [G.M.] be called but was told by the police officers that they had tried but there had been no answer. When he was brought to the police station, blood samples were taken from the defendant. They show that he had a high level of alcohol and drugs in his blood.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Between 1.00 p.m. on 13 March 2007 and around 7.00 p.m. on 14 March 2007 (these time periods are only known to the defence lawyer from informal sources because he had no access to the Rijeka County State Attorney’s case file) the defendant was never given any food.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'It is clear that although all these facts were known to the Rijeka State Attorney, D.H., he disregarded them and, although personally present, allowed the defendant to be questioned in presence of a lawyer who had [neither been requested by him] nor [...] hired by his family. This amounts to extracting a confession contrary to Article 225 § 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Namely, the State Attorney, since about 12.30 p.m. [on 14 March 2007], knew who the defence lawyer was.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'On the same date the defence lawyer sent the power of attorney to the Primorsko-Goranska Police Department and written complaints were also sent to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, the State Attorney General of the Republic of Croatia, the Rijeka County State Attorney’s Office, the Croatian Bar Association, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the Chief of the Primorsko-Goranska Police Department and the Rijeka County Court. ...”',
'elements': []},
{'content': '22.\xa0\xa0On 16 March 2007 an investigation was opened in respect of the applicant, L.O. and R.L.J. on the suspicion that on 13 March 2007 they had committed the three aggravated murders and arson in Vežica.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '23.\xa0\xa0On 23 March 2007 the State Attorney General of the (Glavni državni odvjetnik Republike Hrvatske) dismissed G.M.’s request for disqualification of the Rijeka County State Attorney on the grounds that there were no reasons for his disqualification. On 26 March 2007 the Rijeka County State Attorney dismissed the request for disqualification of his Deputies on the same basis.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '24.\xa0\xa0On 28 March 2007 G.M. informed the that he would no longer represent the applicant and on 30 March 2007 the President of the appointed a legal aid lawyer, S.M.Č., to represent the applicant.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '25.\xa0\xa0During the investigation a number of witnesses were heard, and a report on the inspection of the crime scene and search and seizure, as well as medical, fire and ballistic expert reports, were obtained by the investigating judge.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '26.\xa0\xa0On 12 July 2007 the Rijeka County State Attorney’s Office indicted the applicant, L.O. and R.L.J. in the Rijeka County Court on three counts of aggravated murder and one count of arson committed on 13 March 2007 in Vežica.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '27.\xa0\xa0The applicant, represented by lawyer S.M.Č., lodged an objection against the indictment with the Rijeka County Court on 24 July 2007 on the grounds that it had contained numerous substantive and procedural flaws. He also argued that he had given his statement to the police under the influence of alcohol and drugs.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '28.\xa0\xa0The applicant’s objection against the indictment was dismissed as ill-founded by a three-judge panel of the Rijeka County Court on 28 August 2007.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '29.\xa0\xa0On 9 October 2007, the first day of the trial, the applicant and the other accused pleaded not guilty to all charges and the trial court heard evidence from seven witnesses.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '30.\xa0\xa0Another hearing was held on 11 October 2007, at which the trial court examined video recordings of the crime scene investigation and the autopsy of the victims.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '31.\xa0\xa0Further hearings were held on 12 November 2007 and 11\xa0January 2008, at which the trial court heard evidence from nine witnesses.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '32.\xa0\xa0At a hearing on 14 January 2008 two toxicological experts, a fingerprint expert, a ballistics expert and a DNA expert gave evidence. The defence made no objection in respect of their evidence. At the same hearing four other witnesses gave evidence.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '33.\xa0\xa0At a hearing held on 15 January 2008 the trial court heard another toxicological expert and a pathologist, as well as thirteen other witnesses. The defence made no objections in respect of the evidence of the expert witnesses but asked the trial court to commission a psychiatric report concerning the applicant.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '34.\xa0\xa0At the same hearing the defence lawyer asked that a handwriting expert’s report be commissioned in respect of the applicant’s signature on the record of his statement given to the police on 14 March 2007. She argued that the applicant had not signed any record during his questioning by the police.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '35.\xa0\xa0The trial court considered for the time being not necessary to commission a psychiatric report and thus dismissed the applicant’s request in that regard. However, it commissioned a handwriting expert’s report in respect of the signature on the record of the applicant’s statement given to the police.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '36.\xa0\xa0On 23 January 2008 the handwriting expert submitted her report. She found that the applicant had signed the record of his statement given to the police on 14 March 2007.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '37.\xa0\xa0Another hearing was held on 12 March 2008, at which a medical expert, fire expert witnesses and one other witness gave evidence. The handwriting expert also gave oral evidence confirming her previous findings. The applicant’s lawyer challenged the veracity of these findings and motioned to have another report commissioned, but the motion was dismissed by the trial court. At the same hearing, the trial court commissioned a psychiatric report in respect of the applicant and the other accused.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '38.\xa0\xa0On 2 April 2008 the applicant asked the Rijeka County Court to call lawyer G.M. as a witness in connection with the alleged unlawful extraction of his confession by the police. He pointed out that G.M. had not been allowed to see him while he had been in police custody and stated that he had been forced by the police officers to confess.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '39.\xa0\xa0On 24 April 2008 the two psychiatric experts submitted their report to the Rijeka County Court. They found that the applicant suffered from borderline personality disorder and addictions to heroin and alcohol. However, they found no distinctive mental disorder or illness. They concluded that, even assuming that he had been intoxicated at the time when the murders had been committed, he had retained the mental capacity to understand the nature of his acts, although it had been diminished to a degree. As to his mental capacity concerning the charge of arson, they concluded that, at the time when the offence had been committed, the applicant had been able to understand the nature of his acts and to control his actions.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '40.\xa0\xa0At a hearing on 26 June 2008 the psychiatric experts confirmed their findings and the parties made no objections to their evidence. The trial court also dismissed the applicant’s request that lawyer G.M. be heard as a witness on the grounds that all relevant facts had already been established.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '41.\xa0\xa0At the same hearing one of the accused, R.L.J., confirmed the course of the events as described by the applicant in his statement given to the police on 14 March 2007. R.L.J., however, claimed that he had not personally participated in the killings because he had panicked and had left the flat when he had heard fighting.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '42.\xa0\xa0After R.L.J. gave his statement, the Deputy County State Attorney amended the indictment. The applicant was charged with three aggravated murders, armed robbery and arson, and L.O. and R.LJ. were charged with armed robbery and aiding and abetting the perpetrator of an offence. The applicant and the other accused pleaded not guilty to the charges listed in the amended indictment.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '43.\xa0\xa0On 27 June 2008 L.O. gave oral evidence confirming the course of the events as described by R.L.J. He stated that after the applicant had gotten into a fight with Đ.V., he had heard gunshots, after which he had panicked and had left the flat.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '44.\xa0\xa0At the same hearing the parties made their closing arguments. The applicant’s defence lawyer argued that it had not been proven that the applicant had committed the offences he was charged with. She pointed out, however, that if the trial court considered differently, then the applicant’s confession to the police and his sincere regret had to be taken into consideration in sentencing him.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '45.\xa0\xa0On 30 June 2008 the Rijeka County Court found the applicant guilty of the three charges of aggravated murder and of the charges of armed robbery and arson and sentenced him to forty years’ imprisonment. The trial court firstly examined the applicant’s confession against the confession of the other co-accused and found that his confession was essentially consistent with the evidence provided by his co-accused, L.O. and R.L.J. When finding the applicant guilty the trial court took into account his confession and examined it against the evidence from the case file.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '46.\xa0\xa0The trial court in particular relied on the search and seizure records and the photographs depicting the accused L.O. holding the same type of handgun as was used for the murders. Based on the witness statements, and the recording of a nearby video surveillance, the trial court concluded that the applicant and the other co-accused had come to the flat of Đ.V. on the critical date. Furthermore, the ballistic reports and the crime scene reports indicated that the details of the statements of the applicant and his co-accused were accurate, and the course of the events was ascertained based on the fire, ballistic and toxicological reports and the DNA report. The trial court also found that the statements of the accused as to the manner in which the murders had been carried out were supported by the autopsy report, the evidence of the pathologist provided at the trial, the crime scene report and the witness statements about the gunshots that had been heard in the flat of Đ.V. Furthermore, as to the arson charges, the trial court examined the materials from the crime scene investigation and the evidence from the fire expert report, as well as medical records and damage reports submitted by the victims, and the statements of a number of residents in the building where the fire occurred.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '47.\xa0\xa0As regards the request made by the defence to hear lawyer G.M. (see paragraphs 38 and 40 above), the Rijeka County Court noted:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“The request made by the [Ivan Dvorski’s] defence to hear lawyer G.M. as a witness ... was dismissed as irrelevant. Namely, the documents from the case file do not reveal that there was any extraction of a confession by the police, but only [a record of] the time that lawyer [M.]R. came [to the police station], whereupon the questioning of [Ivan Dvorski] in presence of the lawyer to whom he had signed a power of attorney started ... Nobody, including [Ivan Dvorski’s] defence lawyer who was present during the police questioning – lawyer [M.]R., has alleged any extraction of a confession and there is no indication of that in the record of Ivan Dvorski’s statement, [who] at the time [was] only a suspect.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': '48.\xa0\xa0The applicant lodged an appeal against the first-instance judgment with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) on 6\xa0November 2008. He complained, inter alia, that the conviction had been based on his confession to the police, which had not been given in presence of a lawyer of his own choosing, namely G.M., but in the presence of a lawyer, M.R., who had been offered to him by the police. The applicant also referred to the request for disqualification of the Rijeka County State Attorney and all his Deputies lodged by G.M. on 16 March 2007, highlighting the part of that request which stated that he had been denied food during his police detention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '49.\xa0\xa0On 8 April 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal as ill-founded. As regards his complaints concerning his statement given to the police, that court noted:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“... The lawfulness of [the statement given to the police] was not put into doubt by the appellant’s complaints that lawyer M.R. had not been his lawyer and that his lawyer had been G.M., who had been hired by his father and mother on the same day, nor was its lawfulness put into doubt by the complaints that the appellant had been denied food in the period between 1.00 p.m. on 13 March 2007 and 7.00 p.m. on 14\xa0March 2007 until he had agreed to hire lawyer M.R., since according to the record of his arrest (pages ...) the appellant had been arrested at 9.50 a.m. on 14 March 2007 and lawyer M.R. had arrived [at the police station] at 6.45 p.m. on the same day.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': '50.\xa0\xa0The applicant lodged a further appeal against the appellate judgment with the Supreme Court on 14 September 2009 reiterating his previous arguments.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '51.\xa0\xa0On 17 December 2009 the Supreme Court, acting as the court of final appeal, dismissed the applicant’s appeal as ill-founded. That court stressed that the record of the applicant’s statement suggested that the applicant had chosen lawyer M.R. to represent him during the police questioning and that lawyer M.R. had provided him adequate legal advice. The Supreme Court also noted that nothing in the case file indicated that the applicant had been ill-treated or forced to confess.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '52.\xa0\xa0The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) on 11 March 2010. He complained, inter alia, that he had been ill-treated during his police detention and that he had been forced to confess. He also complained that he had been denied the chance to have a lawyer of his own choosing conduct his defence.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '53.\xa0\xa0On 16 September 2010 the dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint. The Constitutional Court, endorsing the reasoning of the Supreme Court, noted that the proceedings as a whole had been fair and that there was no evidence in the case file that the applicant had been ill-treated during his police detention.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'II.\xa0\xa0RELEVANT LAW',
