Appendix: JSON and Web APIs#
In Files and Exceptions we saw how to read data from files. In this part, we will look at how to read data directly from web APIs. Web APIs are machine-readable online data sources. We will look at two different web APIs.
ECHR-OD API
The European Court of Human Rights Open Data (ECHR-OD) project provides data about ECHR cases. ECHR-OD provides machine-readable data for download, but also a public ECHR-OD API for online use. Here is the ECHR-OD API documentation.
Harvard’s Caselaw Access Project
We will also use data from Harvard’s Caselaw Access Project (CAP). CAP aims to make all published US courts decisions freely available in a standard, machine-readable format. CAP and the data format is documented here.
Reading JSON from file#
JSON
JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) is a machine-readable data format. Machine-readable data makes it easy to read and process the information with a computer. JSON data is usually tree structured, with multiple levels containing information.
In Python, JSON data is stored as lists and dictionaries. The top level can be either a list or a dictionary.
First, let’s look at how we can read JSON data from a local file. Here we read a file containing a few cases from ECHR-OD.
import json
def read_json_file(filename):
with open(filename, 'r') as file:
text_data = file.read()
return json.loads(text_data)
cases = read_json_file('cases-5.json')
However, this approach has some drawbacks. Firstly, we must manually download the data set. Secondly, we must keep the data set updated. Case law databases are updated regularly, and we probably want to include the latest data. Therefore, using online data directly is sometimes preferable. For example, if we are developing a mobile app, the full data set might be too large to fit on the device.
Reading JSON from a web API#
To fetch data from the web, we can use a library called requests that makes this task quite easy. First, we import this:
import requests
First, we will look at the ECHR-OD API. This API has a function of getting statistics about the number of cases. We need to specify the URL:
URL = 'https://echr-opendata.eu/api/v1/stats'
Now, we can get the data.
We use the request library’s .get() function to fetch the data,
and then the method .json() to parse the results into Python lists and dictionaries.
request = requests.get(URL)
data = request.json()
The result is a list of dictionaries with statistics about the numbers of violations and non-violations for different articles of the ECHR. We can display the first few articles:
display(data[:5])
[{'article': 'p1-1', 'count': 2, 'type': 'other'},
{'article': '10', 'count': 190, 'type': 'no-violation'},
{'article': '10', 'count': 665, 'type': 'violation'},
{'article': '11', 'count': 50, 'type': 'no-violation'},
{'article': '11', 'count': 443, 'type': 'violation'}]
Let’s try to get some cases. This query has a different URL:
URL = 'https://echr-opendata.eu/api/v1/cases'
This query will result in all the cases in ECHR-OD, which are several thousand.
Therefore, the query results are split into several “pages” of results.
We must specify the page size, called limit.
We usually start with page number 1.
We specify both these parameters in a dictionary.
parameters = {'page': 1,
'limit': 3}
Now, we can get the results.
We include the parameters in the query as a parameter to the .get() function.
cases = requests.get(URL, params=parameters).json()
Tip
We can fetch the results and parse the JSON in two steps or in one line. Both are fine, and this is a matter of preference.
Inspecting the Data#
We can display the data, however this is a lot of text:
display(cases)
Show code cell output
[{'itemid': '001-95845',
'docname': 'CASE OF POPOVIC v. SERBIA',
'doctypebranch': 'CHAMBER',
'ecli': 'ECLI:CE:ECHR:2009:1124JUD003388805',
'importance': 4,
'applicability': '',
'appno': '33888/05',
'decisiondate': None,
'introductiondate': None,
'judgementdate': '2009-11-24T00:00:00',
'kpdate': '2009-11-24T00:00:00',
'languageisocode': 'ENG',
'originatingbody_name': 'Second Section',
'originatingbody_type': 'Court',
'rank': '134.36655',
'respondent': 'SRB',
'separateopinion': True,
'typedescription': 15,
'judgment': [{'content': 'PROCEDURE',
'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0The case originated in an application (no. 33888/05) against the State Union of Serbia and , lodged with the Court, under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”), by a Serbian national, Ms Milica Popović (“the applicant”), on 12 September 2005.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0As of 3 June 2006, following the Montenegrin declaration of independence, remained the sole respondent in the proceedings before the Court.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '3.\xa0\xa0The applicant was represented by Mr S. Stojanović, a lawyer practicing in . The Serbian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr S. Carić.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '4.\xa0\xa0On 13 July 2006 the President of the Second Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it was also decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility.',
'elements': []}],
'section_name': 'procedure'},
{'content': 'THE FACTS',
'elements': [{'content': 'I.\xa0\xa0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE',
'elements': [{'content': "5.\xa0\xa0On 23 October 1984 the Second Municipal Court (Drugi opštinski sud) in Belgrade issued a judgment stating, inter alia, that the applicant was the owner of 36% of a flat and a garage located in . The remaining 64% was determined to be the property of D.S., the applicant's former partner.\xa0On 25 June 1985 this judgment became final.",
'elements': []},
{'content': '6.\xa0\xa0In a separate set of proceedings, on 30 March 1987, the Fourth Municipal Court (Četvrti opštinski sud) in ruled that the physical division of the said real estate was impossible, that a public auction should be held instead, and that the proceeds thereof should be divided among the former partners accordingly.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '7.\xa0\xa0On 16 November 1987 this decision became final.',
'elements': []},
{'content': "8.\xa0\xa0On 18 May 1990 the Fourth Municipal Court in (hereinafter “the enforcement court”) accepted the applicant's request and ordered the enforcement of the above decision dated 30 March 1987.",
'elements': []},
{'content': '9.\xa0\xa0At the hearing held on 2 September 1996 the applicant offered to buy the 64% of the flat in question owned by D.S. and thereby become its sole owner. On the same date the enforcement court accepted this offer, “awarded” the flat (“dosudio nepokretnosi”) to the applicant and set the price at 25,126.22 Dinars.\xa0D.S. subsequently filed an appeal against this decision.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '10.\xa0\xa0Following a remittal, on 26 April 2002 the District Court upheld the decision of the enforcement court and it thereby became final.',
'elements': []},
{'content': "11.\xa0\xa0On 3 March 2004 the Supreme Court accepted the request for the protection of legality (zahtev za zaštitu zakonitosti) filed by the Chief Public Prosecutor personally. It quashed the lower courts' decisions and remitted the case to the enforcement court for reconsideration. It would appear that the Supreme Court's decision was served on the applicant by 12 January 2005.",
'elements': []},
{'content': '12.\xa0\xa0Following their separation in 1978, D.S. retained sole possession of the flat in question while the applicant appears to have had no access since then.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '13.\xa0\xa0On 20 October 2006 the applicant was given back the nominal value of the amount paid pursuant to the decision of 2 September 1996 (see paragraph 9 above).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '14.\xa0\xa0On 2 September 2007 the applicant died.',
'elements': []},
{'content': "15.\xa0\xa0On 21 September 2007 the Fourth Municipal Court suspended the proceedings pending the determination of the applicant's legal heirs.",
'elements': []},
{'content': "16.\xa0\xa0On 10 October 2008 the applicant's son, as her only legal heir, requested the continuation of the proceedings.",
'elements': []},
{'content': '17.\xa0\xa0It would appear that there have been no further developments in the case since then.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'II.\xa0\xa0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW',
'elements': [{'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Enforcement Procedure Act (Zakon o izvršnom postupku; Official Gazette of nos. 28/00, 73/00 and 71/01)',
'elements': [{'content': '18.\xa0\xa0Article 4 provides that enforcement proceedings are to be conducted with particular urgency.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '19.\xa0\xa0Articles 147-160 set out the details as regards the auctioning of real estate.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Inheritance Act 1995 (Zakon o nasleđivanju, published in the Official Gazette of the nos. 46/95 and 101/03)',
'elements': [{'content': "20.\xa0\xa0Article 212 § 1 provides that the deceased's estate shall be transferred ex lege to the legal heirs at the moment of death.",
'elements': []}]}]}],
'section_name': 'facts'},
{'content': 'THE LAW',
'elements': [{'content': "I.\xa0\xa0THE APPLICANT'S DEATH",
'elements': [{'content': '21.\xa0\xa0On 2 June 2007 the applicant died.',
'elements': []},
{'content': "22.\xa0\xa0On 20 March 2008 the First Municipal Court (Prvi opštinski sud) in declared the applicant's son, Mr Vojko Mišković, to be her sole legal heir.",
'elements': []},
{'content': '23.\xa0\xa0On 23 April 2009 Mr Mišković informed the Court that he wished to maintain the proceedings lodged by his mother.',
'elements': []},
{'content': "24.\xa0\xa0Given the relevant domestic legislation (see paragraph 20 above), as well as the fact that he has a “definite pecuniary interest” in the enforcement proceedings at issue, the Court finds, without prejudice to the Government's other preliminary objections, that Mr Mišković has standing to proceed in his mother's stead (see, mutatis mutandis, Marčić and Others v. , no. 17556/05, § 35-40, 30 October 2007).",
'elements': []},
{'content': '25.\xa0\xa0Mr Mišković shall, therefore, himself be referred to as “the applicant” hereinafter.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'II.\xa0\xa0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1',
'elements': [{'content': "26.\xa0\xa0Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant complained about the non-execution of the Fourth Municipal Court's final decision of 30\xa0March 1987.",
'elements': []},
{'content': '27.\xa0\xa0Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 reads as follows:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his [or her] possessions. No one shall be deprived of his [or her] possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Admissibility',
'elements': [{'content': '28.\xa0\xa0The Government raised various objections to the admissibility of this matter. However, the Court has rejected similar objections in many previous cases (see, for example, EVT Company v. Serbia, no. 3102/05, §§ 39-42, 21 June 2007).\xa0\xa0It finds no particular circumstances in the instant case which would require a departure from this jurisprudence. It therefore declares the application admissible.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Merits',
'elements': [{'content': '29.\xa0\xa0The applicant reaffirmed that his property rights had been violated while the Government maintained that there had been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.',
'elements': []},
{'content': "30.\xa0\xa0The Court has frequently found that, in the context of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the States' positive obligations may require that measures be taken where necessary to protect the right of property, particularly where there is a direct link between the measures which an applicant may legitimately expect the authorities to undertake and the effective enjoyment of his or her possessions (see, for example, Burdov v. , no. 59498/00, §§ 39-42, ECHR 2002III).",
'elements': []},
{'content': "31.\xa0\xa0It is thus the State's responsibility to make use of all available legal means at its disposal in order to enforce a final court decision, notwithstanding the fact that it has been issued against a private party, as well as to make sure that all relevant domestic procedures are duly complied with (see, mutatis mutandis, Marčić and Others v. Serbia, cited above, §\xa056).",
'elements': []},
{'content': "32.\xa0\xa0Turning to the present case, the Court first notes that the ongoing inability of the domestic authorities to auction the flat in question amounts to an interference with the applicant's property rights. Secondly, the decision at issue had become final by 16 November 1987, and its enforcement had been ordered on 18 May 1990. Thirdly, Protocol No. 1 had entered into force in respect of on 3 March 2004, meaning that the non-enforcement at issue has been within the Court's competence ratione temporis for a period of five years and eight months, some fourteen years having already elapsed before that date. Lastly, there is nothing to suggest that the auction should have been anything but straightforward.",
'elements': []},
{'content': '33.\xa0\xa0In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the Serbian authorities have failed to fulfil their positive obligation, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, to enforce the decision of 30 March 1987. There has, accordingly, been a violation of the said provision.',
'elements': []}]}]},
{'content': 'III.\xa0\xa0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION',
'elements': [{'content': '34.\xa0\xa0The applicant further complained, under Article 13 of the Convention, that he has had no means to expedite the proceedings in question or obtain compensation for the past delay.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '35.\xa0\xa0Article 13 reads as follows:', 'elements': []},
{'content': '“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': '36.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and that it cannot be declared inadmissible on any other ground. The complaint must therefore be declared admissible.',
'elements': []},
{'content': "37.\xa0\xa0Having regard to its findings in respect of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and its prior judgments on the issue (see, mutatis mutandis, Cvetković v. Serbia, no. 17271/04, § 59, 10 June 2008), the Court considers that, at the relevant time, there was indeed no effective remedy under domestic law for the applicant's complaint about the non-enforcement in question. There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article\xa013 of the Convention taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.",
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'IV.\xa0\xa0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS',
'elements': [{'content': "38.\xa0\xa0Under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant also complained about the Supreme Court's decision of 3 March 2004.",
'elements': []},
{'content': '39.\xa0\xa0The Court observes that this decision was served on the applicant by 12 January 2005 while the application itself was introduced on 12\xa0September 2005, more than six months later. It follows that this complaint has been lodged out of time, and must therefore be rejected in accordance with Article\xa035 §§\xa01 and\xa04 of the Convention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': "40.\xa0\xa0Finally, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant, again, complained about the non-enforcement of the Fourth Municipal Court's decision of 30 March 1987.",
'elements': []},
{'content': "41.\xa0\xa0Having regard to its finding in respect of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 above, the Court declares the applicant's identical complaint made under Article 6 § 1 admissible, but does not find it necessary to examine it separately on the merits under this provision (see, mutatis mutandis, Davidescu v. Romania, no. 2252/02, §\xa057, 16 November 2006).",
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'IV.\xa0\xa0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION',
'elements': [{'content': '42.\xa0\xa0Article 41 of the Convention provides:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Damage',
'elements': [{'content': '43.\xa0\xa0The applicant claimed a total of 147,350 Euros (EUR) in respect of the pecuniary and the non-pecuniary damage suffered.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '44.\xa0\xa0The Government contested these claims.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '45.\xa0\xa0The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '46.\xa0\xa0However, the Court considers that the applicant must have suffered some non-pecuniary damage as a result of the non-enforcement at issue. Accordingly, taking into account the circumstances of the case and making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 1,800\xa0under this head.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '46.\xa0\xa0However, the Court considers that the applicant must have suffered some non-pecuniary damage as a result of the non-enforcement at issue. Accordingly, taking into account the circumstances of the case and making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 1,800\xa0under this head.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '46.\xa0\xa0However, the Court considers that the applicant must have suffered some non-pecuniary damage as a result of the non-enforcement at issue. Accordingly, taking into account the circumstances of the case and making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 1,800\xa0under this head.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '47.\xa0\xa0It must, further, be noted that a judgment in which the Court finds a violation of the Convention or of its Protocols imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction, but also to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in its domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found (see Apostol\xa0v. Georgia, no.\xa040765/02, §\xa071, ECHR 2006).',
'elements': []},
{'content': "48.\xa0\xa0Having regard to its finding in the instant case, the Court considers that the respondent State must secure, by appropriate means, the enforcement of the Fourth Municipal Court's final decision of 30 March 1987 (see, among many other authorities, Marčić and Others v. Serbia, cited above, § 65).",
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Costs and expenses',
'elements': [{'content': '49.\xa0\xa0The applicant claimed EUR 41,092 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 2,000 for those incurred before the Court.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '50.\xa0\xa0 The Government contested these claims.',
'elements': []},
{'content': "51.\xa0\xa0According to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to their quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings but considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 600 for the proceedings before the Court.",
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'C.\xa0\xa0Default interest',
'elements': [{'content': '52.\xa0\xa0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.',
'elements': []}]}]}],
'section_name': 'law'},
{'content': 'FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY',
'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0Declares the complaint concerning the non-enforcement of the final domestic decision admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;',
'elements': []},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;',
'elements': []},
{'content': '3.\xa0\xa0Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;',
'elements': []},
{'content': '4.\xa0\xa0Holds that it is not necessary to examine separately the non-enforcement complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;',
'elements': []},
{'content': '5.\xa0\xa0 Holds', 'elements': []},
{'content': "(a)\xa0\xa0that the respondent State shall ensure, by appropriate means, within three months from the date on which this judgment becomes final, in accordance with Article\xa044\xa0§\xa02 of the Convention, the enforcement of the Fourth Municipal Court's final decision of 30 March 1987;",
'elements': []},
{'content': '(b)\xa0\xa0that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within the same three month period, the following sums:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '(c)\xa0\xa0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;',
'elements': []},
{'content': "6.\xa0\xa0Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.",
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Done in English, and notified in writing on 24 November 2009, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.',
'elements': []}],
'section_name': 'conclusion'}],
'parties': ['POPOVIC', 'SERBIA']},
{'itemid': '001-209033',
'docname': 'CASE OF HANDZHIYSKI v. BULGARIA',
'doctypebranch': 'CHAMBER',
'ecli': 'ECLI:CE:ECHR:2021:0406JUD001078314',
'importance': 2,
'applicability': '',
'appno': '10783/14',
'decisiondate': None,
'introductiondate': None,
'judgementdate': '2021-04-06T00:00:00',
'kpdate': '2021-04-06T00:00:00',
'languageisocode': 'ENG',
'originatingbody_name': 'Fourth Section',
'originatingbody_type': 'Court',
'rank': '138.37206',
'respondent': 'BGR',
'separateopinion': True,
'typedescription': 15,
'judgment': [{'content': 'INTRODUCTION',
'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0The case chiefly concerns the question whether the conviction of the applicant, a local politician, of minor hooliganism in relation to his placing a Santa Claus cap and a red bag on the monument of an early twentieth century political figure on Christmas Day amounted to a violation of Article\xa010 of the Convention.',
'elements': []}],