'elements': [{'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Domestic law',
'elements': [{'content': '54.\xa0\xa0The relevant provisions of the Constitution of the (Ustav Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette no. 56/1990, 135/1997, 113/2000, 28/2001, 76/2010) read as follows:',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Article 23', 'elements': []},
{'content': '“No one shall be subjected to any form of ill-treatment ...”',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Article 29', 'elements': []},
{'content': '“In the determination of his rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court established by law.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'In the case of suspicion of a criminal offence or criminal charges [being brought], the suspect, defendant or accused shall have the right:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '...', 'elements': []},
{'content': '- to defend himself in person or with the assistance of a defence lawyer of his own choosing, and if he does not have sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free as provided by law,',
'elements': []},
{'content': '...”', 'elements': []},
{'content': '55.\xa0\xa0The relevant provisions of the Criminal Code (Kazneni zakon, Official Gazette nos. 110/1997, 27/1998, 129/2000, 51/2001, 105/2004, 84/2005, 71/2006) provide:',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'AGGRAVATED MURDER', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'Article 91', 'elements': []},
{'content': '“A sentence of imprisonment of not less than ten years or long-term imprisonment shall be imposed on anyone who:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '...', 'elements': []},
{'content': '6. murders another in order to commit or to cover up another criminal offence,',
'elements': []},
{'content': '...”', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'ROBBERY', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'Article 218', 'elements': []},
{'content': '“(1) Whoever, by use of force against a person or using threats of a direct attack on a person’s life or limb, takes away movable property from another with intent to unlawfully appropriate it shall be punished by imprisonment for one to ten years.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '(2) If the perpetrator commits the robbery as a member of a group or a criminal organisation, or if, during the robbery, a weapon or dangerous instrument is used, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for three to fifteen years.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'ENDANGERING LIFE AND PROPERTY BY DANGEROUS ACT OR MEANS',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Article 263', 'elements': []},
{'content': '“(1) Whoever endangers the life or limb of others or property of considerable value by [setting a] fire ... shall be punished by imprisonment for six months to five years.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': '...', 'elements': []},
{'content': '(3) If the criminal offences referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article are committed at a place where a number of people are gathered ... the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for one to eight years.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '...”', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'AGGRAVATED CRIMINAL OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC SAFETY',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Article 271', 'elements': []},
{'content': '“(1) If by the criminal offence referred to in Article 263, paragraph 1 ... of this Code the serious bodily injury of another or extensive material damage was caused, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for one to eight years.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': '56.\xa0\xa0The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Zakon o\xa0kaznenom postupku, Official Gazette nos. 110/1997, 27/1998, 58/1999, 112/1999, 58/2002, 143/2002 and 62/2003) provide as follows:',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Article 62', 'elements': []},
{'content': '“(1) A defendant may be represented by a lawyer at any stage of the proceedings, as well as before their commencement when prescribed by this Act. ...',
'elements': []},
{'content': '...', 'elements': []},
{'content': '(4) The defendant’s legal guardian, spouse or common-law spouse, linear blood relative, adoptive parent or adopted child, sibling or foster parent may hire a lawyer for the defendant, unless the defendant expressly refuses it.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '...', 'elements': []},
{'content': '(6) A defence lawyer must present his power of attorney to the authorities conducting the proceedings. The defendant may also grant a power of attorney to a lawyer orally before the authority conducting the proceedings, in which case it must be entered into the record.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Article 177', 'elements': []},
{'content': '“ ...', 'elements': []},
{'content': '(5) In the course of the investigation the police authorities shall inform the suspect pursuant to Article 237 paragraph 2 of this Code. Upon the request of the suspect, the police authorities shall allow him to hire a lawyer and for that purpose they shall stop interviewing the suspect until the lawyer appears or at the latest three hours from the moment the suspect asked to appoint the lawyer. ... If the circumstances show that the chosen lawyer will not be able to appear within this period of time, the police authorities shall allow the suspect to appoint a lawyer from the list of lawyers on duty provided to the competent police authority by the county branches of the Croatian Bar Association ... If the suspect does not hire a lawyer or if the requested lawyer fails to appear within the time period provided, the police authorities may resume interviewing the suspect ... The State Attorney has the right to be present during the questioning. The record of [any] statement given by the defendant to the police authorities in presence of a lawyer may be used as evidence in the criminal proceedings.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '...”', 'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Relevant international law materials',
'elements': [{'content': 'Right of access to a lawyer of own choosing during police custody',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': '(a)\xa0\xa0Council of Europe',
'elements': [{'content': '57.\xa0\xa0Rule 93 of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Resolution (73)5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe) provides: “An untried prisoner shall be entitled, as soon as he is imprisoned, to choose his legal representation ... and to receive visits from his legal adviser with a view to his defence and to prepare and hand to him and to receive, confidential instructions. At his request, he shall be given all necessary facilities for this purpose. ... Interviews between the prisoner and his legal adviser may be within sight but not within hearing, either direct or indirect, of a police or institution official.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': '58.\xa0\xa0Furthermore, the recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States of the Council of Europe on the European Prison Rules (Rec\xa0(2006)2), adopted on 11 January 2006 at the 952nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“Legal advice', 'elements': []},
{'content': '23.1\tAll prisoners are entitled to legal advice, and the prison authorities shall provide them with reasonable facilities for gaining access to such advice.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '23.2\tPrisoners may consult on any legal matter with a legal adviser of their own choice and at their own expense.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '...', 'elements': []},
{'content': '23.5\tA judicial authority may in exceptional circumstances authorise restrictions on such confidentiality to prevent serious crime or major breaches of prison safety and security.”',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': '(b)\xa0\xa0United Nations',
'elements': [{'content': '59.\xa0\xa0Article 14 § 3 (b) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence is to be entitled “[t]o have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing”.',
'elements': []}]}]}],
'section_name': 'facts'},
{'content': 'THE LAW',
'elements': [{'content': 'I.\xa0\xa0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION',
'elements': [{'content': '60.\xa0\xa0The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated during his police detention. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Admissibility',
'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0The parties’ arguments',
'elements': [{'content': '61.\xa0\xa0The applicant submitted that between 1 p.m. on 13 March 2007 and 7 p.m. on 14 March 2007 he had been kept in police detention in a windowless cell with no light and without food and water and that the domestic authorities had failed to respond appropriately to his complaints in this respect.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '62.\xa0\xa0The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of his Article 3 complaints, as he had not brought a criminal complaint against the police officers or a civil action for damages against the State. They further argued that he had submitted his application to the Court outside the six-month time-limit, as his complaints concerned his police detention on 14 March 2007 and his application had been lodged with the Court on 16 April 2011.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '63.\xa0\xa0In any event, the Government considered that the applicant had failed to substantiate his complaints of ill-treatment during his police detention. In this respect, the Government provided photographs of the detention facilities in Rijeka Police Station and service orders for food and drinks during the police operation in which the applicant had been arrested. They pointed out that the photographs showed that the applicant had been kept in appropriate conditions with all necessary facilities and that the food service orders showed that food and drink had been given to the applicant during his police detention. The Government further submitted that only about twenty police officers had taken part in the police operation, while significant amounts of food had been ordered in the period of the applicant’s arrest and detention.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0The Court’s assessment',
'elements': [{'content': '64.\xa0\xa0The Court finds that it is not necessary to address all of the Government’s objections, as the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '65.\xa0\xa0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim’s behaviour (see Labita v.\xa0Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000-IV).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '66.\xa0\xa0According to the Court’s settled case-law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Kudła v.\xa0Poland [GC], no.\xa030210/96, § 91, ECHR 2000-XI, and Peers v.\xa0Greece, no.\xa028524/95, §\xa067, ECHR\xa02001-III).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '67.\xa0\xa0In order for a punishment or treatment associated with it to be “inhuman” or “degrading”, the suffering or humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment (see Labita, cited above, § 120).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '68.\xa0\xa0Measures depriving a person of his liberty may often involve such an element. Nevertheless, the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured by, among other things, providing him with the requisite medical assistance (see Kudła, cited above, §§ 93-94, and Riviere v.\xa0France, no. 33834/03, § 62, 11\xa0July 2006).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '69.\xa0\xa0Allegations of ill-treatment must be supported by appropriate evidence (see Labita, cited above, § 121). The Court has held on many occasions that in assessing evidence it has generally applied the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”, but adds that such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18\xa0January 1978, § 161, Series A no. 25).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '70.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that there is no dispute between the parties that the applicant was placed in the detention facilities of Rijeka Police Station which are depicted on the photographs provided by the Government. These photographs show that the detention room is equipped with appropriate sanitary facilities and a bed, as well as an artificial light and a window allowing daylight to come into the room. There is no reason for the Court to consider that these facilities differed in any respect during the applicant’s detention, and the Court does not consider that placing the applicant there when he was not being interrogated discloses any appearance of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '71.\xa0\xa0As regards the applicant’s complaints that he was not given food or water during police detention, the Court observes that the receipts for food and drink service orders provided by the Government show that on 13\xa0March 2007 the police ordered seventy hot meals with the purpose of facilitating the investigation in the present case. On 14 March 2007, the day of the applicant’s police detention, as well as that of two other co-suspects, an additional thirty-five hot meals and thirty-six soft drinks were ordered.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '72.\xa0\xa0Whereas this does not necessary show that the applicant received any of the food or drink ordered, it does indicate that the number of hot meals ordered significantly exceeded the number required by the police officers themselves. In this respect it is also to be noted that none of the applicant’s co-accused ever complained that they had been denied food or water during police detention. In these circumstances, the Court cannot consider the applicant’s mere assertion that he was not given any food or water during police detention sufficiently substantiated.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '73.\xa0\xa0Thus, as the applicant’s submissions have not otherwise in any way substantiated his allegations of ill-treatment during the police questioning on 13 and 14 March 2007, the Court finds that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.',
'elements': []}]}]}]},
{'content': 'II.\xa0\xa0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION',
'elements': [{'content': '74.\xa0\xa0The applicant complained that he had not had a fair trial. In support of his complaint the applicant argued that following his arrest he had not been allowed to be represented by a lawyer of his choice; that the services of the lawyer who had represented him had fallen short of the requirements of a good defence; that he had been questioned in a coercive environment; that he had been forced to incriminate himself without the benefit of legal advice from a lawyer of his own choosing and that his conviction was based on the statements made while unrepresented by the lawyer of his choice.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'He relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, read as follows:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...',
'elements': []},
{'content': '...', 'elements': []},
{'content': '3.\xa0\xa0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '...', 'elements': []},
{'content': '(c)\xa0\xa0to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;',
'elements': []},
{'content': '... “', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Admissibility',
'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0The parties’ submissions',
'elements': [{'content': '75.\xa0\xa0The Government submitted that the power of attorney of 16\xa0April 2011, which the applicant’s representative had provided to the Court, had not been signed by the applicant. In their view, the applicant’s signature on the power of attorney did not correspond to his actual signature. They also pointed out that during 2011 the applicant had neither met nor communicated with the lawyer representing him in the proceedings before the Court. The lawyer had, however, visited him in September 2010, but at that time the had still not served its decision on the applicant so there had been no reason for him to sign a power of attorney to be represented in proceedings before the Court. Therefore, the Government requested that the application be struck out from the list of cases.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '76.\xa0\xa0The applicant argued that he had given the power of attorney to his representative in September 2010. He had given her a power of attorney before the decision of the had been served on him because, having in mind the public pressure that had been put on the authorities to secure a conviction in his case, he had expected that the would dismiss his constitutional complaint. Since the prison in which he had been serving his prison sentence was some distance from , where his lawyer had her office, they had arranged to take all necessary steps, including the power of attorney, for lodging an application with the Court in September 2010. The exact date on the power of attorney granted by him had been filled in later with the applicant’s knowledge and consent. Besides that, he had been in constant contact with his representative – either through his mother, who had been visiting him regularly, or by telephone.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0The Court’s assessment',
'elements': [{'content': '77.\xa0\xa0The Court reiterates at the outset that the representative of the applicant must produce a “power of attorney or a written authority to act” (see Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. [GC], no. 27765/09, § 52, ECHR 2012). Therefore, a simple written authority would be valid for the purposes of the proceedings before the Court, in so far as it has not been shown that it was made without the applicant’s understanding and consent (see Velikova v.\xa0Bulgaria, no. 41488/98, § 50, ECHR 2000-VI).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '78.\xa0\xa0Furthermore, neither the Convention nor the Rules of Court impose any specific requirements on the manner in which the form of authority must be drafted or require any form of certification of that document by any national authority. What is important for the Court is that the form of authority should clearly indicate that the applicant has entrusted his or her representation before the Court to a representative and that the representative has accepted that commission (see Ryabov v.\xa0Russia, no.\xa03896/04, §§ 40 and 43, 31 January 2008).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '79.\xa0\xa0The Court notes in the present case that the power of attorney, dated 16 April 2011, included in the case file bears the applicant’s name and is signed in handwriting. The Court is unable by mere observation, and in the absence of direct and convincing evidence to the contrary, to doubt that the signature on the power of attorney is the applicant’s.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '80.\xa0\xa0The Court also notes that the applicant provided detailed information concerning his contacts with his representative which do not appear unreasonable and unconvincing. Moreover, there is nothing in the case file that could call into question the lawyer’s account or her exchange of information concerning the applicant with the Court (see Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, § 55).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '81.\xa0\xa0In these circumstances, the Court has no reason to doubt the validity of the power of attorney. Consequently, it rejects the Government’s objection. The Court further considers that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.',
'elements': []}]}]},
{'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Merits',
'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0The parties’ submissions',
'elements': [{'content': '82.\xa0\xa0The applicant submitted that throughout his detention in Rijeka Police Station the lawyer hired by his parents, G.M., had been unable to contact him. G.M. had therefore filed numerous complaints with various domestic authorities, including a request for disqualification of the Rijeka State Attorney and all his Deputies, by which he had sought to cease that illegal situation. Instead, the police had only allowed lawyer M.R., notably the former chief of the Primorsko-Goranska Police Department, to contact the applicant in order for the applicant to make a self-incriminating statement. Lawyer M.R. had been called by the police officers and not by the applicant as he had been a person whom the police officers could trust to make the applicant confess to the crimes he had been suspected of. The fact that lawyer M.R. had never asked the applicant to pay for legal representation proved that he had been cooperating with the police.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '83.\xa0\xa0The representation of the applicant by M.R. had fallen short of the requirements of a good defence. They had only had twenty-five minutes to discuss the case, which had been disproportionate to the severity of the crimes the applicant had been accused of and the fact that he had been questioned for almost three hours. This, together with the fact that the applicant had been starved and kept in inhumane conditions and that he had been under the influence of drugs and alcohol, had made the applicant confess to the crimes. Furthermore, the applicant complained that the trial court had relied on his statement given to the police and dismissed his request to hear certain witnesses, including lawyer G.M., which would have allowed it to elucidate the circumstances of the applicant’s questioning at the police station and the accusations held against him. Therefore, he had not had a fair trial.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '84.\xa0\xa0The Government argued that the applicant had had the benefit of all the guarantees of a fair trial during the criminal proceedings against him and that the proceedings, taken as a whole, had been fair. Throughout the proceedings the applicant had been represented by a qualified lawyer and he had effectively participated at the trial having had every opportunity to question witnesses and to make all his comments. Furthermore, the applicant’s case had been examined at three instances including the . The first-instance judgment had been based on his confession but also on a number of other evidence from the case file. As to the applicant’s right not to incriminate himself, the Government submitted that it had not been infringed in any respect, since he had confessed to the crimes of his own free will and conscience, after consulting a lawyer. In this respect they pointed out that the applicant had signed his statement by which he had expressly confirmed that he had not been coerced or pressured to make the statement. The circumstances of the case revealed that there had been no reason for the police officers to question his mental ability to understand the circumstances in which he had found himself and to make a fully conscience statement.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '85.\xa0\xa0The applicant had been given sufficient time, according to the record of his questioning approximately two hours, in which to consult with his lawyer and had given his statement thereafter. Lawyer M.R. had been chosen by the applicant from a list of lawyers provided in every police station and the applicant had granted him a power of attorney. In the presence of that lawyer, he had given a statement to the police which had been made without any pressure or coercion. The fact that the applicant had been represented by another lawyer in later stages of the proceedings was irrelevant to the fact that M.R. had been his chosen lawyer who had represented him in accordance with their agreement and defence strategy at that stage.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0The Court’s assessment', 'elements': []}]},
{'content': '(a)\xa0\xa0General principles',
'elements': [{'content': '86.\xa0\xa0The applicant alleged that he did not have a fair trial and complained of a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c). The Court first notes that the guarantees in paragraph 3 of Article 6 are specific aspects of the right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings as set forth in paragraph 1 of the same Article. Accordingly, the applicant’s complaint will be examined under these provisions taken together (see, among other authorities, Poitrimol v.\xa0France, 23 November 1993, § 29, Series A no. 277A; Benham v.\xa0the United Kingdom, 10 June 1996, § 52, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996III; Krombach v. , no. 29731/96, § 82, ECHR 2001II; Kulikowski v. Poland, no. 18353/03, § 55, 19 May 2009; Sakhnovskiy v.\xa0Russia [GC], no. 21272/03, § 94, 2 November 2010; Zagorodniy v.\xa0Ukraine, no. 27004/06, § 52, 24 November 2011; and Neziraj v.\xa0Germany, no. 30804/07, § 45, 8 November 2012).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '87.\xa0\xa0In this context, the Court reiterates that Article 6 of the Convention, read as a whole, guarantees the right of an accused to participate effectively in a criminal trial (see Rowe and Davis v.\xa0the\xa0United Kingdom [GC], no.\xa028901/95, § 60, ECHR 2000-II).\xa0In particular, the accused must have the opportunity to organise his defence in an appropriate way and without restriction as to the opportunity to put all relevant defence arguments before the trial court and thus to influence the outcome of the proceedings (see Luchaninova v. , no. 16347/02, § 62, 9 June 2011).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '88.\xa0\xa0In order to exercise his right of defence, the accused should normally be allowed to effectively benefit from the assistance of a lawyer from the initial stages of the proceedings (see Salduz v. [GC], no. 36391/02, §\xa052, 27 November 2008). The right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer is one of the fundamental features of a fair trial (see Krombach v. France, cited above, § 89).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '89.\xa0\xa0A person charged with a criminal offence who does not wish to defend himself in person must be able to have recourse to legal assistance of his own choosing (see Campbell and Fell v.\xa0the United Kingdom, 28\xa0June 1984, § 99, Series\xa0A no.\xa080; Pakelli v. Germany, 25 April 1983, §\xa031, Series\xa0A no. 64; and Whitfield and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 46387/99, 48906/99, 57410/00 and 57419/00, § 48, 12 April 2005). Notwithstanding the importance of a relationship of confidence between lawyer and client, this right cannot be considered to be absolute (see Prehn v. Germany (dec.), no. 40451/06, 24 August 2010). The national authorities may override the defendant’s wish relating to legal representation when there are relevant and sufficient grounds for holding that this is necessary in the interests of justice (see Croissant v. Germany, 25 September 1992, §§\xa029 and 30, Series A no.\xa0237-B, and Pavlenko v. , no. 42371/02, § 98, 1 April 2010).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '90.\xa0\xa0The Court further reiterates its established case-law according to which the State cannot normally be held responsible for the actions or decisions of an accused person’s lawyer (see Stanford v. the United Kingdom, 23\xa0February 1994, § 28, Series A no. 282A) because the conduct of the defence is essentially a matter between the defendant and his counsel, whether appointed under a legal aid scheme or privately financed (see Czekalla v. , no.\xa038830/97, §\xa060, ECHR 2002VIII; see also Bogumil v. , no. 35228/03, §\xa046, 7\xa0October 2008). Nevertheless, in the case of a manifest failure by counsel appointed under the legal aid scheme, or in certain circumstances a privately paid lawyer, to provide effective representation, Article 6\xa0§\xa03 (c) of the Convention requires the national authorities to intervene (see Güveç v. , no. 70337/01, §§\xa0130-131, ECHR 2009).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '91.\xa0\xa0As regards the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to remain silent, the Court reiterates that these are generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of a fair procedure. Their aim is to provide an accused person with protection against improper compulsion by the authorities and thus to avoid miscarriages of justice and secure the aims of Article 6 of the Convention. The right not to incriminate oneself is primarily concerned with respecting the will of an accused person to remain silent and presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case will seek to prove the case against the accused without resorting to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused. In examining whether a procedure has impaired the very essence of the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court must examine the nature and degree of any compulsion, the existence of any relevant safeguards in the procedure and the use to which any material so obtained is put (see Bykov v. [GC], no. 4378/02, § 92, 10 March 2009).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '92.\xa0\xa0The Court underlines the importance of the investigation stage for the preparation of the criminal proceedings, as the evidence obtained during this stage determines the framework in which the offence charged will be considered at the trial (see Salduz, cited above, § 54). At the same time, an accused often finds himself in a particularly vulnerable position at that stage of the proceedings, the effect of which is amplified by the fact that legislation on criminal procedure has tended to become increasingly complex, notably with respect to the rules governing the gathering and use of evidence. In most cases, this particular vulnerability can only be properly compensated for by the assistance of a lawyer whose task is, among other things, to help to ensure that the right of an accused not to incriminate himself is respected (see Pavlenko, cited above, § 101).',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': '(b)\xa0\xa0Application of these principles to the present case',