'section_name': 'introduction'},
{'content': 'THE FACTS',
'elements': [{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Blagoevgrad. He was represented by Mr M. Ekimdzhiev and Ms K. Boncheva, lawyers practising in Plovdiv.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '3.\xa0\xa0The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms I. Stancheva-Chinova of the Ministry of Justice.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Background to the case', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'Background to the case',
'elements': [{'content': '4.\xa0\xa0Following parliamentary elections on 12 May 2013, on 29 May 2013 a new government was formed, led by Mr Plamen Oresharski and supported in Parliament by the Coalition for Bulgaria (whose main member was the Bulgarian Socialist Party – see paragraph 8 below), which had eighty-four members of Parliament, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, which had thirty-six members of Parliament, and the chairman of another political party, Ataka, Mr Volen Siderov, who was also a member of Parliament. Together, these provided a majority of one hundred twenty-one out of the total of two hundred and forty members of Parliament.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '4.\xa0\xa0Following parliamentary elections on 12 May 2013, on 29 May 2013 a new government was formed, led by Mr Plamen Oresharski and supported in Parliament by the Coalition for Bulgaria (whose main member was the Bulgarian Socialist Party – see paragraph 8 below), which had eighty-four members of Parliament, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, which had thirty-six members of Parliament, and the chairman of another political party, Ataka, Mr Volen Siderov, who was also a member of Parliament. Together, these provided a majority of one hundred twenty-one out of the total of two hundred and forty members of Parliament.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '5.\xa0\xa0On the evening of 14 June 2013 a wave of demonstrations against that government erupted in various cities and towns throughout the country. At first, the demonstrators’ main grievance was the appointment on the same date of Mr Delyan Peevski, a wealthy businessman and media-owner, as chairman of the State Agency for National Security. The daily demonstrations continued until about mid-January 2014. In an opinion poll carried out in late November and early December 2013, forty-three per cent of the respondents supported those anti-government protests, and forty per cent were of the view that they should continue; twenty-two percent declared that they would themselves participate in them. In another opinion poll carried out during the same period by another agency, forty-one per cent of the respondents said that the best political solution for the country would be for that government to resign and for new parliamentary elections to take place. Several months later, on 23 July 2014, Mr Oresharski’s government stepped down.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '5.\xa0\xa0On the evening of 14 June 2013 a wave of demonstrations against that government erupted in various cities and towns throughout the country. At first, the demonstrators’ main grievance was the appointment on the same date of Mr Delyan Peevski, a wealthy businessman and media-owner, as chairman of the State Agency for National Security. The daily demonstrations continued until about mid-January 2014. In an opinion poll carried out in late November and early December 2013, forty-three per cent of the respondents supported those anti-government protests, and forty per cent were of the view that they should continue; twenty-two percent declared that they would themselves participate in them. In another opinion poll carried out during the same period by another agency, forty-one per cent of the respondents said that the best political solution for the country would be for that government to resign and for new parliamentary elections to take place. Several months later, on 23 July 2014, Mr Oresharski’s government stepped down.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '6.\xa0\xa0At that time, the applicant was chairman of the Blagoevgrad chapter of the political party Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria (Демократи за силна България – “DSB”), which was then not represented in Parliament and which supported the anti-government protests.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'Events of 25 December 2013', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'Events of 25 December 2013',
'elements': [{'content': '7.\xa0\xa0In the early hours of 25 December 2013, Christmas day, the statue of Mr Dimitar Blagoev in the central square of Blagoevgrad was painted by unknown persons in red and white so as to resemble Santa Claus, and the plinth of the statue was daubed, using white spray-paint, with the words “Father Frost”.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '7.\xa0\xa0In the early hours of 25 December 2013, Christmas day, the statue of Mr Dimitar Blagoev in the central square of Blagoevgrad was painted by unknown persons in red and white so as to resemble Santa Claus, and the plinth of the statue was daubed, using white spray-paint, with the words “Father Frost”.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '8.\xa0\xa0Mr Blagoev (1856-1924) was the founder in 1891 of the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Party. In 1919, that party took the name Bulgarian Communist Party, which it kept until April 1990, when, in the wake of the fall of the communist regime in Bulgaria in late 1989, in which it was the dominating political force, it renamed itself Bulgarian Socialist Party. It continues to operate under this name. In 1950 the town of Blagoevgrad was named after Mr Blagoev, and in 1971 his statue was placed in its central square. In 1991, shortly after the fall of the communist regime, the municipal council proposed to the President of Bulgaria to give the town one of its old names – Gorna Dzhumaya or Skaptopara (Σκαπτοπάρα) – but the President did not act on the proposal, apparently owing to objections by some of the town’s inhabitants. In June 2014 there was another unsuccessful initiative to give the town another name.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '8.\xa0\xa0Mr Blagoev (1856-1924) was the founder in 1891 of the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Party. In 1919, that party took the name Bulgarian Communist Party, which it kept until April 1990, when, in the wake of the fall of the communist regime in Bulgaria in late 1989, in which it was the dominating political force, it renamed itself Bulgarian Socialist Party. It continues to operate under this name. In 1950 the town of Blagoevgrad was named after Mr Blagoev, and in 1971 his statue was placed in its central square. In 1991, shortly after the fall of the communist regime, the municipal council proposed to the President of Bulgaria to give the town one of its old names – Gorna Dzhumaya or Skaptopara (Σκαπτοπάρα) – but the President did not act on the proposal, apparently owing to objections by some of the town’s inhabitants. In June 2014 there was another unsuccessful initiative to give the town another name.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '9.\xa0\xa0In December 1991 Blageovgrad’s municipal council resolved to remove Mr Blagoev’s statue from the town centre. From the evidence adduced at the applicant’s subsequent trial (see paragraph 14 below), it appears that that resolution was put into effect. However, in May 1996 that decision was repealed by the new municipal council, and, again according to the evidence adduced at the applicant’s trial (see paragraph 14 below), the statue was then put back in its place.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '9.\xa0\xa0In December 1991 Blageovgrad’s municipal council resolved to remove Mr Blagoev’s statue from the town centre. From the evidence adduced at the applicant’s subsequent trial (see paragraph 14 below), it appears that that resolution was put into effect. However, in May 1996 that decision was repealed by the new municipal council, and, again according to the evidence adduced at the applicant’s trial (see paragraph 14 below), the statue was then put back in its place.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '10.\xa0\xa0Shortly before 10 a.m. on 25 December 2013 the applicant went to the already painted statue, which had been surrounded by a number of people and journalists drawn there by media reports that it had been painted over, and placed a red Santa Claus cap on its head and a red sack at its feet. The sack had a white band bearing the word “resignation” attached to it. The applicant said that he had been inspired to do that when seeing the media reports that the statue had been painted over.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '10.\xa0\xa0Shortly before 10 a.m. on 25 December 2013 the applicant went to the already painted statue, which had been surrounded by a number of people and journalists drawn there by media reports that it had been painted over, and placed a red Santa Claus cap on its head and a red sack at its feet. The sack had a white band bearing the word “resignation” attached to it. The applicant said that he had been inspired to do that when seeing the media reports that the statue had been painted over.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '11.\xa0\xa0Some of the journalists who were present took photographs of the statue with the cap and the sack and later published them. Shortly after that municipal workers came, took down the cap and the sack, and began removing the paint from the statue.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'Proceedings against the applicant', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'Proceedings against the applicant',
'elements': [{'content': '12.\xa0\xa0At about 2 p.m. the same day, 25 December 2013, the applicant was arrested in his home and taken to a police station, where he was placed in police detention for twenty-four hours, on suspicion of having committed hooliganism contrary to Article 325 § 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph\xa023 below), and searched.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '13.\xa0\xa0The next day, 26 December 2013, the applicant was charged with minor hooliganism contrary to Article 1 § 2 of the 1963 Decree on Combatting Minor Hooliganism (“the 1963 Decree” – see paragraphs 22-23 below) in relation to his having placed the cap and the sack on Mr\xa0Blagoev’s statue. He was then released from detention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '13.\xa0\xa0The next day, 26 December 2013, the applicant was charged with minor hooliganism contrary to Article 1 § 2 of the 1963 Decree on Combatting Minor Hooliganism (“the 1963 Decree” – see paragraphs 22-23 below) in relation to his having placed the cap and the sack on Mr\xa0Blagoev’s statue. He was then released from detention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '14.\xa0\xa0In the course of his trial, which took place four days later, on\xa030\xa0December 2013, the applicant stated that his act had been intended to express his protest against the government, which was his constitutional right, that that act had been met with universal approval, and that he had in effect made a good political joke. For their part, his counsel argued that he had exercised his constitutional right to express his views.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '14.\xa0\xa0In the course of his trial, which took place four days later, on\xa030\xa0December 2013, the applicant stated that his act had been intended to express his protest against the government, which was his constitutional right, that that act had been met with universal approval, and that he had in effect made a good political joke. For their part, his counsel argued that he had exercised his constitutional right to express his views.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '15.\xa0\xa0The same day, 30 December 2013, the Blagoevgrad District Court found the applicant guilty of minor hooliganism contrary to Article 1 § 2 of the 1963 Decree (see paragraphs 22-23 below), and fined him 100 Bulgarian levs (BGN) (equivalent to 51 euros (EUR)).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '15.\xa0\xa0The same day, 30 December 2013, the Blagoevgrad District Court found the applicant guilty of minor hooliganism contrary to Article 1 § 2 of the 1963 Decree (see paragraphs 22-23 below), and fined him 100 Bulgarian levs (BGN) (equivalent to 51 euros (EUR)).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '16.\xa0\xa0The court held, inter alia, that the 1963 Decree did not contravene Article\xa039 of the 1991 Constitution (see paragraph 21 below), because the right to freedom of expression enshrined in that provision was subject to exceptions. It was immaterial whether Mr Blagoev was a controversial historical figure, as asserted by the applicant. Even if he was one, that did not entitle people to mock his statue, which had stood in the centre of Blagoevgrad for a long time and had to be respected and preserved; that was also a requirement of the cultural-heritage conventions to which Bulgaria had adhered. Cultured people valued historical monuments and treated them with respect. If supporters of the Bulgarian Socialist Party were to paint the statue of a recently deceased anti-communist politician from the 1990s in Sofia as Superman, that would likewise amount to hooliganism. Such acts were unbecoming of the activists of a responsible political party, and had to be sanctioned in a State governed by the rule of law. Mr Blagoev was one of Blagoevgrad’s symbols, as attested by the town’s very name, which had not been changed after the fall of the communist regime. Contrary to the applicant’s assertions, his act had not been met with universal appreciation, as could be seen from a perusal of the numerous comments about it on the Internet, which ranged from approving to extremely disapproving ones. The “thin red line” between a proper political Christmas joke and hooliganism had been crossed.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '16.\xa0\xa0The court held, inter alia, that the 1963 Decree did not contravene Article\xa039 of the 1991 Constitution (see paragraph 21 below), because the right to freedom of expression enshrined in that provision was subject to exceptions. It was immaterial whether Mr Blagoev was a controversial historical figure, as asserted by the applicant. Even if he was one, that did not entitle people to mock his statue, which had stood in the centre of Blagoevgrad for a long time and had to be respected and preserved; that was also a requirement of the cultural-heritage conventions to which Bulgaria had adhered. Cultured people valued historical monuments and treated them with respect. If supporters of the Bulgarian Socialist Party were to paint the statue of a recently deceased anti-communist politician from the 1990s in Sofia as Superman, that would likewise amount to hooliganism. Such acts were unbecoming of the activists of a responsible political party, and had to be sanctioned in a State governed by the rule of law. Mr Blagoev was one of Blagoevgrad’s symbols, as attested by the town’s very name, which had not been changed after the fall of the communist regime. Contrary to the applicant’s assertions, his act had not been met with universal appreciation, as could be seen from a perusal of the numerous comments about it on the Internet, which ranged from approving to extremely disapproving ones. The “thin red line” between a proper political Christmas joke and hooliganism had been crossed.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '17.\xa0\xa0In fixing the quantum of the penalty, the court took into account the preponderance of mitigating circumstances: the absence of any aggression or violence on the part of the applicant, his clean criminal record and good character, and his being unemployed. All those factors militated towards giving him the lowest possible fine.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '17.\xa0\xa0In fixing the quantum of the penalty, the court took into account the preponderance of mitigating circumstances: the absence of any aggression or violence on the part of the applicant, his clean criminal record and good character, and his being unemployed. All those factors militated towards giving him the lowest possible fine.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '18.\xa0\xa0The applicant appealed. At the appeal hearing he argued, inter alia, that his act had been a way of exercising his constitutional right to protest against the government.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '18.\xa0\xa0The applicant appealed. At the appeal hearing he argued, inter alia, that his act had been a way of exercising his constitutional right to protest against the government.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '19.\xa0\xa0In a final judgment of 7 January 2014 the Blagoevgrad Regional Court upheld the lower court’s judgment. It held, inter alia, that the applicant’s act had properly been characterised as minor hooliganism, as it had been indecent and had breached public order. It was not in doubt that the applicant had sought to express a political position, in particular since he was the regional leader of a political party. This had not, however, entitled him to protest by breaching the law, especially since Mr Blagoev’s statue had shortly before that been vandalised by an unknown person by being painted over, and the applicant had in effect completed that act by placing a cap and a sack on it, thus expressing his mocking attitude towards it. It was not necessary to establish whether specific bystanders had felt aggrieved by the applicant’s act, which had been carried out in front of a multitude of people. The applicant’s arguments that his act had not amounted to an offence because it had been an exercise of his right to protest could not be accepted, because fundamental rights could not be exercised by committing acts contrary to the 1963 Decree.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '19.\xa0\xa0In a final judgment of 7 January 2014 the Blagoevgrad Regional Court upheld the lower court’s judgment. It held, inter alia, that the applicant’s act had properly been characterised as minor hooliganism, as it had been indecent and had breached public order. It was not in doubt that the applicant had sought to express a political position, in particular since he was the regional leader of a political party. This had not, however, entitled him to protest by breaching the law, especially since Mr Blagoev’s statue had shortly before that been vandalised by an unknown person by being painted over, and the applicant had in effect completed that act by placing a cap and a sack on it, thus expressing his mocking attitude towards it. It was not necessary to establish whether specific bystanders had felt aggrieved by the applicant’s act, which had been carried out in front of a multitude of people. The applicant’s arguments that his act had not amounted to an offence because it had been an exercise of his right to protest could not be accepted, because fundamental rights could not be exercised by committing acts contrary to the 1963 Decree.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '20.\xa0\xa0The applicant paid the fine on 20 January 2014.',
'elements': []}]}],
'section_name': 'facts'},
{'content': 'RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK',
'elements': [],
'section_name': 'relevant_law'},
{'content': 'RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK',