'elements': [{'content': '93.\xa0\xa0The Court considers, in view of the applicant’s complaints, that the central issue raised in this case is the applicant’s right to retain counsel of his own choice; and whether as a result of not having that opportunity, he was prevailed upon in a coercive environment to incriminate himself without the benefit of effective legal advice.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '94.\xa0\xa0The Court notes at the outset that the present case does not concern a situation in which the applicant was provided with a legal aid lawyer by the police, but rather a situation in which he was offered a choice of lawyer provided by the police, whose services the applicant had to pay for from his own funds. Therefore, the following wording of Article 6 § 3 (c) is applicable in the present case: “Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: ... to defend himself ... through legal assistance of his own choosing ...”. Thus, the Court considers that, in principle, an accused in criminal proceedings who is bearing the costs of his or her legal representation has the right to choose his or her defence lawyer, save for in exceptional circumstances where it is necessary to override this right in the interests of justice or where this is associated with justifiable and significant obstacles (see Pavlenko, cited above, § 98, and Klimentyev v.\xa0Russia, no. 46503/99, §§ 116-119, 16 November 2006).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '95.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that when the applicant was arrested by the police, his family contacted lawyer G.M. to represent him. G.M., according to his account of the events (see paragraph 21 above), which the Government did not dispute, arrived at Rijeka Police Station on 14 March 2007 at around 10.45 a.m., before the questioning of the applicant by the police commenced. At that time G.M. did not have the power of attorney. The police did not allow him to see the applicant, neither did they tell the applicant that G.M. had been hired as his defence lawyer by his parents.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '96.\xa0\xa0Later on the same date, at around 1.30 p.m., a legal trainee in G.M.’s office tried to contact the applicant at Rijeka Police Station, submitting a power of attorney signed by the applicant’s father authorising G.M. to represent the applicant, but was again denied access without the applicant being told that G.M. was trying to contact him. At the same time, G.M. informed other relevant domestic authorities about the conduct of the police officers refusing him access to the applicant.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '97.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that the documents in the criminal case file against the applicant do not reveal any good reasons for not allowing the lawyer G.M. to provide legal assistance to the applicant during police questioning, and neither the national courts nor the Government have provided any arguments in respect of the matter. The applicant, when brought before the investigating judge on 15 March 2007, the day after his arrest, expressly stated that he wished to be represented by lawyer G.M. (see paragraph\xa017 above), to whom the police officers had denied access without providing any relevant reasons. Instead, without having told the applicant that G.M. had been hired as his defence lawyer by his parents, the police officers, according to the Government (see paragraph 85 above), offered the applicant a list of lawyers in accordance with Article 177 § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 56 above) in order for him to choose one to represent him during police questioning, and from this list of lawyers, M.R. was hired to represent the applicant.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '98.\xa0\xa0The Court observes that the Government never provided the list of lawyers which was allegedly presented to the applicant. The Court also notes that the Government did not dispute that M.R. had been the former chief of the Rijeka Police and that this lawyer had never charged the applicant for his services, which would normally be expected of a privately hired lawyer. In these circumstances, the Court has serious doubts as to whether the police acted in good faith and whether M.R. was a lawyer who would actually have been chosen by the applicant if he knew that his parents had engaged services of lawyer G.M. The fact that the applicant signed a power of attorney in favour of this lawyer authorising him to be present during his police questioning, in the circumstances of the present case, has no bearing on this finding, since it is the Court’s well-established principle that the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are practical and effective and not theoretical and illusory (see Airey v. , 9\xa0October 1979, § 24, Series A no. 32; Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, 24 November 1993, §\xa038, Series A no. 275; and Salduz, cited above, § 55).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '99.\xa0\xa0Therefore, the Court excludes any possibility that by merely signing the power of attorney and providing a statement to the police, the applicant explicitly and unequivocally waived his right to retain G.M. as the lawyer of his own choosing and instead consented to be represented by M.R. This is because the right to counsel, being a fundamental right among those which constitute the notion of a fair trial and ensuring the effectiveness of the rest of the guarantees laid down in Article 6 of the Convention, is a prime example of those rights which require the special protection of the “knowing and intelligent waiver” standard established in the Court’s case-law (see Pishchalnikov v. , no. 7025/04, §§ 77-79, 24 September 2009).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '100.\xa0\xa0The foregoing considerations raise serious concerns as to the manner in which the domestic authorities acted and as to the applicant’s representation by a lawyer of his own choosing during the pre-trial interrogation by the police, guaranteed under Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention. It consequently calls for the Court’s careful scrutiny in assessing whether the proceedings as a whole fall short of the requirements of a fair trial as required under Article 6 of the Convention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '101.\xa0\xa0In this respect the Court notes that during the criminal proceedings the applicant never complained that the lawyer M.R. had failed to provide him with adequate legal advice. The record of the applicant’s statement to the police does not reveal any deficiencies in the advice given to the applicant concerning his rights. His statement was given over the course of several hours, during which time the applicant never refused to provide further information, and at the end of the questioning he acknowledged the accuracy of the information provided by signing the record of the statement.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '102.\xa0\xa0Furthermore, the Court observes that it has found that the applicant failed to substantiate his allegations that he was subjected to ill-treatment or that the conditions of his police detention were inadequate (see paragraph 73 above). Accordingly, there are no grounds to believe that any pressure was exerted on him or that there was any defiance of his will.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '103.\xa0\xa0Equally, the Court notes that the psychiatric report commissioned during the trial found that the applicant was able to understand the nature of his acts and to control his actions at the time when the offences were committed, which was only one day before he made the incriminating statements (see paragraph 39 above). Moreover, although the applicant claimed that he was under the influence of drugs and alcohol during police questioning, there is no concrete evidence in the case file to support such an assertion or to suggest that the degree of his addiction was such as to prevent him from understanding the nature and purpose of his questioning.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '104.\xa0\xa0During the trial before the the applicant was given an opportunity to put forward all his arguments concerning the circumstances in which he had given his statement, and after he had raised the argument that he had never signed the record of the statement, he was afforded an effective opportunity to challenge the authenticity of his signature. However, the evidence adduced, namely the handwriting expert’s report, conclusively confirmed that the applicant had signed the statement by which he had given his confession to the police (see paragraph\xa036 above). Therefore, it cannot be said that the applicant’s objections regarding the admissibility of his statement as evidence were ignored by the trial court (see, by contrast, Desde v. , no. 23909/03, § 130, 1 February 2011).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '105.\xa0\xa0Throughout the court proceedings the applicant had the benefit of effective legal advice, and the trial court afforded him an adequate opportunity to participate in the proceedings and to put forward his arguments in respect of the charges and all the relevant evidence adduced; his arguments were duly taken into account. The Court also notes that in his closing arguments at the trial the applicant, through his representative, presented the confession he had given to the police while represented by the lawyer M.R. as a proof of his sincere regret for the crimes committed in order for it to be taken into account as a mitigating factor in the sentencing procedure (see paragraph 44 above).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '106.\xa0\xa0Furthermore, the Court notes that the applicant’s confession was not the central platform of the prosecution’s case (see, by contrast, Magee v.\xa0the United Kingdom, no. 28135/95, § 45, ECHR 2000VI), and that the trial court relied on his statement interpreting it in the light of a complex body of evidence assessed by the court (compare Bykov, cited above, §\xa0103). Specifically, when convicting the applicant, the trial court relied on the statements of a number of witnesses cross-examined during the trial, numerous expert reports and the records of the crime-scene investigation and searches and seizures, as well as relevant photographs and other physical evidence (see paragraphs 29-43 and 45-46 above). In addition, the trial court had at its disposal the confessions made by the applicant’s co-accused at the trial and neither the applicant nor his co-accused ever argued that any of their rights had been infringed when they had made those statements.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '107.\xa0\xa0Therefore, although the applicant was not represented by a lawyer selected on the basis of a fully informed choice during the police questioning, the Court does not consider that this rendered the proceedings as a whole unfair (compare O’Kane v.\xa0the (dec.), no.\xa030550/96, 6 July 1999), since all the applicant’s rights were adequately secured during the trial and his confession was not the sole, let alone the decisive, evidence in the case and as such did not call into question his conviction and sentence (compare Gäfgen v. [GC], no. 22978/05, §\xa0187, ECHR 2010; and, by contrast, Martin v. Estonia, no. 35985/09, §\xa095-96, 30 May 2013).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '108.\xa0\xa0Against the above background, and in view of the principle that the requirements of Article 6 § 3 are to be seen as particular aspects of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article\xa06 § 1 of the Convention (see, for example, Zagorodniy, cited above, § 51) and the requirement for the Court to evaluate the fairness of the criminal proceedings as a whole (see Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the [GC], nos.\xa026766/05 and 22228/06, § 118, ECHR 2011), the Court considers that it has not been shown that the applicant’s defence rights have been irretrievably prejudiced or that his right to a fair trial under Article 6 has been adversely affected (see, mutatis mutandis, Mamaç and Others v. , nos. 29486/95, 29487/95 and 29853/96, § 48, 20 April 2004, and Sarıkaya v. Turkey, no.\xa036115/97, § 67, 22 April 2004; and, by contrast, Martin, cited above, §\xa097).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '109.\xa0\xa0Accordingly, in the light of these considerations, given the particular circumstances of the present case, the Court concludes that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 read in conjunction with § 3 (c) of the Convention.',
'elements': []}]}]},
{'content': 'III.\xa0\xa0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION',
'elements': [{'content': '110.\xa0\xa0Lastly, the applicant complained that his requests to hear certain witnesses had been denied without good reason.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '111.\xa0\xa0In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court considers that this complaint does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention. It follows that it is inadmissible under Article\xa035 § 3 as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article\xa035 §\xa04 of the Convention.',
'elements': []}]}],
'section_name': 'law'},
{'content': 'FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT',
'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0Declares unanimously the complaint concerning the applicant’s right to a fair trial admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;',
'elements': []},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0Holds by five votes to two that there has been no violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Done in English, and notified in writing on 28 November 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judges I. Berro-Lefèvre and J.\xa0Laffranque is annexed to this judgment.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Unfortunately we are unable to follow the majority in finding no violation of Article 6 § 1 read in conjunction with Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention. We consider that there was a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3\xa0(c), for the following reasons.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Central issue of this case and previous case-law of the Court',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'The central issue of this present case is the applicant’s right under Article\xa06 § 3 (c) of the Convention to defend himself through legal assistance of his own choosing. As a result of his not having had this opportunity, it cannot be excluded that the applicant was prevailed upon in a coercive environment to incriminate himself. The foregoing affected the entire trial, made it unfair and led to a violation of Article 6 § 1.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Recently the Court dealt with a similar issue in the case of Martin v. Estonia, no. 35985/09, 30 May 2013, where it found a violation because the counsel of the applicant’s own choosing was denied access to him. The Court pointed out in this connection that the guarantees in Article 6 §\xa03 (c) are specific aspects of the right to a fair hearing set forth in paragraph 1 of that provision, which must be taken into account in any assessment of the fairness of proceedings. In addition, the Court’s primary concern under Article 6 § 1 is to evaluate the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings. The Court also had regard to the subsequent use of statements made by the applicant during the preliminary investigation in breach of his defence rights. It is unfortunate that in the present case the majority did not follow the approach adopted unanimously in Martin v. Estonia.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Violation of the right to be represented by counsel of one’s own choosing',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'In the present case, when the applicant was arrested by the police his family engaged the services of lawyer G.M. to represent him. However, the police denied G.M. access to the applicant without giving any valid reason. Furthermore, the applicant had never been informed that G.M. had come to the police station, even though he had expressly stated that he wished to be represented by G.M. Instead, according to the Government, the police offered the applicant a list of lawyers from which to choose one to represent him during police questioning, the Government failed to produce that list before the Court.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'We are concerned that in § 94 of the judgment, without any explanation, the majority use the expression “legal aid lawyer provided by the police” and “choice of lawyer provided by the police” as if they somehow considered it normal, or even legitimate, that the police should provide a lawyer for a suspect. This does not exactly correspond to the relevant national law cited in § 56 of the judgment: Article 177 § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Croatia provides for the police authorities to allow the suspect to appoint a lawyer from the list of lawyers on duty provided to the competent police authority by the county branches of the Croatian Bar Association.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'We fail to see the meaning of the distinction made by the majority in §\xa094 of the judgment between a situation where the applicant is “provided with a legal aid lawyer by the police” and a situation where he “was offered a choice of lawyer provided by the police, whose services the applicant had to pay for from his own funds”. To us the question of payment in this connection is irrelevant, since in many legal systems even the legal aid lawyers’ fees need to be paid subsequently by the accused. How the lawyer is paid should not, as such, be a criterion in establishing whether there is “legal assistance of one’s own choosing” or not. In the present case it is rather the fact that the lawyer M.R. did not charge the applicant for his services that raises questions about the good faith of the police.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'The Government do not dispute that the appointed lawyer, M.R., was a former chief of Rijeka Police and that when acting as his lawyer he never charged the applicant for his services.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'The Court has constantly held that a person charged with a criminal offence who does not wish to defend himself in person must be able to have recourse to legal assistance of his own choosing (see Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, 28 June 1984, § 99, Series A no. 80). It is true that notwithstanding the importance of a relationship of confidence between lawyer and client, this right cannot be considered to be absolute, but the national authorities may override the defendant’s wish relating to legal representation only when there are relevant and sufficient grounds for holding that this is necessary in the interests of justice (Pavlenko v. Russia, no. 42371/02, § 98, 1 April 2010).',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'We are unable to accept the actions of the police in preventing lawyer G.M. from contacting the applicant, and failing to inform the applicant of G.M.’s presence in the police station despite applicant’s wish to be represented by him, or the way the lawyer M.R. was involved in the case. Contrary to the principles cited above, the documents in the criminal case file against the applicant do not reveal any good – let alone relevant and sufficient – reasons for not allowing lawyer G.M to assist the applicant during the police questioning, and neither the national courts nor the Government have produced any arguments in that respect.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'In the circumstances M.R.’s background and the fact that he did not charge the applicant are also relevant and worrying. To our mind there was no waiver on the part of the applicant of his right to retain G.M., since the applicant had not been informed of G.M.’s arrival at the police station when he signed the power of attorney with M.R.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'It is noteworthy that the majority also had serious doubts as to whether the police acted in good faith and whether M.R. was a lawyer the applicant would actually have chosen had he known about the other lawyer, G.M., hired by his parents (§ 98 of the judgment). The majority also acknowledge that the mere signature by the applicant of the power of attorney with M.R. did not constitute a “knowing and intelligent waiver” of his right to retain G.M. as lawyer. Therefore it is even more striking that, despite having serious concerns as to the manner in which the domestic authorities acted (see §\xa0100 of the judgment) and the failure to allow the applicant to be represented by a lawyer of his own choosing during the pre-trial interrogation – a crucial moment in the criminal proceedings –, the majority found no violation of Article 6 § 3 (c). For us these serious concerns, including the manner in which M.R.’s services were proposed to the applicant by the police are valid grounds for a finding of a violation.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Possible pressure by the police to confess', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'Furthermore, the applicant consistently maintained that his statement was obtained in a coercive environment. Since it is established that the police and the Rijeka County State Attorney questioned the applicant while at the same time preventing him from meeting lawyer G.M., and suggested that he choose another lawyer proposed by them, the applicant’s allegations of pressure exerted by the authorities do not appear completely misplaced.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Therefore the finding of the majority in § 106 of the judgment that the applicant never argued that any of his rights had been infringed when he made his statement seems to be in contradiction with the statement of facts in § 38 of the judgment, which reads: “On 2 April 2008 the applicant asked the Rijeka County Court to call lawyer G.M. as a witness in connection with the alleged unlawful extraction of his confession by the police. He pointed out that G.M. had not been allowed to see him while he had been in police custody and stated that he had been forced by the police officers to confess.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'In addition, we fail to adhere to the conclusion made by the majority in §\xa0105 of the judgment: “The Court also notes that in his closing arguments at the trial the applicant, through his representative, presented the confession he had given to the police while represented by the lawyer M.R. as a proof of his sincere regret for the crimes committed in order for it to be taken into account as a mitigating factor in the sentencing procedure.” In §\xa042 of the judgment it is stated that the applicant pleaded not guilty to the charges and in §\xa044 it is said that during the closing arguments: “The applicant’s defence lawyer argued that it had not been proven that the applicant had committed the offences he was charged with. She pointed out, however, that if the trial court considered differently, then the applicant’s confession to the police and his sincere regret had to be taken into consideration in sentencing him.” Thus the lawyer used a common tactic of alternative pleadings and used the confession, in the event of sentencing, as a mitigating circumstance, which is by no means the same as maintaining the confession the applicant had given to the police while represented by the lawyer M.R.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Confession as evidence and overall fairness of the criminal proceedings',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Although the applicant had the benefit of adversarial proceedings in which he was represented by a lawyer, the detriment he suffered because of the breach of due process at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings was not remedied by the subsequent proceedings. We think that the serious shortcomings in respect of legal assistance at such an important stage of pre-trial events seriously undermined the position of the applicant’s defence at the trial as well. In these subsequent proceedings his confession was held to be admissible as evidence, and even though other evidence was adduced and the confession was not the sole evidence, it nevertheless played a decisive role, without any importance being attached to the circumstances in which the confession had been made (see Panovits v. Cyprus, no. 4268/04, § 75, 11 December 2008).',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'For all these reasons we conclude that there has been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(c) of the Convention on account of the infringement of the applicant’s right to defend himself through legal assistance of his own choosing.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '', 'elements': []}],
'section_name': 'conclusion'}],
'parties': ['DVORSKI', 'CROATIA']},
{'itemid': '001-223271',
'docname': 'CASE OF CĂPĂŢÎNĂ v. ROMANIA',
'doctypebranch': 'CHAMBER',
'ecli': 'ECLI:CE:ECHR:2023:0228JUD000091116',
'importance': 3,
'applicability': '',
'appno': '911/16',
'decisiondate': None,
'introductiondate': None,
'judgementdate': '2023-02-28T00:00:00',
'kpdate': '2023-02-28T00:00:00',
'languageisocode': 'ENG',
'originatingbody_name': 'Fourth Section',
'originatingbody_type': 'Court',
'rank': '155.9272',
'respondent': 'ROU',
'separateopinion': True,
'typedescription': 15,
'judgment': [{'content': 'INTRODUCTION',
'elements': [{'content': '.\xa0\xa0The application concerns the seizure of some of the applicant’s assets by the prosecutor during criminal proceedings brought against her and other individuals for alleged acts of corruption, and the method used to calculate the proceeds of crime which were confiscated from the applicant following her criminal conviction for participating in organised crime and bribe-taking. The Government were given notice of the application, under Article\xa01 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.',
'elements': []}],
'section_name': 'introduction'},
{'content': 'THE FACTS',
'elements': [{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Rădăuţi. She was represented by Ms A.M. Horhogea, a lawyer practising in Iași.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '3.\xa0\xa0The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms O.F.\xa0Ezer, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '4.\xa0\xa0The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '5.\xa0\xa0At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, the applicant was a border police officer in the customs office at Siret, a border crossing point between Ukraine and Romania. She resigned during the criminal proceedings described below.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '5.\xa0\xa0At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, the applicant was a border police officer in the customs office at Siret, a border crossing point between Ukraine and Romania. She resigned during the criminal proceedings described below.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '6.\xa0\xa0On 30 January and 1 February 2011 the National Anti-corruption Directorate (Direcţia Naţională Anticorupţie – hereinafter “the prosecutor”) opened criminal proceedings against the applicant and over sixty other individuals, border police officers and customs officers, on suspicion of participating in organised crime and bribetaking in connection with the unlawful importation of cigarettes, diesel and alcohol from Ukraine. The prosecutor investigated acts that had allegedly occurred from September\xa02010 to January\xa02011.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0During the investigation, the prosecutor found evidence that the officers who had checked the cars entering Romania had taken bribes from traffickers in exchange for allowing them to cross the border with illicit goods. According to the prosecutor’s calculations, during each shift the officers in question received between 8,000 and 25,000 Romanian lei (RON – between approximately 1,800 euros (EUR) and EUR 5,600). They hid the money in safe places and at the end of each shift they shared it proportionally with all the colleagues working during that shift.