'elements': [{'content': '21.\xa0\xa0Article 39 of the Constitution of 1991 provides:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“1.\xa0\xa0Everyone is entitled to express an opinion or to publicise it through words, written or oral, sound, or image, or in any other way.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0This right shall not be used to the detriment of the rights and reputation of others, or for the incitement of a forcible change of the constitutionally established order, the perpetration of a crime, or the incitement of enmity or violence against anyone.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0This right shall not be used to the detriment of the rights and reputation of others, or for the incitement of a forcible change of the constitutionally established order, the perpetration of a crime, or the incitement of enmity or violence against anyone.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': '22.\xa0\xa0Decree no. 904 of 28 December 1963 on Combating Minor Hooliganism (“the 1963 Decree”) was passed by the then Presidium of the National Assembly under a simplified legislative procedure, as possible under Article 35 § 5 and Article 36 of the 1947 Constitution, then in force. The Supreme Administrative Court has consistently held that the Decree has the same force as an Act of Parliament (see опр. № 9959 от 07.11.2003 г. по адм. д. № 9327/2003 г., ВАС, I о.; опр. № 10286 от 10.12.2004 г. по адм. д. № 9761/2004 г., ВАС, петчл. с-в; опр. № 14673 от 03.12.2009 г. по адм. д. № 15200/2009 г., ВАС, I о.; and опр. № 12764 от 01.11.2010 г. по адм. д. № 13284/2010 г., ВАС, I о.).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '22.\xa0\xa0Decree no. 904 of 28 December 1963 on Combating Minor Hooliganism (“the 1963 Decree”) was passed by the then Presidium of the National Assembly under a simplified legislative procedure, as possible under Article 35 § 5 and Article 36 of the 1947 Constitution, then in force. The Supreme Administrative Court has consistently held that the Decree has the same force as an Act of Parliament (see опр. № 9959 от 07.11.2003 г. по адм. д. № 9327/2003 г., ВАС, I о.; опр. № 10286 от 10.12.2004 г. по адм. д. № 9761/2004 г., ВАС, петчл. с-в; опр. № 14673 от 03.12.2009 г. по адм. д. № 15200/2009 г., ВАС, I о.; and опр. № 12764 от 01.11.2010 г. по адм. д. № 13284/2010 г., ВАС, I о.).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '23.\xa0\xa0Article 1 § 2 of the 1963 Decree defines minor hooliganism as, inter alia, “indecent statements, made in a public place in front of many people”, or “[showing an] offensive attitude towards citizens, public authorities or society”, which breach public order and quietness but which, owing to their lower degree of seriousness, do not amount to the criminal offence of hooliganism laid down in Article 325 § 1 of the 1968 Criminal Code. Such acts, if committed by people older than sixteen, are punishable with up to fifteen days’ detention, or by a fine ranging from BGN 100 to BGN 500 (equivalent to EUR 51 to EUR 256) (Article 1 § 1).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '23.\xa0\xa0Article 1 § 2 of the 1963 Decree defines minor hooliganism as, inter alia, “indecent statements, made in a public place in front of many people”, or “[showing an] offensive attitude towards citizens, public authorities or society”, which breach public order and quietness but which, owing to their lower degree of seriousness, do not amount to the criminal offence of hooliganism laid down in Article 325 § 1 of the 1968 Criminal Code. Such acts, if committed by people older than sixteen, are punishable with up to fifteen days’ detention, or by a fine ranging from BGN 100 to BGN 500 (equivalent to EUR 51 to EUR 256) (Article 1 § 1).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '24.\xa0\xa0Cases under the 1963 Decree fall under the jurisdiction of the district courts (Article 3 § 1 (a) and Article 4). By Article 7 § 2, a district court’s decision to impose a penalty is amenable to appeal on points of law before a regional court, on the same grounds as those set out in the Code of Criminal Procedure: a breach of the substantive law, a material breach of the rules of procedure, or manifest disproportionality of the sentence. The regional court’s judgment is final (Article 7 § 3 in fine).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '24.\xa0\xa0Cases under the 1963 Decree fall under the jurisdiction of the district courts (Article 3 § 1 (a) and Article 4). By Article 7 § 2, a district court’s decision to impose a penalty is amenable to appeal on points of law before a regional court, on the same grounds as those set out in the Code of Criminal Procedure: a breach of the substantive law, a material breach of the rules of procedure, or manifest disproportionality of the sentence. The regional court’s judgment is final (Article 7 § 3 in fine).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '25.\xa0\xa0A conviction under the 1963 Decree is not regarded as criminal or entered in the criminal records of the people concerned (Article 7 § 4).',
'elements': []}],
'section_name': 'relevant_law'},
{'content': 'THE LAW',
'elements': [{'content': 'ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION',
'elements': [{'content': '26.\xa0\xa0The applicant complained that the interference with his right to freedom of expression had not been necessary in a democratic society. He relied on Article 10 of the Convention, which provides, in so far as relevant:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“1.\xa0\xa0Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority ...',
'elements': []},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Admissibility',
'elements': [{'content': 'Exhaustion of domestic remedies',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'The parties’ submissions',
'elements': [{'content': '27.\xa0\xa0The Government noted that the applicant had not sought judicial review of his police detention and had not sought damages in relation to it. There was ample case-law of the Bulgarian courts in such cases, including in cases touching upon freedom of expression. In view of that omission, the applicant’s police detention was not to be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of the interference with his right to freedom of expression.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '28.\xa0\xa0The applicant replied that any claim for judicial review of his police detention would have been heard long after the latter had ended, and could not thus have served to ensure his release. Such a claim was accordingly not an effective remedy. Moreover, the matters to be examined in such proceedings would have been nearly identical to those considered in the proceedings in which he had been found guilty of minor hooliganism. There was hence no reason to believe that the courts would have approached them any differently and found in his favour.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'The Court’s assessment', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'The Court’s assessment',
'elements': [{'content': '29.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that the complaint under Article 10 of the Convention, as formulated in the relevant part of the application, concerned solely the judgments finding the applicant guilty of minor hooliganism; it did not relate to his earlier police detention. It is true that the part of the application which set out the facts of the case contained a reference to that detention. But when articulating his complaint under Article 10, the applicant laid emphasis on the reasons given by the courts for finding him guilty of minor hooliganism and said:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“When finding the applicant guilty of minor hooliganism, the national courts did not take into account the specific social and political context in which he had carried out acts of ‘hooliganism’, or the harmless artistic means of expression used by [him]. The unjustified police arrest of the applicant supports that conclusion.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“When finding the applicant guilty of minor hooliganism, the national courts did not take into account the specific social and political context in which he had carried out acts of ‘hooliganism’, or the harmless artistic means of expression used by [him]. The unjustified police arrest of the applicant supports that conclusion.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': '30.\xa0\xa0The Court has had occasion to note that police or pre-trial detention and concomitant hooliganism proceedings constitute distinct interferences with the right to freedom of expression (see Kandzhov v. Bulgaria, no.\xa068294/01, § 70, 6 November 2008, and Stefanov v. Bulgaria (dec.), no.\xa051127/18, §§ 74-75, 8 September 2020). It does not find that the last phase of the above quotation from the application form can be construed to mean that the applicant was also complaining of his police detention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '30.\xa0\xa0The Court has had occasion to note that police or pre-trial detention and concomitant hooliganism proceedings constitute distinct interferences with the right to freedom of expression (see Kandzhov v. Bulgaria, no.\xa068294/01, § 70, 6 November 2008, and Stefanov v. Bulgaria (dec.), no.\xa051127/18, §§ 74-75, 8 September 2020). It does not find that the last phase of the above quotation from the application form can be construed to mean that the applicant was also complaining of his police detention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '31.\xa0\xa0The scope of the case referred to the Court in the exercise of the right of individual application is determined by the applicant’s complaint, and the Court cannot base its decision on facts not covered by the complaint (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §\xa0126, 20 March 2018). It follows that in the present case the Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the applicant’s police detention, and accordingly to examine the Government’s non-exhaustion objection in relation to it.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '31.\xa0\xa0The scope of the case referred to the Court in the exercise of the right of individual application is determined by the applicant’s complaint, and the Court cannot base its decision on facts not covered by the complaint (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §\xa0126, 20 March 2018). It follows that in the present case the Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the applicant’s police detention, and accordingly to examine the Government’s non-exhaustion objection in relation to it.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '32.\xa0\xa0In any event, even assuming that the applicant’s complaint can be read to encompass also his police detention, that part of it is indeed inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. As noted by the Government, the applicant did not seek judicial review of that detention and damages in relation to it, as possible under Bulgarian law (see Stefanov, cited above, § 77). It cannot be presumed that in such proceedings the Bulgarian courts would have refused to entertain arguments based on freedom of expression, or that a claim founded on such arguments would have been destined to fail (ibid.). It is true that in the minor hooliganism proceedings against the applicant the Blagoevgrad District Court and the Blagoevgrad Regional Court came to the view that it was proper to find him guilty and fine him even though he had sought to exercise his right to freedom of expression (see paragraphs 15-17 and 19 above). But that does not necessarily imply that the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court – the courts competent at the time to deal at first instance and on appeal with legal challenges against police detention – would have seen the matter in the same light and decided that it had been lawful and justified to detain the applicant. He did not therefore exhaust domestic remedies with respect to his grievance – assuming he raised one – that his police detention was in breach of his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'No significant disadvantage', 'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'The parties’ submissions',
'elements': [{'content': '33.\xa0\xa0The Government submitted that the applicant had not suffered a significant disadvantage. He had merely been given a fine which had amounted to the equivalent of EUR 51, which was not criminal under Bulgarian law, and which had not been entered into the applicant’s criminal record. Nor had it tarnished his reputation, as attested by the fact that in 2015 and 2019 he had obtained enough votes to be elected as a municipal councillor in Blagoevgrad. His case had been duly considered at two levels of jurisdiction. Respect for human rights did not require his application to be examined on the merits, as the kind of issues raised by it had already been elucidated in judgments against Bulgaria.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '34.\xa0\xa0The applicant replied that the point had to be assessed based on the cumulative effect of his police detention and of his subsequent fine, which had been disproportionate in view of the minor seriousness of his act. It also had to be borne in mind that he was the local leader of an opposition political party, and that his arrest and the minor hooliganism proceedings against him had received broad media coverage and had brought him into disrepute. The fact that the issues thrown up by his case had already given rise to findings of violation against Bulgaria suggested a systemic problem and was an even stronger reason why his application had to be examined on the merits.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'The Court’s assessment', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'The Court’s assessment',
'elements': [{'content': '35.\xa0\xa0The Court first reiterates that the applicant’s police detention cannot be taken into account in determining whether he suffered a “significant disadvantage” within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention (see paragraphs 29 to 32 above).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '35.\xa0\xa0The Court first reiterates that the applicant’s police detention cannot be taken into account in determining whether he suffered a “significant disadvantage” within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention (see paragraphs 29 to 32 above).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '36.\xa0\xa0As for the minor hooliganism proceedings against him, it is true that the fine imposed in them was not criminal in nature, that its amount was quite modest, and that there is no indication that these matters led to any serious adverse consequences for the applicant (see paragraphs 15 and 25 above, and compare with Sylka v. Poland (dec.), no. 19219/07, §§ 31-34, 3\xa0June 2014; Mura v. Poland (dec.), no. 42442/08, §§ 23, 26 and 27, 2 June 2016; and Savelyev v. Russia (dec.), no. 42982/08, §§ 28-30, 21 May 2019). However, in the present case the practical and in particular the pecuniary effects on the applicant cannot be the sole criterion for assessing whether he has suffered a “significant disadvantage”. He was found guilty of and fined for an act which had in his view amounted to a proper exercise of his right to freedom of expression on a matter of public interest. The case thus validly concerns a point of principle for him (see, mutatis mutandis, Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, no. 35399/05, § 46, 27 October 2015, and Margulev v. Russia, no. 15449/09, § 42, 8 October 2019). Indeed, his complaint under Article 10 of the Convention gives rise to issues of general importance: whether political protest carried out in the manner chosen by the applicant – by profaning a public monument without damaging it – can amount to a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression (contrast Sylka, § 35; Mura, § 28; and Savelyev, § 31, all cited above) and under what conditions can sanctions imposed in response to such acts be considered “necessary in a democratic society” (see, mutatis mutandis, Berladir and Others v. Russia, no. 34202/06, § 34, 10 July 2012; Yılmaz Yıldız and Others v. Turkey, no. 4524/06, § 28, 14 October 2014; and Yordanovi v. Bulgaria, no. 11157/11, § 51, 3 September 2020). Moreover, the applicant’s case appears to have received wide media coverage and to have given rise to public debate in Bulgaria (see, mutatis mutandis, Eon v.\xa0France, no. 26118/10, § 34 in fine, 14 March 2013).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '36.\xa0\xa0As for the minor hooliganism proceedings against him, it is true that the fine imposed in them was not criminal in nature, that its amount was quite modest, and that there is no indication that these matters led to any serious adverse consequences for the applicant (see paragraphs 15 and 25 above, and compare with Sylka v. Poland (dec.), no. 19219/07, §§ 31-34, 3\xa0June 2014; Mura v. Poland (dec.), no. 42442/08, §§ 23, 26 and 27, 2 June 2016; and Savelyev v. Russia (dec.), no. 42982/08, §§ 28-30, 21 May 2019). However, in the present case the practical and in particular the pecuniary effects on the applicant cannot be the sole criterion for assessing whether he has suffered a “significant disadvantage”. He was found guilty of and fined for an act which had in his view amounted to a proper exercise of his right to freedom of expression on a matter of public interest. The case thus validly concerns a point of principle for him (see, mutatis mutandis, Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, no. 35399/05, § 46, 27 October 2015, and Margulev v. Russia, no. 15449/09, § 42, 8 October 2019). Indeed, his complaint under Article 10 of the Convention gives rise to issues of general importance: whether political protest carried out in the manner chosen by the applicant – by profaning a public monument without damaging it – can amount to a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression (contrast Sylka, § 35; Mura, § 28; and Savelyev, § 31, all cited above) and under what conditions can sanctions imposed in response to such acts be considered “necessary in a democratic society” (see, mutatis mutandis, Berladir and Others v. Russia, no. 34202/06, § 34, 10 July 2012; Yılmaz Yıldız and Others v. Turkey, no. 4524/06, § 28, 14 October 2014; and Yordanovi v. Bulgaria, no. 11157/11, § 51, 3 September 2020). Moreover, the applicant’s case appears to have received wide media coverage and to have given rise to public debate in Bulgaria (see, mutatis mutandis, Eon v.\xa0France, no. 26118/10, § 34 in fine, 14 March 2013).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '37.\xa0\xa0It cannot therefore be accepted that the applicant has not suffered a “significant disadvantage” within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '37.\xa0\xa0It cannot therefore be accepted that the applicant has not suffered a “significant disadvantage” within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '38.\xa0\xa0The same considerations amount to grounds to find that “respect for human rights as defined in the Convention” in any event requires an examination of the complaint on the merits (see, mutatis mutandis, Gafiuc v.\xa0Romania, no. 59174/13, § 40, 13 October 2020).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '39.\xa0\xa0The Government’s objection must therefore be rejected.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Other grounds for inadmissibility',
'elements': [{'content': '40.\xa0\xa0It was already found that the complaint – so far as it concerns the applicant’s conviction of minor hooliganism – is not inadmissible on account of a failure to exhaust domestic remedies, or because the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage. Nor is that complaint manifestly ill-founded or inadmissible on any of the other grounds set out in Article 34 and Article 35 §§ 1 to 3 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.',
'elements': []}]}]},
{'content': 'Merits',
'elements': [{'content': 'The parties’ submissions', 'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'The applicant',
'elements': [{'content': '41.\xa0\xa0The applicant pointed out that the protection of public order was not among the legitimate aims enumerated in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. The nearest notion to which that provision referred was “the prevention of disorder or crime”, but there was a perceptible difference between the two. His harmless prank had not been capable of causing “disorder of crime” even if it had upset some people. Nor was it clear how precisely it had affected the “rights of others”.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '42.\xa0\xa0For the applicant, his case showed that Bulgarian law did not properly distinguish between legitimate political protest and wanton acts of vandalism and hooliganism. It was puzzling to him that thirty years after the fall of the communist regime the authorities still conflated those notions, and perceived political protest as hooliganism without inquiring into its goals or symbolism. They had disregarded the applicant’s motives and had seen his innocuous gesture as vandalism even though it had not damaged the monument in any way. It had to be emphasised in that connection that his act had been a form of protest against a government which had lost its legitimacy and which had shortly after that resigned. Indeed, the courts had acknowledged that fact, and had noted that the applicant was a local politician. It could hardly be said that the proceedings against him had somehow increased his popularity. Only the first-instance court had tried to carry out some sort of balancing exercise, whereas the appellate court had brushed aside the arguments based on his right to freedom of expression.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'The Government',
'elements': [{'content': '43.\xa0\xa0The Government conceded that the applicant’s act had constituted “expression”, and that the minor hooliganism proceedings against him had interfered with the exercise of his right to freedom of expression. They were, however, of the view that that interference had met the requirements of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. The legal basis for the interference – the 1963 Decree – was sufficiently accessible and precise, and the case-law of the Bulgarian courts under it was abundant and settled. The interference had sought to protect public safety and the rights of others; that was evident from the terms of Article 1 § 2 of the 1963 Decree, under which the applicant had been sanctioned, and from the reasons given by the Bulgarian courts in his case.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '44.\xa0\xa0The interference had also been necessary and proportionate. The applicant’s sanction had been administrative rather than criminal, and a very mild one – the minimum possible fine under the 1963 Decree, which had equalled less than a third of the minimum monthly salary in Bulgaria at the time. The applicant had been found guilty for desecrating a monument rather than for offending Mr Blagoev’s memory or for voicing his political views. It was true that political expression enjoyed heightened protection, but it could be interfered with if the means used for it disturbed public order or the everyday functioning of society. It was clear that the applicant had prepared his act in advance, and that he had sought to attract media attention to it. Apart from its artistic and historical value, Mr Blagoev’s monument was also a symbol of the eponymous town. Vandalism against monuments was amenable to sanctions in all Contracting States. The link between the monument and the government in power was neither evident nor perceived by the public as direct. At the time the applicant had not been a well-known politician. Indeed, it had been that very act and the subsequent proceedings against him that had made him popular and had propelled him into being elected as a municipal councillor. When finding him guilty, the courts had carefully weighed up all circumstances, with due regard for his right to freedom of expression, and had spelled out in detail the justification for interfering with that right. There was no evidence that the fine given to the applicant had caused him any hardship.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'The Court’s assessment', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'The Court’s assessment',