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0During the investigation, the prosecutor found evidence that the officers who had checked the cars entering Romania had taken bribes from traffickers in exchange for allowing them to cross the border with illicit goods. According to the prosecutor’s calculations, during each shift the officers in question received between 8,000 and 25,000 Romanian lei (RON – between approximately 1,800 euros (EUR) and EUR 5,600). They hid the money in safe places and at the end of each shift they shared it proportionally with all the colleagues working during that shift.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '8.\xa0\xa0The charges against the applicant consisted of thirteen counts of alleged bribe-taking, which had occurred between 17 and 25\xa0December\xa02010.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '8.\xa0\xa0The charges against the applicant consisted of thirteen counts of alleged bribe-taking, which had occurred between 17 and 25\xa0December\xa02010.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '9.\xa0\xa0By an order of 18 April 2011, on the basis of Articles 163 to 166 of the former Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter “the old CCP” – see paragraph\xa022 below), the prosecutor ordered the seizure of some of the applicant’s assets to cover the damage allegedly caused by her, which was estimated by the prosecutor to amount to RON 28,800 (about EUR 7,000 at the relevant time). The prosecutor accordingly seized from the applicant, until the end of the proceedings, the sums of EUR\xa05,530 and 24\xa0United States dollars (which were estimated to amount to the equivalent of RON\xa022,192), as well as a car which had remained in her possession. The applicant was present when the measure was carried out by the prosecutor. She argued that she had not caused any damage and she also contested the method of estimation used by the prosecutor.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '9.\xa0\xa0By an order of 18 April 2011, on the basis of Articles 163 to 166 of the former Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter “the old CCP” – see paragraph\xa022 below), the prosecutor ordered the seizure of some of the applicant’s assets to cover the damage allegedly caused by her, which was estimated by the prosecutor to amount to RON 28,800 (about EUR 7,000 at the relevant time). The prosecutor accordingly seized from the applicant, until the end of the proceedings, the sums of EUR\xa05,530 and 24\xa0United States dollars (which were estimated to amount to the equivalent of RON\xa022,192), as well as a car which had remained in her possession. The applicant was present when the measure was carried out by the prosecutor. She argued that she had not caused any damage and she also contested the method of estimation used by the prosecutor.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '10.\xa0\xa0On 26 April 2011 the prosecutor committed for trial sixtyseven police officers and customs officers, including the applicant, before the Suceava Court of Appeal for their alleged participation in the illegal trafficking. The prosecutor noted that it was impossible to calculate the exact amounts taken by each individual in bribes, as they had shared the sums obtained in that manner according to the work tasks of each individual during each of the shifts worked from September 2010 to January 2011, taking into account the date and time of day of the shift and other factors. For that reason, the prosecutor proposed having regard, for each of the accused persons, to their number of shifts during that period and their duties during each shift, as well as to the average amount taken per shift. On the basis of that calculation, the prosecutor estimated that the amount to be confiscated from the applicant was RON\xa028,800 (approximately EUR\xa07,000 at the relevant time – see paragraph\xa09 above).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '10.\xa0\xa0On 26 April 2011 the prosecutor committed for trial sixtyseven police officers and customs officers, including the applicant, before the Suceava Court of Appeal for their alleged participation in the illegal trafficking. The prosecutor noted that it was impossible to calculate the exact amounts taken by each individual in bribes, as they had shared the sums obtained in that manner according to the work tasks of each individual during each of the shifts worked from September 2010 to January 2011, taking into account the date and time of day of the shift and other factors. For that reason, the prosecutor proposed having regard, for each of the accused persons, to their number of shifts during that period and their duties during each shift, as well as to the average amount taken per shift. On the basis of that calculation, the prosecutor estimated that the amount to be confiscated from the applicant was RON\xa028,800 (approximately EUR\xa07,000 at the relevant time – see paragraph\xa09 above).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '11.\xa0\xa0On 17 October 2011 the applicant applied to the Court of Appeal to have the measure ordered by the prosecutor on 18 April 2011 lifted and the assets taken from her returned (see paragraph 9 above). She argued that the prosecutor had failed to indicate the estimated value of the damage allegedly caused by her acts. She submitted a letter from the National Authority for Integrity (Agenţia Naţională de Integritate) and bank contracts, with the aim of proving that the money seized from her had been lawfully obtained.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '11.\xa0\xa0On 17 October 2011 the applicant applied to the Court of Appeal to have the measure ordered by the prosecutor on 18 April 2011 lifted and the assets taken from her returned (see paragraph 9 above). She argued that the prosecutor had failed to indicate the estimated value of the damage allegedly caused by her acts. She submitted a letter from the National Authority for Integrity (Agenţia Naţională de Integritate) and bank contracts, with the aim of proving that the money seized from her had been lawfully obtained.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '12.\xa0\xa0By an interlocutory judgment of 24\xa0November 2011, the Court of Appeal dismissed her application. It considered that the applicant had not proven that the money seized by the prosecutor corresponded to the sums indicated in the documents presented and it observed that the money lawfully obtained by the applicant might have been spent on other things.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '12.\xa0\xa0By an interlocutory judgment of 24\xa0November 2011, the Court of Appeal dismissed her application. It considered that the applicant had not proven that the money seized by the prosecutor corresponded to the sums indicated in the documents presented and it observed that the money lawfully obtained by the applicant might have been spent on other things.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '13.\xa0\xa0In a judgment of 6 May 2014, the Court of Appeal convicted sixtythree individuals, including the applicant, of taking bribes. It observed, on the basis of the evidence adduced – in particular, video recordings – that each worker had had a role in the commission of the criminal offence during his or her shift, and that the bribetaking had become institutionalised and normalised to such an extent that the officers were taking bribes – in the form of either money or goods, such as cigarettes, alcohol, cakes and diesel – in the presence of other workers and their superiors, who had all become part of the scheme. In respect of the applicant, the court found that she had committed acts of bribetaking but it decided to convict her only for those acts which she could be seen committing in video recordings. She was thus convicted of six of the thirteen counts of bribe-taking identified by the prosecutor (see paragraph 8 above) and was given a two-year suspended prison sentence.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '13.\xa0\xa0In a judgment of 6 May 2014, the Court of Appeal convicted sixtythree individuals, including the applicant, of taking bribes. It observed, on the basis of the evidence adduced – in particular, video recordings – that each worker had had a role in the commission of the criminal offence during his or her shift, and that the bribetaking had become institutionalised and normalised to such an extent that the officers were taking bribes – in the form of either money or goods, such as cigarettes, alcohol, cakes and diesel – in the presence of other workers and their superiors, who had all become part of the scheme. In respect of the applicant, the court found that she had committed acts of bribetaking but it decided to convict her only for those acts which she could be seen committing in video recordings. She was thus convicted of six of the thirteen counts of bribe-taking identified by the prosecutor (see paragraph 8 above) and was given a two-year suspended prison sentence.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '14.\xa0\xa0The Court of Appeal took note of the manner in which the prosecutor had estimated the amounts to be confiscated as the proceeds of the crimes (see paragraph 10 above) and agreed with it. It observed that the exact amounts received by each convicted person could not be established, and for that reason, when calculating the amounts to be confiscated, it took into account the number of shifts during which it was established that the individual concerned had taken bribes and the calculation method proposed by the prosecutor, which attributed an amount ranging from RON\xa01,400 (approximately EUR 300 at the relevant time) to RON 300 (approximately EUR\xa070 at the relevant time) to each individual according to their position during the relevant shift. In respect of the applicant, the Court of Appeal issued a confiscation order for RON 3,400 (approximately EUR\xa0800 at the relevant time), an amount considered equivalent to the proceeds of the crimes. Relying on Article 112 § 1 (e) of the new Criminal Code and on Article\xa0118 §\xa01\xa0(e) of the old Criminal Code (see paragraph 24 below), the court ordered that the money be paid from the value of the forfeited assets and that the difference be returned to the applicant at the end of the proceedings. The applicant was also ordered to pay RON\xa06,000 (approximately EUR 1,300 at that time) for costs, namely RON\xa03,000 for the proceedings before the prosecutor and RON 3,000 for the proceedings before the Court of Appeal.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '14.\xa0\xa0The Court of Appeal took note of the manner in which the prosecutor had estimated the amounts to be confiscated as the proceeds of the crimes (see paragraph 10 above) and agreed with it. It observed that the exact amounts received by each convicted person could not be established, and for that reason, when calculating the amounts to be confiscated, it took into account the number of shifts during which it was established that the individual concerned had taken bribes and the calculation method proposed by the prosecutor, which attributed an amount ranging from RON\xa01,400 (approximately EUR 300 at the relevant time) to RON 300 (approximately EUR\xa070 at the relevant time) to each individual according to their position during the relevant shift. In respect of the applicant, the Court of Appeal issued a confiscation order for RON 3,400 (approximately EUR\xa0800 at the relevant time), an amount considered equivalent to the proceeds of the crimes. Relying on Article 112 § 1 (e) of the new Criminal Code and on Article\xa0118 §\xa01\xa0(e) of the old Criminal Code (see paragraph 24 below), the court ordered that the money be paid from the value of the forfeited assets and that the difference be returned to the applicant at the end of the proceedings. The applicant was also ordered to pay RON\xa06,000 (approximately EUR 1,300 at that time) for costs, namely RON\xa03,000 for the proceedings before the prosecutor and RON 3,000 for the proceedings before the Court of Appeal.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '15.\xa0\xa0The court upheld the order of 18 April 2011 (see paragraph 9 above) and decided that the amounts remaining after payment of damages and costs would be returned to each individual when the decision became final.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '15.\xa0\xa0The court upheld the order of 18 April 2011 (see paragraph 9 above) and decided that the amounts remaining after payment of damages and costs would be returned to each individual when the decision became final.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '16.\xa0\xa0All the parties appealed to the High Court of Cassation and Justice (hereinafter “the High Court”). The applicant sought her acquittal for all the alleged acts of bribe-taking. She also requested that the measure ordered by the prosecutor on 18 April 2011 (see paragraph 9 above) be lifted, arguing that, as shown in a new report by the National Authority for Integrity of 22\xa0April 2013, her assets were not disproportionate to her income.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0In a final decision of 17 March 2015, the High Court dismissed the appeals lodged by the convicted persons, including the applicant, and upheld the appeal lodged by the prosecutor. In addition to upholding the conviction for the offence of bribe-taking handed down by the Court of Appeal, the High Court found that all the accused persons were also guilty of forming an organised criminal group. The applicant’s prison sentence remained unchanged. In addition, she was ordered to pay RON 1,000 (approximately EUR\xa0225 at the relevant time) for costs incurred in the proceedings before the High Court.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0In a final decision of 17 March 2015, the High Court dismissed the appeals lodged by the convicted persons, including the applicant, and upheld the appeal lodged by the prosecutor. In addition to upholding the conviction for the offence of bribe-taking handed down by the Court of Appeal, the High Court found that all the accused persons were also guilty of forming an organised criminal group. The applicant’s prison sentence remained unchanged. In addition, she was ordered to pay RON 1,000 (approximately EUR\xa0225 at the relevant time) for costs incurred in the proceedings before the High Court.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '18.\xa0\xa0As for the amounts that the convicted persons, including the applicant, were ordered to pay, the High Court observed that the evidence in the case file proved that they had received bribes and, at the same time, they had failed to prove that the seized assets had been lawfully obtained. It also endorsed the method used by the prosecutor to calculate the damage (see paragraph\xa010 above). In respect of the applicant, it additionally upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision not to accept the entire amount proposed by the prosecutor, as that sum had been calculated for all thirteen alleged acts of bribe-taking, thus exceeding the counts for which she had eventually been convicted (see paragraph\xa013 in fine above). For those reasons, the High Court upheld the order for the confiscation of RON\xa03,400 (see paragraph 14 above).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0The High Court also upheld the remaining findings of the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 14 above).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0The High Court also upheld the remaining findings of the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 14 above).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '20.\xa0\xa0The decision was made available to the parties on 16 September 2015.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '20.\xa0\xa0The decision was made available to the parties on 16 September 2015.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '21.\xa0\xa0On 21 September 2015, after two requests by the applicant (on 30\xa0June and 3 August 2015), the Administration of Public Finance reimbursed the remaining sum, that is, RON 13,785 (approximately EUR\xa03,200 at the exchange rate applicable at the date when the sum was returned).',
'elements': []}],
'section_name': 'facts'},
{'content': 'RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE',
'elements': [],
'section_name': 'relevant_law'},
{'content': 'RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE',
'elements': [{'content': '22.\xa0\xa0The relevant domestic provisions concerning the seizure of assets during criminal proceedings, notably Articles 163 and 168 of the old CCP, as in force at the date of the facts of the present case, and Article 250 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure (“the new CCP”), in force since 1\xa0February 2014, as well as the relevant provisions of both the old CCP and the new CCP and of the Civil Code regarding compensation, are described in Călin v.\xa0Romania (no.\xa054491/14, §§ 29-35, 5\xa0April 2022, with a further reference).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0The same judgment also contains a description of domestic practice in cases in which the seizure of assets ordered during an investigation had been contested before the courts (ibid., §§ 36-40).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0The same judgment also contains a description of domestic practice in cases in which the seizure of assets ordered during an investigation had been contested before the courts (ibid., §§ 36-40).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '24.\xa0\xa0In addition, under the provisions of the Criminal Code, goods obtained through the commission of a criminal offence are to be confiscated unless they are used to pay compensation for the damage caused (Article\xa0112\xa0§\xa01\xa0(e) of the new Criminal Code, in force since 1 February 2014, and Article\xa0118 §\xa01\xa0(e) of the old Criminal Code).',
'elements': []}],
'section_name': 'relevant_law'},
{'content': 'THE LAW',
'elements': [{'content': 'ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION',
'elements': [{'content': '25.\xa0\xa0The applicant complained of the seizure of her assets by the prosecutor during the criminal investigation against her, the subsequent confiscation order and the manner in which the difference between the amount of money seized and the sum confiscated by the courts had been returned to her by the authorities.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'The applicant relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Admissibility',
'elements': [{'content': 'The parties’ submissions', 'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'The Government', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'The Government',
'elements': [{'content': '26.\xa0\xa0The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as she had not lodged an objection against the prosecutor’s order of 18 April 2011 (see paragraph 9 above), a remedy provided for in Article\xa0168 of the old CCP and in Article 250 of the new CCP (see paragraph\xa022 above).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '26.\xa0\xa0The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as she had not lodged an objection against the prosecutor’s order of 18 April 2011 (see paragraph 9 above), a remedy provided for in Article\xa0168 of the old CCP and in Article 250 of the new CCP (see paragraph\xa022 above).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '27.\xa0\xa0Furthermore, she could have sought compensation from the State in the civil courts for damage allegedly caused by a State agent, if she considered that the prosecutor had overstepped his powers when bringing charges against her or that the criminal investigation had been unlawful or had lasted too long (the Government cited Ibriş v. Romania (dec.), no.\xa015193/12, §§\xa029-31, 21 June 2016).',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'The applicant',
'elements': [{'content': '.\xa0\xa0The applicant submitted that she had objected to the prosecutor’s order (see paragraph 11 above) and that for that reason it would be disproportionate to require her to have taken the civil path as well.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'The Court’s assessment', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'The Court’s assessment',
'elements': [{'content': '29.\xa0\xa0In respect of the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies, the Court refers to the well-established principles of its case-law (see, in particular, Gherghina v. Romania (dec.) [GC], no. 42219/07, §§ 83‑89, 9 July 2015, and Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos.\xa017153/11 and 29 others, §§ 69-77, 25 March 2014).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0In particular, the Court reiterates that in the event of there being a number of domestic remedies which an individual can pursue, that person is entitled to choose, for the purpose of fulfilling the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies, a remedy which addresses his or her essential grievance. In other words, when one remedy has been pursued, the use of another remedy which has essentially the same objective is not required (see Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], no. 41720/13, § 177, 25 June 2019, with further references).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0In particular, the Court reiterates that in the event of there being a number of domestic remedies which an individual can pursue, that person is entitled to choose, for the purpose of fulfilling the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies, a remedy which addresses his or her essential grievance. In other words, when one remedy has been pursued, the use of another remedy which has essentially the same objective is not required (see Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], no. 41720/13, § 177, 25 June 2019, with further references).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '31.\xa0\xa0In this connection, the Court observes that the applicant contested the seizure of her assets before the courts which had examined the criminal charges against her, and those courts addressed her arguments (see paragraphs\xa011-12 and 16-18 above). The present case thus differs from Călin v.\xa0Romania (no.\xa054491/14, §§ 17 and 83, 5\xa0April 2022), where the applicant had not had a genuine opportunity to bring his grievances before a court, as the criminal charges against him had been dropped by the prosecutor.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0The Court considers that the applicant in the present case could reasonably have expected the Suceava Court of Appeal and the High Court to address her grievances in respect of the seizure. In these circumstances, the fact that the applicant did not lodge an objection against the prosecutor’s order of 18 April 2011 (see paragraph 26 above) cannot be held against her when assessing whether she exhausted domestic remedies. Indeed, in requesting that the Court of Appeal and the High Court lift the measure imposed by the prosecutor, the applicant made normal use of the remedies which were available and sufficient in respect of her Convention grievances (see Gherghina, cited above, § 85). Moreover, as far as the confiscation is concerned, the Court observes that the applicant had been convicted of bribe-taking and of forming an organised criminal group; that conviction became final (see paragraph 17 above). In these circumstances, the Court is of the opinion that a separate civil action against the State for allegedly unlawful acts committed by the prosecutor (see paragraph 27 above) would have had little prospect of success and that it was highly unlikely that the applicant could have obtained the restitution of the sums considered by the criminal courts to be the proceeds of crime.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0For these reasons, the Court considers that the Government’s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '34.\xa0\xa0The Court further notes that the application is neither manifestly illfounded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article\xa035 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.',
'elements': []}]}]},
{'content': 'Merits',
'elements': [{'content': 'The parties’ submissions', 'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'The applicant', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'The applicant',
'elements': [{'content': '35.\xa0\xa0The applicant argued that the prosecutor had confiscated her assets despite evidence that they had been lawfully obtained (see paragraphs\xa09, 1112 and 16 above) and that the value of the assets seized had been disproportionately high, bearing in mind the final confiscation order issued by the courts against her.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '35.\xa0\xa0The applicant argued that the prosecutor had confiscated her assets despite evidence that they had been lawfully obtained (see paragraphs\xa09, 1112 and 16 above) and that the value of the assets seized had been disproportionately high, bearing in mind the final confiscation order issued by the courts against her.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '36.\xa0\xa0Moreover, she complained that the damages she had been ordered to pay had been calculated randomly and arbitrarily by the courts (see paragraphs\xa010, 14 and 18 above), which had acknowledged the impossibility of establishing the exact amounts allegedly received by the applicant and the other defendants.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '36.\xa0\xa0Moreover, she complained that the damages she had been ordered to pay had been calculated randomly and arbitrarily by the courts (see paragraphs\xa010, 14 and 18 above), which had acknowledged the impossibility of establishing the exact amounts allegedly received by the applicant and the other defendants.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '37.\xa0\xa0Lastly, she contended that the reimbursement of the difference between the forfeited amounts and those ordered to be confiscated had been calculated in Romanian lei at an exchange rate which the applicant considered to be unfavourable, and that it had taken place more than one year after the first-instance court’s decisions and more than six months after the final decision (see paragraph 21 above), thus causing an additional infringement of her right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'The Government', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'The Government',
'elements': [{'content': '38.\xa0\xa0The Government accepted that the measures taken against the applicant in the present case had constituted interference with the right protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '39.\xa0\xa0In their view, the measure ordered by the prosecutor had been necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest, had been applied in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law (Article\xa0163 of the old CCP – see paragraph 22 above), had pursued the legitimate aims of ensuring public order and prevention of crime, and had been justified. They submitted that States enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in choosing the measures to be applied and in assessing whether their consequences were legitimate.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0The Government further argued that the prosecutor and the courts had thoroughly considered the circumstances in which the criminal offences had been committed before proposing and upholding the method of calculating the damages owed by each of the convicted persons.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0They also submitted that the applicant had been able to present her point of view and evidence and that her pleas had been examined by the courts in adversarial proceedings which had been fair and in which the applicant’s defence rights had been respected.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'The Court’s assessment', 'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'General principles', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'General principles',
'elements': [{'content': '42.\xa0\xa0The Court reiterates that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 comprises three distinct rules: “the first rule, set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates the principle of the peaceful enjoyment of property; the second rule, contained in the second sentence of the first paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions; the third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises that the Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest ... . The three rules are not, however, ‘distinct’ in the sense of being unconnected. The second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first rule” (see, among other authorities, Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96, § 98, ECHR 2000-I, with further references).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0The Court reiterates that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 requires above all that any interference by a public authority with the enjoyment of property be in accordance with the law (see Călin, cited above, § 71).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0Furthermore, any interference by a public authority with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions can only be justified if it serves a legitimate public (or general) interest. Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to decide what is “in the public interest”. Under the system of protection established by the Convention, it is thus for the national authorities to make the initial assessment as to the existence of a problem of public concern warranting measures interfering with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions (see Balsamo v. San Marino, nos. 20319/17 and 21414/17, §\xa087, 8 October 2019).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 also requires that any interference be reasonably proportionate to the aim sought to be realised. In other words, a “fair balance” must be struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. The requisite balance will not be found if the person or persons concerned have had to bear an individual and excessive burden (see Yașar v. Romania, no.\xa064863/13, §§ 50-51, 26 November 2019).',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'Application of those principles to the facts of the present case',