'elements': [{'content': '45.\xa0\xa0The Court considers that, seen in its proper context, the conduct which led to the applicant’s conviction of minor hooliganism can be regarded as “expression” within the meaning of Article 10 § 1 of the Convention. The applicant was a local opposition politician who combined a symbolic act intended to mock publicly the monument of the founder of the political party which was providing the main parliamentary support for the government in power with a call for that government to resign. Also, he acted in the course of a prolonged nation-wide protest against that government (see paragraphs 4-11 above). It is hence clear that with his act he sought to engage in political protest, and “impart” his “ideas” about the government and the political party which supported it (see, mutatis mutandis, Murat Vural v. Turkey, no. 9540/07, §§ 7-10 and 54-56, 21\xa0October 2014; Shvydka v. Ukraine, no. 17888/12, §§ 37-38, 30 October 2014; Sinkova v. Ukraine, no. 39496/11, §§ 7-8 and 100, 27 February 2018; Mătăsaru v. the Republic of Moldova, nos. 69714/16 and 71685/16, §§ 7-8 and 31, 15 January 2019; and Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, nos.\xa063571/16 and 5 others, §§ 166-67, 13 February 2020).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '45.\xa0\xa0The Court considers that, seen in its proper context, the conduct which led to the applicant’s conviction of minor hooliganism can be regarded as “expression” within the meaning of Article 10 § 1 of the Convention. The applicant was a local opposition politician who combined a symbolic act intended to mock publicly the monument of the founder of the political party which was providing the main parliamentary support for the government in power with a call for that government to resign. Also, he acted in the course of a prolonged nation-wide protest against that government (see paragraphs 4-11 above). It is hence clear that with his act he sought to engage in political protest, and “impart” his “ideas” about the government and the political party which supported it (see, mutatis mutandis, Murat Vural v. Turkey, no. 9540/07, §§ 7-10 and 54-56, 21\xa0October 2014; Shvydka v. Ukraine, no. 17888/12, §§ 37-38, 30 October 2014; Sinkova v. Ukraine, no. 39496/11, §§ 7-8 and 100, 27 February 2018; Mătăsaru v. the Republic of Moldova, nos. 69714/16 and 71685/16, §§ 7-8 and 31, 15 January 2019; and Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, nos.\xa063571/16 and 5 others, §§ 166-67, 13 February 2020).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '46.\xa0\xa0It is furthermore not in doubt that the applicant’s conviction of minor hooliganism in relation to that act and the resultant fine amounted to interference with his right to freedom of expression (see Cholakov v.\xa0Bulgaria, no. 20147/06, § 25, 1 October 2013). Nor is it in doubt that this interference was “prescribed by law” (ibid., § 26). In particular, it can be accepted that the legal basis for it – Article 1 § 2 of the 1963 Decree (see paragraphs 15-16, 19 and 22-23 above) – was sufficiently foreseeable. It is true that this provision defines “minor hooliganism” in broad terms, but in this case the applicant resorted to a provocative gesture likely to disturb or insult some of the people who witnessed it directly or learned about it from the media. It can thus be accepted that his act could reasonably be characterised by the Bulgarian courts as “minor hooliganism” within the meaning of the 1963 Decree (see, mutatis mutandis, Shvydka, cited above, §\xa039).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '46.\xa0\xa0It is furthermore not in doubt that the applicant’s conviction of minor hooliganism in relation to that act and the resultant fine amounted to interference with his right to freedom of expression (see Cholakov v.\xa0Bulgaria, no. 20147/06, § 25, 1 October 2013). Nor is it in doubt that this interference was “prescribed by law” (ibid., § 26). In particular, it can be accepted that the legal basis for it – Article 1 § 2 of the 1963 Decree (see paragraphs 15-16, 19 and 22-23 above) – was sufficiently foreseeable. It is true that this provision defines “minor hooliganism” in broad terms, but in this case the applicant resorted to a provocative gesture likely to disturb or insult some of the people who witnessed it directly or learned about it from the media. It can thus be accepted that his act could reasonably be characterised by the Bulgarian courts as “minor hooliganism” within the meaning of the 1963 Decree (see, mutatis mutandis, Shvydka, cited above, §\xa039).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '47.\xa0\xa0In the light of the same considerations, it can also be accepted that the interference pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the “rights of others” (ibid., § 40). There is, however, no indication that it was meant to protect “public safety”. As noted by the national courts, the applicant’s act was entirely peaceful (see paragraph 17 above). Nor is there any indication that it was likely to cause public disturbances, or that when sanctioning the applicant the authorities had that in mind (see, mutatis mutandis, Perinçek v.\xa0Switzerland [GC], no. 27510/08, §§ 152-53, ECHR 2015 (extracts), and contrast Maguire v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 58060/13, § 47 in fine, 3\xa0March 2015).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '47.\xa0\xa0In the light of the same considerations, it can also be accepted that the interference pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the “rights of others” (ibid., § 40). There is, however, no indication that it was meant to protect “public safety”. As noted by the national courts, the applicant’s act was entirely peaceful (see paragraph 17 above). Nor is there any indication that it was likely to cause public disturbances, or that when sanctioning the applicant the authorities had that in mind (see, mutatis mutandis, Perinçek v.\xa0Switzerland [GC], no. 27510/08, §§ 152-53, ECHR 2015 (extracts), and contrast Maguire v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 58060/13, § 47 in fine, 3\xa0March 2015).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '48.\xa0\xa0The salient issue is whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. The general principles governing this point have recently been set out in Perinçek (cited above, §§ 196-97).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '49.\xa0\xa0The sanction imposed on the applicant was the mildest possible under the legal provision that he was found to have breached (see paragraphs 17 and 23 above). It was indeed quite lenient, consisting solely of an administrative fine of BGN 100 (equivalent to EUR 51), which the applicant was able to pay almost immediately and apparently without any difficulty (see paragraphs 15 and 20 above). It was, moreover, not entered in the applicant’s criminal record (see paragraph 25 above). If his conviction is considered justified, that sanction cannot hence be seen as disproportionate in itself (contrast Murat Vural, §§ 66-68; Shvydka, § 41; and Mătăsaru, §§\xa035-36, all cited above). The salient question thus becomes, more specifically, whether it was at all justified to sanction the applicant’s act. Indeed, the adjective “necessary” in Article 10 § 2 implies the existence of a pressing social need, and does not have the flexibility of such expressions as “useful”, “reasonable” or “desirable” (see, among other authorities, Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, § 48, Series A no. 24; The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), 26 April 1979, § 59, Series A no. 30; and Barthold v. Germany, 25 March 1985, § 55, Series A no. 90).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '50.\xa0\xa0As noted in paragraph 45 above, through that act the applicant, a local opposition politician, sought to protest against the government in power and the political party which provided main parliamentary support for it, in the course of a prolonged nation-wide protest against that government. Expression on matters of public interest is in principle entitled to heightened protection, and there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 for restrictions on it (see, among other authorities, Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 48876/08, § 102, ECHR\xa02013 (extracts); Perinçek, cited above, § 230; and Mariya Alekhina and Others v. Russia, no. 38004/12, § 212, 17 July 2018). Moreover, the protection of Article 10 extends not only to the substance of the ideas and information expressed but also to the form in which they are conveyed (see,\xa0among other authorities, Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 1), 23 May 1991, §\xa057\xa0in fine, Series A no. 204; Animal Defenders International, cited above, §\xa0100 in fine; and Murat Vural, cited above, §§ 44-53, with further references).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '51.\xa0\xa0Although it was not meant as a form of artistic expression, the applicant’s act could also be seen having elements of satirical expression. The Court has had occasion to note that satire, by its inherent features of exaggeration and distortion of reality, aims to provoke and agitate. Accordingly, any interference with the use of this form of expression must be examined with particular care (see, among other authorities, Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria, no. 68354/01, § 33, 25 January 2007; Alves da Silva v. Portugal, no. 41665/07, § 27, 20 October 2009; and Eon, cited above, § 60), even though its use does not definitively rule out the possibility of restriction under Article 10 § 2 (see Leroy v. France, no.\xa036109/03, §§ 39 and 44, 2 October 2008, and Instytut Ekonomichnykh Reform, TOV v. Ukraine, no. 61561/08, § 46, 2 June 2016), or even of finding a complaint being inadmissible by reference to Article 17, in cases in which the satire is directed against the Convention’s underlying values (see M’Bala M’Bala v. France (dec.), no. 25239/13, §§ 31-33 and 39-42, ECHR 2015 (extracts)).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '52.\xa0\xa0It is true that Article 10 of the Convention does not bestow freedom of forum for the exercise of the right to freedom of expression (see Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 44306/98, § 47, ECHR 2003-VI; Taranenko v. Russia, no. 19554/05, § 78, 15 May 2014; and Mariya Alekhina and Others, cited above, § 213). It is also true that in some cases the authorities may, consistently with that provision, limit the channels through which people and organisations can express themselves (see Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland [GC], no. 16354/06, §§ 57-77, ECHR 2012 (extracts), in relation to a refusal to allow a poster campaign on public spaces), even on matters of public interest (see Animal Defenders International, cited above, §§ 99-125, in relation to a general ban on paid political advertising on television). Indeed, the justification for such limitations can be even stronger when the “expression” at issue consists, wholly or in part, in conduct, as it did in the case at hand. In this case, however, the applicant was not prevented from approaching Mr Blagoev’s monument and placing the cap and the sack on it; he was later sanctioned for having done so. When an interference with the right to freedom of expression takes the form of a “penalty”, it inevitably calls for a detailed assessment of the specific conduct sought to be punished. It cannot normally be justified solely because the expression at issue was caught by a legal rule formulated in general terms (see, mutatis mutandis, Perinçek, cited above, § 275).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '53.\xa0\xa0Public monuments are frequently physically unique and form part of a society’s cultural heritage. Measures, including proportionate sanctions, designed to dissuade acts which can destroy them or damage their physical appearance may therefore be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society”, however legitimate the motives which may have inspired such acts. In a democratic society governed by the rule of law, debates about the fate of a public monument must be resolved through the appropriate legal channels rather than by covert or violent means.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '54.\xa0\xa0The Court observes, however, that the applicant did not engage in any form of violence and did not physically impair Mr Blagoev’s monument in any way. He merely placed a cap on its head and a sack at its feet; those were removed by municipal workers a short while later (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above). It was not suggested, either at domestic level or in the proceedings before the Court, that the applicant had somehow coordinated his actions with the unidentified people who had earlier painted Mr\xa0Blagoev’s statue in red and white and had painted the words “Father Frost” on its plinth (see paragraph 7 above).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '55.\xa0\xa0When it comes to such acts – which, though capable of profaning a monument, do not damage it – the question whether it can be “necessary in a democratic society” to impose sanctions in relation to them becomes more nuanced. In such situations, the precise nature of the act, the intention behind it, and the message sought to be conveyed by it cannot be matters of indifference. For instance, acts intended to criticise the government or its policies, or to call attention to the suffering of a disadvantaged group cannot be equated to acts calculated to offend the memory of the victims of a mass atrocity. The social significance of the monument in question, the values or ideas which it symbolises, and the degree of veneration that it enjoys in the respective community will also be important considerations.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '56.\xa0\xa0In the present case, the context clearly suggests that the intention behind the applicant’s act was to protest against the government of the day and the political party which supported it, in the context of a prolonged nation-wide protest against that government, rather than to condemn Mr\xa0Blagoev’s historical role or to express contempt towards him (see paragraphs 4-11 above). The applicant simply used Mr Blagoev’s monument as a symbol of the political party that he wished to criticise. It can thus hardly be said that his act was meant to show disdain for deep-seated social values. This is further confirmed by the fact that it appears that the reactions to it were mixed (see paragraph 16 in fine above).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '57.\xa0\xa0It should also be noted in this connection that Mr Blagoev’s statue was put up during the communist regime in Bulgaria, and appears to have been seen as sufficiently connected to the values and ideas for which that regime stood to have been removed from its place, albeit for a few years only, shortly after the regime came to an end (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above). This can hardly be compared with, for instance, memorials to soldiers who have given their lives for the defence of their country (contrast Sinkova, cited above, § 110).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '58.\xa0\xa0It can be accepted that the applicant’s symbolic gesture was hurtful to some of the people who witnessed it directly or learned about it from the media. However, freedom of expression is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population (see, among many other authorities, Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, §\xa049, Series A no. 24; Müller and Others, cited above, § 33; Perinçek, cited above, § 196 (i); and Stern Taulats and Roura Capellera v. Spain, nos.\xa051168/15 and 51186/15, §§ 30 and 39, 13 March 2018).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '58.\xa0\xa0It can be accepted that the applicant’s symbolic gesture was hurtful to some of the people who witnessed it directly or learned about it from the media. However, freedom of expression is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population (see, among many other authorities, Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, §\xa049, Series A no. 24; Müller and Others, cited above, § 33; Perinçek, cited above, § 196 (i); and Stern Taulats and Roura Capellera v. Spain, nos.\xa051168/15 and 51186/15, §§ 30 and 39, 13 March 2018).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '59.\xa0\xa0It follows that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression – the finding that he was guilty of minor hooliganism and the resultant fine – was not “necessary in a democratic society”, notwithstanding the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national authorities in that domain. There has therefore been a breach of Article 10 of the Convention.',
'elements': []}]}]}]},
{'content': 'APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION',
'elements': [{'content': '60.\xa0\xa0Article 41 of the Convention provides:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Pecuniary damage',
'elements': [{'content': '61.\xa0\xa0The applicant sought reimbursement of the fine imposed on him, plus default interest calculated in accordance with the Bulgarian statutory rules and running from the date on which he had paid the fine.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '62.\xa0\xa0The Government contested the claim. They submitted in particular that there were no grounds to award the applicant interest at the statutory default rate applicable in Bulgaria.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '63.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that the finding of breach of Article 10 of the Convention was based on the mere fact that the applicant was found guilty\xa0of minor hooliganism. He is therefore entitled to recover the fine\xa0of\xa0100\xa0Bulgarian levs (BGN), equivalent to 51 euros (EUR), that he had to pay as a result of his conviction (see, among other authorities, Lingens v.\xa0Austria, 8 July 1986, § 50, Series A no. 103; Axel Springer AG v.\xa0Germany [GC], no. 39954/08, §§ 113 and 115, 7 February 2012; and Marinova and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 33502/07 and 3 others, § 118, 12\xa0July 2016).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '64.\xa0\xa0It can also be accepted that the applicant suffered some further pecuniary loss as a result of the lapse of time since the time when he paid the fine – 20 January 2014 (see paragraph 20 above, and compare with Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, § 83, ECHR\xa01999-III; Unabhängige Initiative Informationsvielfalt v. Austria, no.\xa028525/95, § 58, ECHR 2002-I; Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG v.\xa0Austria (no. 3), no. 39069/97, § 47, ECHR 2003-XII; Albert-Engelmann-Gesellschaft mbH v. Austria, no. 46389/99, § 39, 19 January 2006; and Arbeiter v. Austria, no. 3138/04, § 32, 25 January 2007). But the Court is unable to follow the suggestion that the calculation of that loss should be based on the default statutory interest in Bulgaria; it is not bound by such domestic rules (see Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas, cited above, § 83). The purpose of an award of pecuniary damages under Article 41 of the Convention is to put the applicant, as far as possible, in the position in which he would have been if the breach of his rights had not occurred (restitutio in integrum). The interest rate applied by the Court, meant to compensate the loss of value of money over time, should hence reflect national economic conditions, such as the level of inflation and the rates of interest during the relevant period. Domestic rules on the calculation of default interest, which may reflect considerations going over and above restitutio in integrum, are thus not necessarily an appropriate measure; the Court must rather base itself on a rate of interest which best serves the purpose of its award (see Boyadzhieva and Gloria International Limited EOOD v. Bulgaria, nos. 41299/09 and 11132/10, § 54, 5 July 2018). In the light of these considerations and the available information about the economic conditions in Bulgaria during the relevant period, in this case it is reasonable to apply a rate equal to the base interest rate of the Bulgarian National Bank during the relevant period (which began when the applicant paid the fine and will end with the delivery of this judgment) plus one percentage point (ibid., § 55). This gives BGN 7.15 (equivalent to EUR\xa03.66). The global award in respect of pecuniary damage is thus BGN\xa0107.15, equivalent to EUR 54.66.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'Non-pecuniary damage',
'elements': [{'content': '65.\xa0\xa0The applicant claimed EUR 10,000 in respect of the distress, loss of reputation and affront to his dignity caused by his detention and conviction of minor hooliganism, which had according to him received wide publicity. That damage was according to him further compounded by the tenor of the Government’s submissions on the merits of his complaint.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '66.\xa0\xa0The Government submitted that the actions taken with respect to the applicant had in fact increased his popularity, and that a finding of violation would amount to sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage suffered by him.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '67.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that its findings on the merits of the complaint under Article 10 of the Convention did not relate to the applicant’s police detention – which, depending on how the matter is seen, was either not part of the complaint or was a matter in respect of which the applicant did not exhaust domestic remedies (see paragraphs 29 to 32 above). That said, it can be accepted that the applicant suffered some non-pecuniary damage as a result of the judgment finding him guilty of minor hooliganism and the resultant fine. Ruling on an equitable basis, as required under Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards him EUR 2,000 under this head, plus any tax that may be chargeable.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'Costs and expenses',
'elements': [{'content': 'The applicant’s claim and the Government’s comments on it',
'elements': [{'content': '68.\xa0\xa0The applicant sought reimbursement of:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '(a)\xa0\xa0EUR 3,960 incurred in fees for thirty-three hours of work by his lawyers on the proceedings before the Court, at EUR 120 per hour;',
'elements': []},
{'content': '(b)\xa0\xa0EUR 6.19 spent by his lawyers on postage;',
'elements': []},
{'content': '(c)\xa0\xa0EUR 15 expended by his lawyers on office supplies; and',
'elements': []},
{'content': '(d)\xa0\xa0EUR 116.57 spent by his lawyers’ firm for the translation of the written observations and claims made on his behalf into English.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '69.\xa0\xa0The applicant requested that any award under this head be made directly payable to his lawyers’ firm, Ekimdzhiev and Partners.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '70.\xa0\xa0In support of his claim, the applicant submitted a fee agreement with his lawyers’ firm, a time-sheet and costs report by that firm (which the applicant accepted), a postal receipt, and a contract between his lawyers’ firm and a translator.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '71.\xa0\xa0The Government submitted, with respect to item (a) of the claim, that both the hours claimed and the hourly rate were excessive, in particular in view of the relative simplicity of the issues raised by the case. For their part, items (b) and (c) were operating costs incurred by the firm of the applicant’s lawyers, already covered by the fees which they had charged the applicant. The Government made the same point with respect to item (d), and pointed out that the contact for translation services spoke of nineteen pages, whereas the applicant’s observations only ran to fourteen pages, and that no invoice had been presented for those services.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'The Court’s assessment', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'The Court’s assessment',
'elements': [{'content': '72.\xa0\xa0According to the Court’s case-law, applicants are entitled to the reimbursement of their costs and expenses, but only to the extent that these were actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '72.\xa0\xa0According to the Court’s case-law, applicants are entitled to the reimbursement of their costs and expenses, but only to the extent that these were actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '73.\xa0\xa0In the present case, the only point in dispute in relation to the lawyers’ fees whose reimbursement is sought by the applicant (item (a) of his claim) is whether they were reasonable as to quantum. The hourly rate charged by those lawyers, EUR 120, is much higher than those accepted in recent cases against Bulgaria of similar complexity (see Karaahmed v.\xa0Bulgaria, no. 30587/13, §§ 117 and 119, 24 February 2015; Guseva v.\xa0Bulgaria, no. 6987/07, §§ 74 and 76, 17 February 2015; and Yordanovi, cited above, §§ 89 and 91). It cannot therefore be seen as reasonable. By contrast, in the light of the degree of complexity of the issues raised by the case and the content of the submissions made on behalf of the applicant, the number of hours claimed appears reasonable. In view of these considerations, the Court awards the applicant EUR 2,640, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him, under this head. As requested by him, this sum should be paid directly into the bank account of the law firm of his representatives, Ekimdzhiev and Partners (see, for instance, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483/12, § 288 in fine, ECHR 2016 (extracts)).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '73.\xa0\xa0In the present case, the only point in dispute in relation to the lawyers’ fees whose reimbursement is sought by the applicant (item (a) of his claim) is whether they were reasonable as to quantum. The hourly rate charged by those lawyers, EUR 120, is much higher than those accepted in recent cases against Bulgaria of similar complexity (see Karaahmed v.\xa0Bulgaria, no. 30587/13, §§ 117 and 119, 24 February 2015; Guseva v.\xa0Bulgaria, no. 6987/07, §§ 74 and 76, 17 February 2015; and Yordanovi, cited above, §§ 89 and 91). It cannot therefore be seen as reasonable. By contrast, in the light of the degree of complexity of the issues raised by the case and the content of the submissions made on behalf of the applicant, the number of hours claimed appears reasonable. In view of these considerations, the Court awards the applicant EUR 2,640, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him, under this head. As requested by him, this sum should be paid directly into the bank account of the law firm of his representatives, Ekimdzhiev and Partners (see, for instance, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483/12, § 288 in fine, ECHR 2016 (extracts)).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '74.\xa0\xa0For their part, the administrative costs (in this case, postage and office supplies – items (b) and (c) of the applicant’s claim) incurred by the applicant’s representatives in connection with the proceedings before the Court are in principle recoverable under Article 41 of the Convention (see, among other authorities, The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1) (Article\xa050), 6 November 1980, § 40, Series A no. 38; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom (Article 50), 24 February 1983, § 25, Series A no. 59; Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, no. 23144/93, §§ 85-87, ECHR 2000-III; İpek v.\xa0Turkey, no. 25760/94, § 242 in fine, ECHR 2004-II (extracts); and Antonov v. Bulgaria, no. 58364/10, §§ 72 and 76, 28 May 2020). Indeed, under the terms of the fee agreement between the applicant and his lawyers’ firm, he is liable not only to pay fees for his lawyers’ work on the case, but also to cover all administrative costs incurred by their firm in connection with it. That said, there are no documents supporting the claim in respect of office supplies. In those circumstances, the Court makes an award solely with respect to postage, which according to the documents submitted by the applicant came to BGN 12.10, which equals EUR 6.19. To this should be added any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. As requested by him, this sum is likewise to be paid directly into the bank account of the law firm of his representatives.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '74.\xa0\xa0For their part, the administrative costs (in this case, postage and office supplies – items (b) and (c) of the applicant’s claim) incurred by the applicant’s representatives in connection with the proceedings before the Court are in principle recoverable under Article 41 of the Convention (see, among other authorities, The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1) (Article\xa050), 6 November 1980, § 40, Series A no. 38; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom (Article 50), 24 February 1983, § 25, Series A no. 59; Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, no. 23144/93, §§ 85-87, ECHR 2000-III; İpek v.\xa0Turkey, no. 25760/94, § 242 in fine, ECHR 2004-II (extracts); and Antonov v. Bulgaria, no. 58364/10, §§ 72 and 76, 28 May 2020). Indeed, under the terms of the fee agreement between the applicant and his lawyers’ firm, he is liable not only to pay fees for his lawyers’ work on the case, but also to cover all administrative costs incurred by their firm in connection with it. That said, there are no documents supporting the claim in respect of office supplies. In those circumstances, the Court makes an award solely with respect to postage, which according to the documents submitted by the applicant came to BGN 12.10, which equals EUR 6.19. To this should be added any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. As requested by him, this sum is likewise to be paid directly into the bank account of the law firm of his representatives.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '75.\xa0\xa0Translation costs are also in principle recoverable under Article 41 (see, for instance, The Sunday Times (no. 1) (Article 50), cited above, § 40; Olsson v. Sweden (no. 2), 27 November 1992, § 114, Series A no. 250; Blokhin v. Russia [GC], no. 47152/06, § 229 in fine, 23 March 2016; and\xa0Marinova and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 33502/07 and 3 others, § 133, 12\xa0July 2016). In the present case, the contract between the firm of the applicant’s lawyers and the translator specifically stated that the translation concerned the observations and claims made on behalf of the applicant. It also stipulated that the translator’s fee was to be calculated on the basis of the amount of standard pages (rather than the actual number of pages) of which those documents consisted, and stated that the fee had been paid via bank transfer. There is hence no reason to doubt that the translation costs were actually and necessarily incurred by the applicant’s lawyers. They also appear reasonable as to quantum. The sum expended for translation – EUR\xa0116.57\xa0– is therefore to be awarded in full. To this should be added any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. As requested by him, this sum is likewise to be paid to into the bank account of the law firm of his representatives.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '76.\xa0\xa0The total award in respect of costs and expenses is thus EUR\xa02,762.76.',
'elements': []}]}]},
{'content': 'Default interest',
'elements': [{'content': '77.\xa0\xa0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.',
'elements': []}]}]}],
'section_name': 'law'},
{'content': 'FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT',
'elements': [{'content': 'Declares, unanimously, the application admissible;',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Holds, by six votes to one, that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention;',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Holds, by six votes to one,', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Dismisses, unanimously, the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Done in English, and notified in writing on 6 April 2021, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judge Vehabović is annexed to this judgment.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'I regret that I am unable to subscribe to the view of the majority that there has been a violation of Article 10 in this case.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'This case has many similarities with the case of Sinkova v. Ukraine (no.\xa039496/11, 27 February 2018), but the outcome is completely different. A comparison of the facts in Handzhiyski and Sinkova is very important in order to compare the legal arguments used in these cases, which lead the majority to different conclusions.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'I', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'Sinkova v. Ukraine', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'At the time of the events the applicant belonged to an artistic group called the St Luke Brotherhood, which was known for its provocative public performances.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'On 16 December 2010 the applicant, together with three other members of the group, carried out what she described as an “act of performance”. They went to the Eternal Glory Memorial to those who perished in the Second World War. The applicant took a frying pan prepared in advance, broke some eggs into it and fried them over the Eternal Flame at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Two of her friends joined her and fried sausages on skewers over the flame. Another member of the group filmed the event. On the same day the applicant posted the video on the Internet on behalf of the St Luke Brotherhood. It was accompanied by the following statement:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“Precious natural gas has been being burned, pointlessly, at the Glory Memorial in Kyiv for fifty-three years now. This pleasure costs taxpayers about 300,000 hryvnias per month. And this is only one ‘eternal flame’ pagan temple, whereas there are hundreds or even thousands of them throughout Ukraine. On 16 December the St\xa0Luke Brotherhood reacted to this by an act of protest in the Glory Park in the capital. It showed that people should use the ‘eternal flame’.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'We suggest to the outraged representatives of the Communist Party of Ukraine to follow the example of ancient Roman vestal virgins and to carry out around-the-clock duty at the ‘eternal flames’, keeping the fire lit manually by wood. There is no doubt that communists will have no problems with fulfilling this task, because they already have experience of taking care of the Lenin monument in Kyiv and their financing is much better than that which the vestal virgins had.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'On 29 March 2011 at 9 p.m. the applicant was arrested. After three months in prison she was released.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'On 4 October 2012 the Pecherskyy District Court found the applicant guilty of desecrating the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, acting as part of a group of persons following a prior conspiracy, classified as a criminal offence according to Ukrainian law. As a result, she was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, suspended for two years.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'The applicant alleged a violation of Articles 5 and 10 of the Convention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Handzhiyski v. Bulgaria', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'The applicant was chairman of the Blagoevgrad chapter of the political party Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria, which was not represented in Parliament at the relevant time and which supported the anti-government protests.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'In the early hours of 25 December 2013, Christmas day, the statue of Mr\xa0Dimitar Blagoev in the central square of Blagoevgrad was painted by unknown persons in red and white so as to resemble Santa Claus, and the plinth of the statue was daubed, using white spray-paint, with the words “Father Frost”.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Shortly before 10 a.m. on 25 December 2013 the applicant went to the painted statue, which had been surrounded by a number of people and journalists drawn there by media reports that it had been painted over, and placed a red Santa Claus cap on its head and a red sack at its feet. The sack had a white band bearing the word “resignation” attached to it. The applicant said that he had been inspired to do that when seeing the media reports that the statue had been painted over.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'At about 2 p.m. on the same day, 25 December 2013, the applicant was arrested at his home and taken to a police station, where he was placed in police detention for twenty-four hours on suspicion of having committed hooliganism contrary to Article 325 § 1 of the Criminal Code, and was searched.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'The next day, 26 December 2013, the applicant was charged with minor hooliganism contrary to Article 1 § 2 of the 1963 Decree on Combating Minor Hooliganism, for having placed the cap and the sack on Mr\xa0Blagoev’s statue. He was then released from detention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'In the course of his trial, which took place four days later on\xa030\xa0December 2013, the applicant stated that his act had been intended to express his protest against the government, which was his constitutional right, that that act had been met with universal approval, and that he had in effect made a good political joke. For their part, his counsel argued that he had exercised his constitutional right to express his views.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'The same day, 30 December 2013, the Blagoevgrad District Court found the applicant guilty of minor hooliganism contrary to Article 1 § 2 of the\xa01963 Decree and fined him 100 Bulgarian levs (equivalent to 51 euros (EUR)).',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'The applicant relied only on Article 10 of the Convention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'II', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'It is easy to note that both cases relate to very similar situations, one that can be characterised as an “artistic performance pointing out social, economic and political issues” and the other one constituting purely “political protest”. Both applicants spent some time in prison – three months in the case of Ms Sinkova and 24 hours in the case of Mr Handzhiyski. It is worth noting that in the present case the applicant did not rely on Article 5 of the Convention. In Sinkova, the applicant was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, suspended for two years. In the present case the applicant was sentenced to pay a fine of EUR 51.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Notwithstanding all the similarities, the majority reached a different conclusion in the present case. It seems that this conclusion is based on the considerations set forth in paragraphs 57-59 of the judgment, where it is stated that the statue of Mr Blagoev “was put up during the communist regime in Bulgaria” (similarly to the eternal flame monument in Sinkova) “and appears to have been seen as sufficiently connected to the values and ideas for which that regime stood”. It appears that the majority are of the opinion that anything that was put up during the communist regime and that can be identified with that regime is by default wrong and that it is acceptable to subject it to mockery. It should be noted that Mr Blagoev lived and died a long time (twenty years) before that regime came into power in Bulgaria. It could well be that in the context of Bulgaria’s political life this public figure is considered a part, or even a “founding father”, of the communist regime in Bulgaria. However, I am of the opinion that it would be difficult to objectively conclude that twenty years after his death, Mr\xa0Blagoev had anything to do with what that regime did – good or bad – during the communist era.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'I have difficulty sharing that position, and without wishing to open a discussion on the values attached to statues and monuments in general, I feel bound to say that while we are not able to change history, we can properly evaluate it. We have witnessed many occasions on which historic monuments in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and so on, have been desecrated or completely destroyed for various reasons, but the motives were always a difference of opinion about the values these monuments represent. That behaviour is not acceptable. On the other hand, there are still monuments that glorify events, battles or persons promoting uncivilised actions or aims like slavery, or rulers who committed terrible atrocities during the colonial age, and so forth, but what makes a significant difference is the historical context of these events or personalities. What is acceptable to one person might be unacceptable to another, but one thing is certain – no one can change history and those events and personalities should be evaluated in their particular historical context.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'In the context of this case, it was the duty of the authorities to protect those monuments that are in place today in so far as they are still there. It is up to them too to decide whether these monuments should still be left standing in public places, but in the meantime there is a necessity to act according to the law. In protecting them the authorities should also properly evaluate acts by individuals that publicly mock statues and monuments and what they represent, in the light of the “necessity in a democratic society”. In the instant case they did so by sentencing the applicant to a fine of\xa051\xa0euros, which is insignificant compared with the sentence imposed on Ms\xa0Sinkova, who spent three months in pre-trial detention as well as being sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, suspended for two years.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'This different approach to the process of evaluating the facts in these two cases points once again to an inconsistent approach by the Court in dealing with similar cases, which will not enhance its public image.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'III', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'In Sinkova the Court noted in §§ 107 and 108 that the applicant had carried out what she considered to be an artistic performance aimed at protesting against the wasteful use of natural gas by the State while the latter turned a blind eye to the poor living standards of veterans. However, the applicant was criminally prosecuted and convicted only on account of frying eggs over the Eternal Flame, which the domestic courts considered to amount to desecration of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, an offence under the Ukrainian Criminal Code. The charge against her concerned neither the subsequent distribution by her of the relevant video nor the content of the rather sarcastic and provocative text accompanying that video. In other words, the applicant was not convicted for expressing the views that she did or even for expressing them in strong language. Her conviction was a narrow one in respect of particular conduct in a particular place (compare Maguire v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 58060/13, 3\xa0March 2015). Moreover, it was based on a general prohibition of contempt for the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier forming part of ordinary criminal law.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'By contrast, in the instant case, in paragraph 54 the majority turned its attention to the fact that the applicant had not engaged in any form of violence and had not physically impaired the monument in any way (the same was true of Ms Sinkova, who had merely fried eggs on the eternal flame). On that basis the majority concluded that this act of non-violent protest was “covered” by the principle of “necessity in a democratic society” and as such was justified. The message sent out is a dangerous one\xa0– whenever any desecration of monuments take place it will be justified as long as it is the result of non-violent protest that caused no damage to the statue or monument itself. This approval might easily undermine the principle of the rule of law and could be understood as an invitation to similar non-violent acts against any statue, monument or sacred places, acts that may well injure the feelings of those who support their existence. This is a potentially dangerous approval that is not consistent with the existing case-law of this Court.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '', 'elements': []}],