'elements': [{'content': '46.\xa0\xa0The Court reiterates that the applicant complained mainly about the seizure, confiscation and subsequent return of some of her assets during the criminal investigation and the proceedings brought against her, which resulted in her conviction (see paragraph 25 above).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0Those measures may be regarded as an interference with the applicant’s exercise of her right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions (see, mutatis mutandis, Călin, cited above, § 67, in respect of the seizure of assets, and Phillips v. the United Kingdom, no. 41087/98, §\xa050, ECHR\xa02001VII, in respect of the confiscation of assets). The Government did not contest the existence of an interference (see paragraph 38 above).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0The seizure of assets ordered during criminal proceedings is regarded by the Court as a measure entailing control of the use of property, thus falling within the scope of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see, among other authorities, Călin, cited above, § 69, with further references).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0As for the confiscation of assets following a criminal conviction, in some cases the Court has considered it a permanent measure which entailed a conclusive transfer of ownership to the State thus amounting to a deprivation of property for the purposes of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No.\xa01 to the Convention (see S.C. Service Benz Com S.R.L. v.\xa0Romania, no. 58045/11, § 30, 4 July 2017, with further references; Yașar, cited above, § 49; and B.K.M. Lojistik Tasimacilik Ticaret Limited Sirketi v.\xa0Slovenia, no. 42079/12, §§ 37-38, 17 January 2017). In other cases, however, the Court has regarded it as a measure entailing control of the use of property, thus falling within the scope of the second paragraph of Article\xa01 of Protocol No. 1 (see, among other authorities, Phillips, cited above, §\xa051, and Telbis and Viziteu v. Romania, no. 47911/15, § 72, 26 June 2018).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0Be that as it may, the Court reiterates that, as noted above (see paragraph\xa042 above), both the second sentence of the first paragraph and the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 should be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first sentence of the first paragraph. The Court therefore considers that it should examine the situation complained of as a whole in the light of that general rule (see Beyeler, cited above, § 106, and, mutatis mutandis, Đokić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no.\xa06518/04, § 56, 27 May 2010).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '51.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that both measures at issue in the present case were in conformity with the relevant provisions of the applicable domestic law: Articles\xa0163 to 166 of the old CCP allowed for the seizure of an accused’s assets (see paragraphs 9 and 22 above), and Article\xa0112\xa0§\xa01\xa0(e) of the new Criminal Code and Article 118 § 1 (e) of the old Criminal Code allowed for the confiscation of the proceeds of crime (see paragraphs 14 and 24 above). The Court is therefore satisfied that the interference with the applicant’s property right was provided for by law, as required by Article 1 of Protocol\xa0No.\xa01 to the Convention (see Călin, cited above, § 72, and, mutatis mutandis, Telbis and Viziteu, cited above, § 73, and S.C. Service Benz Com\xa0S.R.L., cited above, § 31).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '52.\xa0\xa0Furthermore, the Court has no doubt that the measures in question were taken in the general interest with a view to punishing acts of corruption, ensuring public order and preventing crime and in the interests of the proper administration of justice (see, among many other authorities, Călin, cited above, § 73). In particular, the decision to seize the applicant’s assets was made in order to cover the damage which the prosecutor considered to have been caused by the criminal acts allegedly committed by the applicant (see paragraph\xa09 above), while the confiscation of part of the sums seized was aimed at deducting the proceeds of crime from the perpetrator’s assets (see paragraphs\xa014 and 24 above).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '53.\xa0\xa0The question is therefore whether, in the circumstances of the case, the measures were proportionate to the aim pursued; in other words, whether a fair balance was struck between the requirements of the general interest and the protection of the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions, in particular by providing procedures affording her a reasonable opportunity to put her case to the relevant authorities (see Călin, cited above, §\xa074, with further references).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0In so far as the complaint concerns the seizure of the applicant’s assets, the Court reiterates, at the outset, that the applicant contested the measure before the courts (see paragraph 31 above). She submitted several documents in an attempt to prove that the assets seized by the prosecutor had been lawfully obtained; that evidence was examined by the domestic courts but was eventually found to be insufficient (see paragraphs 12 and 18 above). The applicant did not assert that she had submitted any other evidence concerning the origin of the seized assets or that any such evidence she had submitted had been disregarded by the courts (see, mutatis mutandis, Radu v.\xa0Romania (dec.), no. 484/08, § 28, 3 September 2013). There is nothing in the conduct of those proceedings to suggest either that the applicant was denied a reasonable opportunity to put forward her case or that the domestic courts’ findings were tainted with manifest arbitrariness (see, mutatis mutandis, Telbis and Viziteu, cited above, § 79).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0For these reasons, the Court cannot accept the applicant’s assertions that she had proven the lawful nature of the seized assets (see paragraph\xa035 above). The fact that the Court of Appeal did not find in the applicant’s favour supports that conclusion.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0The Court also notes that the seizure of the applicant’s assets was only temporary in nature and affected the applicant during a period of a little over four years and five months (see paragraphs 9 and 21 above). Bearing in mind the complexity of the criminal proceedings, which related to the daily activity of more than sixty accused persons over a period of five months (see paragraph\xa06 above), the Court finds that the overall length of time during which the applicant’s assets were seized was not unjustified (contrast Călin, cited above, §§ 83-84, which concerned the seizure of some assets for ten years and other assets for eighteen years). Moreover, during the time when the measure was in place, the applicant had access to courts, which verified the lawfulness and necessity of that measure (see paragraphs 11 and 16 above, and contrast Călin, cited above, § 83).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0As for the applicant’s allegation that the sum seized by the prosecutor was disproportionately high (see paragraph 35 above), the Court cannot but observe that the prosecutor calculated that sum on the basis of thirteen counts of bribe-taking of which he accused the applicant. The Court does not see any appearance of arbitrariness in the manner in which the prosecutor conducted the investigation and indicted the applicant for thirteen counts of bribe-taking or in the manner in which the courts examined the accusations brought against her. Therefore, although the applicant’s final conviction only concerned six of the thirteen counts of alleged bribe-taking (see paragraph 13 above), the amount seized by the prosecutor does not appear disproportionately high for all thirteen counts, bearing in mind the method of calculation used (see paragraph\xa010 above).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0The Court further notes that the applicant also contested the method of calculation used by the prosecutor and the courts and the resulting amount which was confiscated (see paragraph 36 above). However, the Court observes that the confiscation measure was applied by the domestic courts on the basis of their findings, following an examination of the evidence in the case file, that the applicant had committed the criminal offences under investigation and had thus obtained illicit gains (see paragraphs 14 and 18 above; see also, mutatis mutandis, Phillips, cited above, §\xa053). In this respect, it is noteworthy that, having found the applicant guilty of only six of the thirteen counts of bribe-taking identified by the prosecutor (see paragraph\xa013 above), the Court of Appeal decided to confiscate only a part of the sum seized and ordered that the difference be returned to the applicant (see paragraph\xa014 above), thus ensuring the proportionality of the confiscation visàvis the level of guilt which had been established in respect of the applicant.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0Lastly, the Court observes that the applicant complained of delays in the return of the remaining assets and the manner in which it took place (see paragraph\xa037 above). However, those assets were returned only a few days after the final decision was made available to the parties (see paragraphs\xa02021 above). It does not appear that the applicant complained to the domestic authorities about either the time it had taken the High Court to finalise its decision or the manner in which those assets had been returned. That said, the Court has already found that the mechanism put in place by the respondent State whereby an applicant can complain about delays in proceedings, including in the drafting stage of court decisions, may offer individuals in the applicant’s situation the safeguards required by the Convention standards in relation to this matter (see, mutatis mutandis, Mierlă and Others v. Romania (dec.), nos.\xa025801/17, 26272/18 and 4052/19, §§\xa011114, 17 May 2022; Ibriş, cited above, §§ 21 and 30-31; and Mand and\xa0Others v. Romania (dec.), no. 39273/07, § 139, 19 November 2019).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0Having regard to all the above considerations, and in particular to the fair way in which the domestic courts assessed the case, the Court finds that the proceedings in the present case cannot be considered to have been arbitrary. Having regard to the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by States in pursuit of a crime policy designed to combat corruption in the public service (see, mutatis mutandis, Telbis and Viziteu, cited above, § 81), and to the fact that the domestic courts afforded the applicant a reasonable opportunity of putting her case through adversarial proceedings (see, mutatis mutandis, Balsamo, cited above, §\xa094), the Court concludes that the interference with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions did not upset the requisite fair balance.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '.\xa0\xa0There has accordingly been no violation of Article\xa01 of Protocol No.\xa01 to the Convention.',
'elements': []}]}]}],
'section_name': 'law'},
{'content': 'FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,',
'elements': [{'content': 'Declares the application admissible;',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Holds that there has been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Done in English, and notified in writing on 28 February 2023, pursuant to Rule\xa077\xa0§§\xa02 and 3 of the Rules of Court.',
'elements': []}],
'section_name': 'conclusion'}],
'parties': ['CĂPĂŢÎNĂ', 'ROMANIA']}]
JSON data can be contained in a list or dictionary at the top level. Let’s check which type we got:
type(cases)
list
Our data is a list of cases. Let’s check the type of case 0:
type(cases[0])
dict
The data about each case is in a dictionary.
We can print the keys using list():
keys = list(cases[0])
print(keys)
['itemid', 'docname', 'doctypebranch', 'ecli', 'importance', 'applicability', 'appno', 'decisiondate', 'introductiondate', 'judgementdate', 'kpdate', 'languageisocode', 'originatingbody_name', 'originatingbody_type', 'rank', 'respondent', 'separateopinion', 'typedescription', 'judgment', 'parties']
We can loop over the list to get the title of each case:
for case in cases:
print(case['docname'])
CASE OF WELLER v. HUNGARY
CASE OF DVORSKI v. CROATIA
CASE OF CĂPĂŢÎNĂ v. ROMANIA
Each case has a decision or judgment date.
for case in cases:
print(case['docname'])
print(case.get('decisiondate'))
print(case.get('judgementdate'))
print()
CASE OF WELLER v. HUNGARY
None
2009-03-31T00:00:00
CASE OF DVORSKI v. CROATIA
None
2013-11-28T00:00:00
CASE OF CĂPĂŢÎNĂ v. ROMANIA
None
2023-02-28T00:00:00
Using Harvard’s CAP API#
Again, we need to specify the URL to the data we want to fetch.
URL = "https://api.case.law/v1/cases/"
We include some parameters that specifies which cases we want to load:
parameters = {'jurisdiction': 'ill',
'full_case': 'true',
'decision_date_min': '2011-01-01',
'page_size': 3}
jurisdictionis Illinois in this examplefull_caseinclude the full text of each casedecision_date_minis the minimum date, we only want decisions later than this datepage_sizeis the number of items
More parameters are listed in the CAP documentation.
Now, let’s fetch the data.
request = requests.get(URL, params=parameters)
data = request.json()
Inspecting the Data#
JSON data can be contained in a list or dictionary at the top level. Let’s check which type we got:
type(data)
dict
Since our data is in a dictionary, we can print the keys using list():
keys = list(data)
print(keys)
['count', 'next', 'previous', 'results']
The field count contains the number of hits in the database.
This is usually different from the number of items we requested.
If the count is zero, we don’t have any results and need to check the URL and the parameters.
print(data["count"])
3869
That looks good. Let’s fetch the list of cases, which are located in results:
cases = data["results"]
Now we can inspect each case. Let’s loop over the cases and get some of the information. The data contains various metadata about each case, such as the case name and the abbreviated case name.
for case in cases:
print("Case name:", case["name_abbreviation"])
Case name: Federal Insurance v. Lexington Insurance
Case name: People v. Connolly
Case name: Eck v. Greer
It’s often useful to look at the data in a web browser to get an overview. We can do that by opening the full URL, including the parameters:
print(request.url)
https://api.case.law/v1/cases/?jurisdiction=ill&full_case=true&decision_date_min=2011-01-01&page_size=3