'section_name': 'conclusion'}],
'parties': ['HANDZHIYSKI', 'BULGARIA']},
{'itemid': '001-178343',
'docname': 'CASE OF ZUBKOV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA',
'doctypebranch': 'CHAMBER',
'ecli': 'ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:1107JUD002943105',
'importance': 3,
'applicability': '',
'appno': '29431/05;7070/06;5402/07',
'decisiondate': None,
'introductiondate': None,
'judgementdate': '2017-11-07T00:00:00',
'kpdate': '2017-11-07T00:00:00',
'languageisocode': 'ENG',
'originatingbody_name': 'Third Section',
'originatingbody_type': 'Court',
'rank': '134.47542',
'respondent': 'RUS',
'separateopinion': True,
'typedescription': 15,
'judgment': [{'content': 'PROCEDURE',
'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0The case originated in three applications (nos.\xa029431/05, 7070/06 and\xa05402/07) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Russian nationals. Their names and dates of birth, as well as the dates on which they lodged their applications, are listed in the appendix.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr\xa0G.\xa0Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr\xa0M.\xa0Galperin. Two of the applicants were represented by lawyers whose names are listed in the appendix.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '3.\xa0\xa0The applicants alleged, in particular, that they had been subjected to covert surveillance in breach of Article 8 of the Convention. One of the applicants also complained of the excessive length of the criminal proceedings. Another complained of the inhuman conditions of detention and transport. He also alleged that his pre-trial detention had not been attended by sufficient procedural guarantees.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '4.\xa0\xa0Between 26 August 2009 and 21 December 2012 the above complaints were communicated to the Government.',
'elements': []}],
'section_name': 'procedure'},
{'content': 'THE FACTS',
'elements': [{'content': 'I.\xa0\xa0THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE',
'elements': [{'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Application no. 29431/05 Zubkov v. Russia',
'elements': [{'content': '5.\xa0\xa0On 12 April 2002 the local police sent to the local investigations committee audio recordings of telephone conversations between the applicant and several persons, and video recordings of their meetings in a flat in Novgorod. The accompanying letter, which the Government presented to the Court, stated that the audio and video recordings had been obtained in the course of covert “operational-search” measures (“оперативно-розыскные мероприятия”) authorised by the President of the Novgorod Regional Court on 19 July and 31 August 2000 and 17 and 27\xa0February 2001.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '6.\xa0\xa0On 16 April 2002 the applicant was arrested and charged with several counts of drug trafficking committed by an organised criminal group. Four more persons were arrested on the same charge.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '7.\xa0\xa0On 18 April 2002 the Novgorod Regional Prosecutor’s Office ordered the applicant’s placement in custody pending trial. He remained in custody throughout the criminal proceedings.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '8.\xa0\xa0The applicant learned about the audio and video recordings on an unspecified date while studying the criminal case file.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '9.\xa0\xa0On 26 June 2002 the investigation was completed and the case was sent for trial to the Novgorod Town Court.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '10.\xa0\xa0On 18 July 2002 counsel of one of the defendants asked that the trial be adjourned until September 2002 because he would be on annual leave until 6 September.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '11.\xa0\xa0On 20 August 2002 the Novgorod Town Court scheduled the first hearing for 16 September 2002. The hearing of 16 September 2002 was adjourned until 23 September 2002 because the applicant’s counsel was in hospital and because the prosecution witnesses did not appear. The trial eventually started on 20 November 2002.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '12.\xa0\xa0At the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty. He claimed, in particular, that the audio and video recordings were inadmissible as evidence as they had been obtained without prior judicial authorisation.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '13.\xa0\xa0His co-defendants pleaded guilty. They testified that the applicant was the leader of an organised group dealing in drugs. The applicant and another defendant, Mr K., had rented a flat where the members of the group had met to receive instructions from the applicant and to distribute the profits. They had also packaged and stored drugs in the flat. The owner of the flat testified that he had rented his flat to Mr K. and that on several occasions the rent had been paid by the applicant.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '14.\xa0\xa0On 24 November 2004 the Novgorod Town Court found the applicant and his co-defendants guilty of drug trafficking. It found it established that the applicant was the leader of an organised criminal group dealing in drugs. It relied on witness testimony, expert reports, audio recordings of telephone conversations between the defendants and video recordings of their meetings in the rented flat. It found that the recordings were admissible as evidence because they “had been obtained in the course of authorised covert operational-search measures aiming at uncovering criminal acts committed by Zubkov and the criminal group organised by him”. The applicant was sentenced to nine years and six months’ imprisonment.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '15.\xa0\xa0In his appeal submissions the applicant complained, in particular, that the audio and video recordings had been obtained without prior judicial authorisation.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '16.\xa0\xa0On 8 February 2005 the Novgorod Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. It repeated verbatim the Town Court’s finding that the audio and video recordings were admissible as evidence because they “had been obtained in the course of authorised covert operational-search measures aiming at uncovering criminal acts committed by Zubkov and the criminal group organised by him”.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Application no. 7070/06 Ippolitov v. Russia',
'elements': [{'content': '17.\xa0\xa0The applicant worked as an investigator at the Prosecutor General’s Office.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '18.\xa0\xa0On 6 April 2004 he was arrested and charged with aiding and abetting bribery.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '19.\xa0\xa0On 29 October 2004, while studying the criminal case file, the applicant discovered that it contained audio recordings of his telephone conversations during the period from November 2003 to March 2004.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '20.\xa0\xa0The criminal case file also contained a letter of 21 October 2004 from the Federal Security Service to the local prosecutor stating that the audio recordings had been obtained in the course of covert operationalsearch measures authorised by the Tver Regional Court in its decisions nos.\xa055-21, 55-30, 55-76, 55-93 and 55-103. Given that they were classified documents, the decisions could not be shown to the prosecutor and would be shown to the trial court only at its request.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '21.\xa0\xa0During the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty. He argued, in particular, that the audio and video recordings were inadmissible as evidence because the case file did not contain a copy of the judicial authorisation. The prosecutor stated in reply that the interception of his telephone communications had been authorised by the Tver Regional Court. A copy of the authorisation had not been included in the case file because it was confidential.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '22.\xa0\xa0On 14 May 2005 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of aiding and abetting bribery and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. The court relied, among other things, on the audio recordings of his telephone conversations. The court rejected the applicant’s argument that the audio recordings were inadmissible as evidence, finding that “the examination of the material in the case file [had] permitted [the court] to establish that the evidence [had been] obtained in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Operational-Search Activities Act”.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '23.\xa0\xa0The applicant appealed. He submitted that the Regional Court had not given reasons for its finding that the audio recordings were admissible as evidence. In particular, it had not examined whether the interception of his telephone conversations had been duly authorised by a court and carried out in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '24.\xa0\xa0On 7 December 2005 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment on appeal. The court did not specifically address the applicant’s argument that the audio recordings were inadmissible as evidence. It held that the finding of guilt had been based on evidence which had been properly analysed and assessed by the Regional Court. The applicant received the decision on 7\xa0March 2006.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'C.\xa0\xa0Application no. 5402/07 Gorbunov v. Russia',
'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0The applicant’s detention',
'elements': [{'content': '25.\xa0\xa0On 5 July 2006 the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladimir ordered the applicant’s detention on charges of fraud. The applicant was absent from the hearing but his counsel attended. On 14 July 2006 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal. The applicant was absent also from the appeal hearing, which was again attended by his counsel.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '25.\xa0\xa0On 5 July 2006 the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladimir ordered the applicant’s detention on charges of fraud. The applicant was absent from the hearing but his counsel attended. On 14 July 2006 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal. The applicant was absent also from the appeal hearing, which was again attended by his counsel.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '26.\xa0\xa0On 3 November 2006 the Frunzenskiy District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 5 January 2007. On 7 November 2006 the applicant appealed. On 5 December 2006 the Vladimir Regional Court found that there were no reasons to vary the preventive measure and upheld the decision of 3 November 2006.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '27.\xa0\xa0The applicant’s detention was further extended on several more occasions.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0Conditions of detention in remand prisons',
'elements': [{'content': '28.\xa0\xa0In the period from 14 September 2006 to 12 January 2007 the applicant was detained in four remand prisons. According to the applicant, all four remand prisons were overcrowded.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '29.\xa0\xa0From 14 to 22 September 2006 the applicant was held in remand prison IZ-67/1 in Smolensk. Cell 196 measuring 15 sq. m was equipped with eight sleeping places and accommodated up to sixteen inmates.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '30.\xa0\xa0From 25 to 28 September 2006 the applicant was held in remand prison 76/1 in Yaroslavl. Cell\xa0133 measuring 9 sq. m was equipped with seven sleeping places and accommodated up to eight inmates.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '31.\xa0\xa0From 29 September to 1 October 2006 the applicant was held in remand prison 43/1 in Kirov. His cell measuring 50 sq. m was equipped with forty sleeping places and accommodated up to twenty inmates. The cell was equipped with wooden boards instead of individual beds.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '32.\xa0\xa0From 2 October 2006 to 12 January 2007 the applicant was held in remand prison 33/1 in Vladimir. Cell\xa063 measuring 14 sq. m was equipped with four sleeping places and accommodated up to five inmates.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': '3.\xa0\xa0Conditions of transport',
'elements': [{'content': '33.\xa0\xa0On 28 and 29 September 2006 the applicant was transported by rail between remand prison IZ-76/1 and remand prison IZ-43/1 from Yaroslavl to Kirov. The train compartment was equipped with seven sleeping places and accommodated up to ten inmates.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '34.\xa0\xa0On 1 and 2 October 2006 the applicant was transported by rail between remand prison IZ-43/1 and remand prison IZ-33/1 from Kirov to Vladimir. The train compartment was equipped with seven sleeping places and accommodated up to twelve inmates.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': '4.\xa0\xa0Interception of the applicant’s telephone communications',
'elements': [{'content': '35.\xa0\xa0On 25 December 2006 the applicant started to study the criminal case file and discovered that it contained audio recordings of his telephone conversations between 22 and 25 July 2004.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '36.\xa0\xa0On 2 February 2007 the applicant asked the investigator for a copy of the judicial decision authorising the interception. On the same day the investigator refused his request. Relying on the Interior Ministry’s Order no.\xa0336 of 13\xa0May 1998 (see paragraph 54 below), he replied that the police were not required to send the interception authorisation to the investigator; it was to be kept in the operational search file. The Vladimir Regional Court’s decisions of 28 May and 2 June 2004 authorising interception of the applicant’s telephone communications were stored by the local police. They were classified documents and neither the applicant nor his counsel, who had no security clearance, could be granted access to them.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '37.\xa0\xa0On 6 February 2007 the applicant complained to\xa0the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladimir that the interception of his telephone communications had been unlawful, in particular because the case file did not contain a judicial authorisation. He submitted that the refusal to give him a copy of the interception authorisation had frustrated him in the exercise of his defence rights and deprived him of an effective remedy against an interference with his rights guaranteed by Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution and Article 8 of the Convention. In particular, he had been unable to ascertain whether the interception authorisation had been issued by a competent court in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, whether it had been based on relevant and sufficient reasons or whether the requirements for judicial authorisation, such as the authorised duration of interception, had been complied with at the implementation stage.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '38.\xa0\xa0On 19 February 2007 the Frunzenskiy District Court examined the complaint under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 63 below) and rejected it. Relying on section 12 of the Operational-Search Activities Act (see paragraph 49 below), the court held that the judicial decision authorising operational-search measures and the material that served as a basis for that decision were to be held in the exclusive possession of the State agency performing such measures. It had therefore not been included in the criminal case file and the defendant was not entitled to have access to it. The court further referred to the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 14 July 1998, holding that the person whose communications were to be intercepted was not entitled to participate in the authorisation proceedings or to be informed about the decision taken (see paragraph 50 below). The refusal to give the applicant a copy of the judicial authorisation had therefore been lawful. The court also rejected the applicant’s complaint about the unlawfulness of the interception, without giving any reasons.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '39.\xa0\xa0On 3 April 2007 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the decision of 19 February 2007 on appeal, finding it lawful, well reasoned and justified.',
'elements': []}]}]}]},
{'content': 'II.\xa0\xa0RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW',
'elements': [{'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Right to respect for private life, home and correspondence',
'elements': [{'content': '40.\xa0\xa0The Constitution guarantees to everyone the right to respect for his private life, personal and family secrets and the right to defend his honour and reputation (Article 23 § 1). It further guarantees the right to respect for correspondence, telephone, postal, telegraph and other communications. That right may be restricted only on the basis of a court order (Article 23 §\xa02).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '41.\xa0\xa0The Constitution also stipulates that it is not permissible to collect, store, use or disseminate information about a person’s private life without his or her consent. State and municipal authorities must ensure that any person has access to documents and material affecting his rights and freedoms, except where the law provides otherwise (Article 24).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '41.\xa0\xa0The Constitution also stipulates that it is not permissible to collect, store, use or disseminate information about a person’s private life without his or her consent. State and municipal authorities must ensure that any person has access to documents and material affecting his rights and freedoms, except where the law provides otherwise (Article 24).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '42.\xa0\xa0The Constitution also guarantees to everyone the right to respect for his or her home. Nobody may enter a home without the consent of those living in it, except in cases established by federal law, or on the basis of a court order (Article 25).',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Provisions on interception of communications and inspection of the home, and use of the data thereby collected in criminal proceedings',
'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0Authorisation of interception of communications or inspection of the home',
'elements': [{'content': '43.\xa0\xa0The Operational-Search Activities Act of 12 August 1995 (Law no.\xa0144FZ – hereafter “the OSAA”) provides that “operational-search” measures (“оперативно-розыскные мероприятия”) may include, among other things, the interception of postal, telegraphic, telephone and other forms of communication; the collection of data from technical channels of communication; the inspection of premises, buildings, other installations, vehicles and areas; “surveillance” (“наблюдение”); and “operative experiments” (“оперативный эксперимент”). Audio and video recording, photography, filming and other technical means may be used during operational-search activities, provided that they are not harmful to anyone’s life or health or to the environment (section 6).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '43.\xa0\xa0The Operational-Search Activities Act of 12 August 1995 (Law no.\xa0144FZ – hereafter “the OSAA”) provides that “operational-search” measures (“оперативно-розыскные мероприятия”) may include, among other things, the interception of postal, telegraphic, telephone and other forms of communication; the collection of data from technical channels of communication; the inspection of premises, buildings, other installations, vehicles and areas; “surveillance” (“наблюдение”); and “operative experiments” (“оперативный эксперимент”). Audio and video recording, photography, filming and other technical means may be used during operational-search activities, provided that they are not harmful to anyone’s life or health or to the environment (section 6).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '44.\xa0\xa0The aims of operational-search activities are: (1) to detect, prevent, suppress and investigate criminal offences and the identification of persons conspiring to commit, committing, or having committed a criminal offence; (2) to trace fugitives from justice and missing persons; and (3) to obtain information about events or activities endangering the national, military, economic or ecological security of the Russian Federation (section 2 of the OSAA, as in force at the material time).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '45.\xa0\xa0Operational-search activities involving interference with the constitutional right to the privacy of postal, telegraphic and other communications transmitted by means of a telecommunications network or mail services (“interception of communications”), or within the privacy of the home (“inspection of the home”), may be conducted following the receipt of information (1) that a criminal offence has been committed or is ongoing, or is being plotted; (2) about persons conspiring to commit, or committing, or having committed a criminal offence; or (3) about events or activities endangering the national, military, economic or ecological security of the Russian Federation (section 8(2) of the OSAA).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '46.\xa0\xa0At the material time the interception of communications or inspection of the home could be authorised only in cases where a person was suspected of, or charged with, a serious offence or an especially serious criminal offence, or might have information about such an offence (section 8(4) of the OSAA, as in force until 24 July 2007). Since 24 July 2007 the interception of communications or inspection of the home may be authorised also in cases where a person is suspected of, or charged with, a criminal offence of medium severity.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '47.\xa0\xa0Operational-search measures involving interception of communications or inspection of the home require prior judicial authorisation (section 8(2) of the OSAA). The judge must specify the period of time for which the authorisation is granted, which must not normally exceed six months. If necessary, the judge may extend the authorised period after a fresh examination of all the relevant material (section 9(4) and (5) of the Act). The judge takes a decision on the basis of a reasoned request by the head of one of the agencies competent to perform operational-search activities. Relevant supporting material, except material containing information about undercover agents or police informers or about the organisation and tactics of operational-search measures, must also be produced at the judge’s request (section 9(2) and (3) of the Act).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '48.\xa0\xa0In urgent cases where there is an immediate danger that a serious or especially serious offence might be committed or where there is information about events or activities endangering national, military, economic or ecological security, the operational-search measures specified in section 8(2) may be conducted without prior judicial authorisation. In such cases a judge must be informed within twenty-four hours of the commencement of the operational-search activities. If judicial authorisation has not been obtained within forty-eight hours of the commencement of the operationalsearch activities, those activities must be stopped immediately (section 8(3) of the Act).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '48.\xa0\xa0In urgent cases where there is an immediate danger that a serious or especially serious offence might be committed or where there is information about events or activities endangering national, military, economic or ecological security, the operational-search measures specified in section 8(2) may be conducted without prior judicial authorisation. In such cases a judge must be informed within twenty-four hours of the commencement of the operational-search activities. If judicial authorisation has not been obtained within forty-eight hours of the commencement of the operationalsearch activities, those activities must be stopped immediately (section 8(3) of the Act).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '49.\xa0\xa0The judicial decision authorising operational-search activities and the material that served as a basis for that decision must be held in the exclusive possession of the State agency performing such activities (section\xa012(3) of the Act).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '49.\xa0\xa0The judicial decision authorising operational-search activities and the material that served as a basis for that decision must be held in the exclusive possession of the State agency performing such activities (section\xa012(3) of the Act).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '50.\xa0\xa0On 14 July 1998 the Constitutional Court, in its decision no. 86-O, dismissed as inadmissible a request for a review of the constitutionality of certain provisions of the OSAA. Relying on the need to keep surveillance measures secret, the Constitutional Court held that the principles of a public hearing and adversarial proceedings were not applicable to the authorisation proceedings. The fact that the person concerned was not entitled to participate in the authorisation proceedings, to be informed about the decision taken or to appeal to a higher court did not, therefore, violate his or her constitutional rights.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '50.\xa0\xa0On 14 July 1998 the Constitutional Court, in its decision no. 86-O, dismissed as inadmissible a request for a review of the constitutionality of certain provisions of the OSAA. Relying on the need to keep surveillance measures secret, the Constitutional Court held that the principles of a public hearing and adversarial proceedings were not applicable to the authorisation proceedings. The fact that the person concerned was not entitled to participate in the authorisation proceedings, to be informed about the decision taken or to appeal to a higher court did not, therefore, violate his or her constitutional rights.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '50.\xa0\xa0On 14 July 1998 the Constitutional Court, in its decision no. 86-O, dismissed as inadmissible a request for a review of the constitutionality of certain provisions of the OSAA. Relying on the need to keep surveillance measures secret, the Constitutional Court held that the principles of a public hearing and adversarial proceedings were not applicable to the authorisation proceedings. The fact that the person concerned was not entitled to participate in the authorisation proceedings, to be informed about the decision taken or to appeal to a higher court did not, therefore, violate his or her constitutional rights.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '51.\xa0\xa0On 15 July 2008 the Constitutional Court, in its decision no.\xa0460OO, held that a person whose communications had been intercepted was entitled to apply for a supervisory review of the judicial decision authorising the interception. The fact that he had no copy of that decision did not prevent him from applying for a supervisory review, because the relevant court could request it from the competent authorities.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0Use in criminal proceedings of data collected as a result of operational-search activities',
'elements': []},
{'content': '52.\xa0\xa0Information about the facilities used in covert operational-search activities, the methods employed, the officials involved and the data thereby collected constitutes a State secret. It may be declassified only pursuant to a special decision of the head of the State agency performing the operationalsearch activities (section 12(1) of the OSAA and section 5(4) of the State Secrets Act (Law no. 5485-I of 21 July 1993)).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '53.\xa0\xa0Data collected as a result of operational-search activities may be used for the preparation and conduct of the investigation and court proceedings, and used as evidence in criminal proceedings in accordance with the legal provisions governing the collection, evaluation and assessment of evidence. The decision to transfer the collected data to other law-enforcement agencies or to a court is taken by the head of the State agency performing the operational-search activities (section 11 of the OSAA).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '53.\xa0\xa0Data collected as a result of operational-search activities may be used for the preparation and conduct of the investigation and court proceedings, and used as evidence in criminal proceedings in accordance with the legal provisions governing the collection, evaluation and assessment of evidence. The decision to transfer the collected data to other law-enforcement agencies or to a court is taken by the head of the State agency performing the operational-search activities (section 11 of the OSAA).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '54.\xa0\xa0Interior Ministry Order no. 336 of 13\xa0May 1998, in force until 17\xa0April 2007, provided that if the data collected in the course of operational-search activities contained information that could serve as a basis for opening a criminal case or could be used as evidence in criminal proceedings, that information was to be sent to the competent investigating authorities or to a court (§ 2). The transmitted data should be capable of meeting the procedural requirements of admissibility of evidence. The data transmitted should permit (a) the establishment of the circumstances relevant to the criminal case; (b) the establishment of the source of the transmitted data; and (c) the verification of its admissibility at the trial (§ 7). The data were to be transmitted in accordance with the special procedure for handling classified information, unless the State agency performing operational-search activities had decided to declassify them (§ 9).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '54.\xa0\xa0Interior Ministry Order no. 336 of 13\xa0May 1998, in force until 17\xa0April 2007, provided that if the data collected in the course of operational-search activities contained information that could serve as a basis for opening a criminal case or could be used as evidence in criminal proceedings, that information was to be sent to the competent investigating authorities or to a court (§ 2). The transmitted data should be capable of meeting the procedural requirements of admissibility of evidence. The data transmitted should permit (a) the establishment of the circumstances relevant to the criminal case; (b) the establishment of the source of the transmitted data; and (c) the verification of its admissibility at the trial (§ 7). The data were to be transmitted in accordance with the special procedure for handling classified information, unless the State agency performing operational-search activities had decided to declassify them (§ 9).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '55.\xa0\xa0On 17\xa0April 2007 Order no. 336 was replaced by Order no. 9407, which remained in force until 27 September 2013 and contained in substance the same provisions. However, by contrast to Order no. 336, Order no. 9407 explicitly provided that if the transmitted data had been obtained as a result of operational-search measures involving interception of communications or inspection of the home, they had be sent to the investigating or prosecuting authorities together with the judicial decision authorising those measures (§ 13). On 27 September 2013 Order no. 9407 was replaced by Order no. 30544, which reiterates the same requirements for transmitted data as those in Order no. 9407.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '56.\xa0\xa0The Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter “the CCrP”) prohibits the use in evidence of data obtained as a result of operational-search activities that do not comply with the admissibility-of-evidence requirements of the CCrP (Article 89 of the CCrP). Evidence obtained in breach of the CCrP is inadmissible. Inadmissible evidence has no legal force and cannot be relied on as grounds for criminal charges or for proving any of the circumstances for which evidence is required in criminal proceedings. If a court decides to exclude evidence, that evidence has no legal force and cannot be relied on in a judgment or other judicial decision, or be examined or used during the trial (Articles 75 and 235 of the CCrP).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '57.\xa0\xa0In its decision of 15 July 2008 (cited in paragraph 51 above), the Constitutional Court held that the statutory requirement contained in section\xa012(3) of the OSAA – that the judicial decision authorising operational-search activities had to be held in the exclusive possession of the State agency performing the operational-search activities – did not prevent the inclusion of such judicial authorisation in the criminal case file. If a copy of the judicial authorisation was not included in the case file, the data obtained as a result of operational-search measures involving interception of communications or inspection of the home could not be used as evidence in criminal proceedings.',
'elements': []}]}]},
{'content': 'C.\xa0\xa0Judicial review',
'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0General provisions on judicial review of interception of communications, as established by the OSAA',
'elements': []},
{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0General provisions on judicial review of interception of communications, as established by the OSAA',
'elements': [{'content': '58.\xa0\xa0A person claiming that his or her rights have been or are being violated by actions of a State official performing operational-search activities may complain about such actions to the official’s superior, a prosecutor or a court. If the person’s rights were violated in the course of operational-search activities by a State official, the official’s superior, a prosecutor or a court must take measures to remedy the violation and compensate for any damage caused (section 5(3) and (9) of the OSAA).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '58.\xa0\xa0A person claiming that his or her rights have been or are being violated by actions of a State official performing operational-search activities may complain about such actions to the official’s superior, a prosecutor or a court. If the person’s rights were violated in the course of operational-search activities by a State official, the official’s superior, a prosecutor or a court must take measures to remedy the violation and compensate for any damage caused (section 5(3) and (9) of the OSAA).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '59.\xa0\xa0If a person was refused access to information about the data collected about him or her in the course of operational-search activities, he or she is entitled to know the reasons for the refusal of access and may appeal against the refusal to a court. The burden of proof is on the lawenforcement authorities to show that the refusal of access is justified. To ensure a full and thorough judicial examination, the law-enforcement agency responsible for the operational-search activities must produce, at the judge’s request, operational-search material containing information about the data to which access was refused, with the exception of material containing information about undercover agents or police informers. If the court finds that the refusal to grant access was unjustified, it may compel the law-enforcement agency to disclose the material to the person concerned (section 5(4 to 6) of the OSAA).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '59.\xa0\xa0If a person was refused access to information about the data collected about him or her in the course of operational-search activities, he or she is entitled to know the reasons for the refusal of access and may appeal against the refusal to a court. The burden of proof is on the lawenforcement authorities to show that the refusal of access is justified. To ensure a full and thorough judicial examination, the law-enforcement agency responsible for the operational-search activities must produce, at the judge’s request, operational-search material containing information about the data to which access was refused, with the exception of material containing information about undercover agents or police informers. If the court finds that the refusal to grant access was unjustified, it may compel the law-enforcement agency to disclose the material to the person concerned (section 5(4 to 6) of the OSAA).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '59.\xa0\xa0If a person was refused access to information about the data collected about him or her in the course of operational-search activities, he or she is entitled to know the reasons for the refusal of access and may appeal against the refusal to a court. The burden of proof is on the lawenforcement authorities to show that the refusal of access is justified. To ensure a full and thorough judicial examination, the law-enforcement agency responsible for the operational-search activities must produce, at the judge’s request, operational-search material containing information about the data to which access was refused, with the exception of material containing information about undercover agents or police informers. If the court finds that the refusal to grant access was unjustified, it may compel the law-enforcement agency to disclose the material to the person concerned (section 5(4 to 6) of the OSAA).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '59.\xa0\xa0If a person was refused access to information about the data collected about him or her in the course of operational-search activities, he or she is entitled to know the reasons for the refusal of access and may appeal against the refusal to a court. The burden of proof is on the lawenforcement authorities to show that the refusal of access is justified. To ensure a full and thorough judicial examination, the law-enforcement agency responsible for the operational-search activities must produce, at the judge’s request, operational-search material containing information about the data to which access was refused, with the exception of material containing information about undercover agents or police informers. If the court finds that the refusal to grant access was unjustified, it may compel the law-enforcement agency to disclose the material to the person concerned (section 5(4 to 6) of the OSAA).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '60.\xa0\xa0In its decision of 14 July 1998 (cited in paragraph 50 above) the Constitutional Court noted that a person who had learned that he or she had been subjected to operational-search activities and believed that the actions of State officials had violated his or her rights was entitled, under section 5 of the OSAA, to challenge before a court the actions of the authorities performing the operational-search activities and the measures applied to them, including in those cases where they had been authorised by a court.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '61.\xa0\xa0At the material time a person wishing to complain of the interception of his or her communications could lodge a judicial review complaint under either Article 125 of the CCrP or Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereafter “the CCP”) and the Judicial Review Act (replaced, as from 15\xa0September 2015, by the Code of Administrative Procedure).',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0Judicial review complaint under Article 125 of the CCrP',
'elements': []},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0Judicial review complaint under Article 125 of the CCrP',
'elements': [{'content': '62.\xa0\xa0In its Ruling no. 1 of 10 February 2009, the Plenary Supreme Court held that decisions or actions of officials or State agencies conducting operational-search activities at the request of an investigator could be challenged in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Article 125 of the CCrP (paragraph 4 of Ruling no. 1). Complaints lodged under that Article may be examined only while the criminal investigation is pending. If the case has already been transmitted to a court for trial, the judge declares the complaint inadmissible and explains to the complainant that he or she may raise the complaints before the relevant trial court (paragraph 9 of Ruling no. 1).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '62.\xa0\xa0In its Ruling no. 1 of 10 February 2009, the Plenary Supreme Court held that decisions or actions of officials or State agencies conducting operational-search activities at the request of an investigator could be challenged in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Article 125 of the CCrP (paragraph 4 of Ruling no. 1). Complaints lodged under that Article may be examined only while the criminal investigation is pending. If the case has already been transmitted to a court for trial, the judge declares the complaint inadmissible and explains to the complainant that he or she may raise the complaints before the relevant trial court (paragraph 9 of Ruling no. 1).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '63.\xa0\xa0Article 125 of the CCrP provides for the judicial review of decisions and acts or failures to act by an investigator or a prosecutor which are capable of adversely affecting the constitutional rights or freedoms of the participants to criminal proceedings. The lodging of a complaint does not suspend the challenged decision or act, unless the investigator, the prosecutor, or the court decides otherwise. The court must examine the complaint within five days. The complainant, his counsel, the investigator and the prosecutor are entitled to attend the hearing. The complainant must substantiate his complaint (Article 125 §§ 1-4 of the CCrP).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '64.\xa0\xa0Participants in the hearing are entitled to study all the material submitted to the court and to submit additional material relevant to the complaint. The disclosure of criminal-case material is permissible only if it is not contrary to the interests of the investigation and does not breach the rights of the participants in the criminal proceedings. The judge may request the parties to produce the material which served as a basis for the contested decision or any other relevant material (paragraph 12 of Plenary Supreme Court Ruling no. 1 of 10 February 2009).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '64.\xa0\xa0Participants in the hearing are entitled to study all the material submitted to the court and to submit additional material relevant to the complaint. The disclosure of criminal-case material is permissible only if it is not contrary to the interests of the investigation and does not breach the rights of the participants in the criminal proceedings. The judge may request the parties to produce the material which served as a basis for the contested decision or any other relevant material (paragraph 12 of Plenary Supreme Court Ruling no. 1 of 10 February 2009).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '65.\xa0\xa0Following the examination of the complaint, the court either declares the challenged decision, act or failure to act unlawful or insufficiently well\xa0reasoned (“необоснованный”) and instructs the responsible official to rectify the indicated shortcoming, or dismisses the complaint (Article 125 §\xa05 of the CCrP). When instructing the official to rectify the indicated shortcoming, the court may not indicate any specific measures to be taken by the official or annul or order that the official annul the decision found to be unlawful or insufficiently well founded (paragraph 21 of Ruling no. 1 of 10 February 2009 of the Plenary Supreme Court of the Russian Federation).',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': '3.\xa0\xa0Judicial review complaint under Chapter 25 of the CCP and the Judicial Review Act',
'elements': []},
{'content': '3.\xa0\xa0Judicial review complaint under Chapter 25 of the CCP and the Judicial Review Act',
'elements': [{'content': '66.\xa0\xa0Plenary Supreme Court Ruling no. 2 of 10 February 2009 provides that complaints about decisions and acts of officials or agencies performing operational-search activities that may not be challenged in criminal proceedings, as well as complaints about refusal of access to information about the data collected in the course of operational-search activities, may be examined in accordance with the procedure established by Chapter 25 of the CCP (paragraph 7 of Ruling no. 2).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '67.\xa0\xa0Chapter 25 of the CCP, in force until 15 September 2015, set out the procedure for examining complaints against decisions and acts of officials violating citizens’ rights and freedoms, which was further detailed in the Judicial Review Act (Law no. 4866-1 of 27 April 1993 on the judicial review of decisions and acts violating citizens’ rights and freedoms).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '68.\xa0\xa0Chapter 25 of the CCP and the Judicial Review Act both provided that a citizen could lodge a complaint before a court about an act or decision by any State or municipal authority or official if he considered that the act or decision had violated his rights and freedoms (Article 254 of the CCP and section 1 of the Judicial Review Act). The complaint might concern any decision, act or omission which had violated the citizen’s rights or freedoms, had impeded the exercise of rights or freedoms, or had imposed a duty or liability on him (Article 255 of the CCP and section\xa02 of the Judicial Review Act).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '68.\xa0\xa0Chapter 25 of the CCP and the Judicial Review Act both provided that a citizen could lodge a complaint before a court about an act or decision by any State or municipal authority or official if he considered that the act or decision had violated his rights and freedoms (Article 254 of the CCP and section 1 of the Judicial Review Act). The complaint might concern any decision, act or omission which had violated the citizen’s rights or freedoms, had impeded the exercise of rights or freedoms, or had imposed a duty or liability on him (Article 255 of the CCP and section\xa02 of the Judicial Review Act).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '69.\xa0\xa0The complaint had to be lodged with a court of general jurisdiction within three months of the date on which the complainant had learnt of the breach of his rights. The time-limit might be extended for valid reasons (Article 254 of the CCP and sections 4 and 5 of the Judicial Review Act). The complaint had to be examined within ten days (Article 257 of the CCP).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '69.\xa0\xa0The complaint had to be lodged with a court of general jurisdiction within three months of the date on which the complainant had learnt of the breach of his rights. The time-limit might be extended for valid reasons (Article 254 of the CCP and sections 4 and 5 of the Judicial Review Act). The complaint had to be examined within ten days (Article 257 of the CCP).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '70.\xa0\xa0When examining the case the court had to ascertain: whether the complainant had complied with the time-limit for lodging a complaint and whether the contested decision, act or omission had been lawful and justified (paragraph 22 of Plenary Supreme Court Ruling no. 2). In particular, the court had to examine: (a) whether the State or municipal authority or official had had the competence to make the contested decision or to perform the contested act or omission – if the law conferred discretionary powers on the State or municipal authority or official, the court had no competence to examine the reasonableness (“целесообразность”) of their decisions, acts or omissions; (b) whether the procedure prescribed by law had been complied with – only serious breaches of procedure could render the contested decision, act or omission unlawful; and (c) whether the contents of the contested decision, act or omission met the requirements of law. The contested decision, act or omission was to be declared unlawful if one of the above conditions had not been complied with (paragraph 25 of Ruling no. 2).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '70.\xa0\xa0When examining the case the court had to ascertain: whether the complainant had complied with the time-limit for lodging a complaint and whether the contested decision, act or omission had been lawful and justified (paragraph 22 of Plenary Supreme Court Ruling no. 2). In particular, the court had to examine: (a) whether the State or municipal authority or official had had the competence to make the contested decision or to perform the contested act or omission – if the law conferred discretionary powers on the State or municipal authority or official, the court had no competence to examine the reasonableness (“целесообразность”) of their decisions, acts or omissions; (b) whether the procedure prescribed by law had been complied with – only serious breaches of procedure could render the contested decision, act or omission unlawful; and (c) whether the contents of the contested decision, act or omission met the requirements of law. The contested decision, act or omission was to be declared unlawful if one of the above conditions had not been complied with (paragraph 25 of Ruling no. 2).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '70.\xa0\xa0When examining the case the court had to ascertain: whether the complainant had complied with the time-limit for lodging a complaint and whether the contested decision, act or omission had been lawful and justified (paragraph 22 of Plenary Supreme Court Ruling no. 2). In particular, the court had to examine: (a) whether the State or municipal authority or official had had the competence to make the contested decision or to perform the contested act or omission – if the law conferred discretionary powers on the State or municipal authority or official, the court had no competence to examine the reasonableness (“целесообразность”) of their decisions, acts or omissions; (b) whether the procedure prescribed by law had been complied with – only serious breaches of procedure could render the contested decision, act or omission unlawful; and (c) whether the contents of the contested decision, act or omission met the requirements of law. The contested decision, act or omission was to be declared unlawful if one of the above conditions had not been complied with (paragraph 25 of Ruling no. 2).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '71.\xa0\xa0The burden of proof as to the lawfulness of the contested decision, act or omission lay with the authority or official concerned. The complainant, however, had to prove that his rights and freedoms had been breached by the contested decision, act or omission (section 6 of the Judicial Review Act and paragraph 20 of Plenary Supreme Court Ruling no.\xa02).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '71.\xa0\xa0The burden of proof as to the lawfulness of the contested decision, act or omission lay with the authority or official concerned. The complainant, however, had to prove that his rights and freedoms had been breached by the contested decision, act or omission (section 6 of the Judicial Review Act and paragraph 20 of Plenary Supreme Court Ruling no.\xa02).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '72.\xa0\xa0The court allowed the complaint if it had been established that the contested decision, act or omission had breached the complainant’s rights or freedoms and had been unlawful (paragraph 28 of Plenary Supreme Court Ruling no.\xa02). In that case it overturned the contested decision or act and required the authority or official to remedy in full the breach of the citizen’s rights. (Article 258 § 1 of the CCP and section 7 of the Judicial Review Act). The court could determine a time-limit for remedying the violation and/or the specific steps which needed to be taken to remedy the violation in full (paragraph 28 of Plenary Supreme Court Ruling no. 2). The claimant could then claim compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage in separate civil proceedings (section 7 of the Judicial Review Act).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '72.\xa0\xa0The court allowed the complaint if it had been established that the contested decision, act or omission had breached the complainant’s rights or freedoms and had been unlawful (paragraph 28 of Plenary Supreme Court Ruling no.\xa02). In that case it overturned the contested decision or act and required the authority or official to remedy in full the breach of the citizen’s rights. (Article 258 § 1 of the CCP and section 7 of the Judicial Review Act). The court could determine a time-limit for remedying the violation and/or the specific steps which needed to be taken to remedy the violation in full (paragraph 28 of Plenary Supreme Court Ruling no. 2). The claimant could then claim compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage in separate civil proceedings (section 7 of the Judicial Review Act).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '72.\xa0\xa0The court allowed the complaint if it had been established that the contested decision, act or omission had breached the complainant’s rights or freedoms and had been unlawful (paragraph 28 of Plenary Supreme Court Ruling no.\xa02). In that case it overturned the contested decision or act and required the authority or official to remedy in full the breach of the citizen’s rights. (Article 258 § 1 of the CCP and section 7 of the Judicial Review Act). The court could determine a time-limit for remedying the violation and/or the specific steps which needed to be taken to remedy the violation in full (paragraph 28 of Plenary Supreme Court Ruling no. 2). The claimant could then claim compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage in separate civil proceedings (section 7 of the Judicial Review Act).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '73.\xa0\xa0The court rejected the complaint if it found that the challenged act or decision had been taken by a competent authority or official, had been lawful, and had not breached the complainant’s rights (Article 258 § 4 of the CCP).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '73.\xa0\xa0The court rejected the complaint if it found that the challenged act or decision had been taken by a competent authority or official, had been lawful, and had not breached the complainant’s rights (Article 258 § 4 of the CCP).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '74.\xa0\xa0A party to the proceedings could lodge an appeal with a higher court (Article 336 of the CCP as in force until 1 January 2012; Article 320 of the CCP as in force after 1 January 2012). The appeal decision entered into force on the day it was delivered (Article 367 of the CCP as in force until 1\xa0January 2012; Article 329 § 5 as in force after 1 January 2012).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '75.\xa0\xa0The CCP provided that a judicial decision allowing a complaint and requiring the relevant authority or official to remedy the breach of the citizen’s rights had to be dispatched to the head of the authority concerned, to the official concerned or to his or her superiors, within three days of its entry into force (Article 258 § 2 of the CCP). The Judicial Review Act required that the judicial decision be dispatched within ten days of its entry into force (section 8). The court and the complainant had to be notified of the enforcement of the decision no later than one month after its receipt (Article\xa0258 § 3 of the CCP and section 8 of the Judicial Review Act).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '76.\xa0\xa0On 15 September 2015 Chapter 25 of the CCP and the Judicial Review Act were repealed and replaced by the Code of Administrative Procedure (Law no. 21-FZ of 8 March 2015, hereafter “the CAP”), which entered into force on that date. The CAP confirmed in substance and expounded the provisions of Chapter 25 of the CCP and the Judicial Review Act.',
'elements': []}]}]}]}],
'section_name': 'facts'},
{'content': 'THE LAW',
'elements': [{'content': 'I.\xa0\xa0JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS',
'elements': [{'content': '77.\xa0\xa0In accordance with Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court, the Court decides to join the applications, given their factual and legal similarities.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'II.\xa0\xa0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION',
'elements': [{'content': '78.\xa0\xa0The applicants complained that the interception of their telephone communications and, for one of the applicants, the covert filming of his meetings with acquaintances in a rented flat, had violated their right to respect for their private life, correspondence and home. They relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“1.\xa0\xa0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Admissibility',
'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0Submissions by the parties',
'elements': [{'content': '79.\xa0\xa0The Government submitted that the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies. Relying on the Constitutional Court’s Ruling of 14\xa0July 1998 (see paragraph 60 above), they submitted that a person who learned that he or she had been subjected to operational-search activities and believed that the actions of State officials – including their refusal to grant access to information about the data collected – had violated his or her rights was entitled to complain to a court under section 5 of the OSAA (see paragraphs 58 and 59 above). As explained by the Plenary Supreme Court (see paragraph 66 above), such complaints were to be examined in accordance with the procedure set out in Chapter 25 of the CCP and the Judicial Review Act.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '80.\xa0\xa0The Government further submitted that the fact that the person concerned did not possess a copy of the interception authorisation did not prevent him or her from lodging such a complaint, because the relevant court could request a copy of the interception authorisation from the competent authorities (they referred to the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 15 July 2008 concerning the possibility of applying for a supervisory review of the judicial decision authorising interception of communications, cited in paragraph 51 above). In any event, the proper procedure was to lodge a complaint under section 5 of the OSAA about the actions of State officials who had carried out the interception, rather than to appeal against the interception authorisation itself.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '81.\xa0\xa0The Government further submitted that instead of using the above effective remedy, Mr Zubkov and Mr Ippolitov (applications nos. 29431/05 and 7070/06) had chosen to raise the issue of covert surveillance in the criminal proceedings against them by contesting the admissibility of the audio and video recordings as evidence. The Government considered that contesting the admissibility of evidence in the framework of criminal proceedings could not be regarded as an effective remedy in respect of a complaint under Article 8. The aim of such a remedy was to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence from the list of evidence examined during the trial. It could therefore provide appropriate redress for a complaint under Article 6, but not for a complaint under Article 8. Indeed, the purpose of the criminal proceedings was to establish whether the defendant was innocent or guilty of the criminal charges levelled against him or her, rather than to attribute responsibility for the alleged violations of his or her right to respect for private life, home or correspondence. The remedy used by Mr Gorbunov (application no.\xa05402/07) had also been ineffective because he had appealed against the refusal to give him a copy of the judicial authorisation, rather than against the actions of the State officials who had intercepted his communications.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '82.\xa0\xa0The Government submitted in their further observations that Mr\xa0Gorbunov had moreover not complied with the six-month rule. The application form in which he had raised the complaint under Article 8 for the first time had been signed on 3\xa0October 2007, the last day of the sixmonth time-limit. There was, however, no evidence that it had been dispatched on that date. The postal receipt of 3 October 2007 produced by the applicant’s representative did not prove that it concerned precisely that application form. It could have concerned a letter sent by the representative to the Court in connection with another pending case. The Government therefore considered that the date on which the Court had received the application form should be taken as the date of introduction, with the consequence that the applicant had missed the six-month time-limit.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '83.\xa0\xa0The applicants submitted that the remedy suggested by the Government had been ineffective. Mr Zubkov and Mr Ippolitov argued that they had raised their complaints about unlawful covert surveillance in the criminal proceedings against them, both before the trial court and on appeal. They therefore considered that they had exhausted the domestic remedies.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '84.\xa0\xa0Mr Gorbunov submitted that he had complained to a court that both the refusal to give him a copy of the judicial authorisation and the interception itself had been unlawful. He conceded that his complaint about the unlawfulness of the interception had been sparsely reasoned. He had been unable, however, to advance more detailed arguments without knowing the contents of the judicial authorisation, that is without having any possibility of ascertaining whether the interception authorisation had been issued by a competent court in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, whether it had been based on relevant and sufficient reasons or whether the requirements of the judicial authorisation, for example the authorised duration of the interception, had been complied with at the implementation stage. The applicant further argued that he had preferred the procedure under Article 125 of the CCrP to the procedure under Chapter 25 of the CCP and that the Plenary Supreme Court had explained that it was the correct avenue in cases where criminal proceedings were pending (see paragraph 62 above). Given that his complaint under Article 125 of the CCrP had been rejected, a similar complaint under Chapter 25 of the CCP had no prospects of success.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0The Court’s assessment',
'elements': [{'content': '85.\xa0\xa0The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 of the Convention obliges those seeking to bring their case against the State before an international judicial or arbitral organ to use first the remedies provided by the national legal system. Consequently, States are dispensed from answering before an international body for their acts before they have had an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system. The rule is based on the assumption, reflected in Article 13 of the Convention with which it has close affinity – that there is an effective remedy available in the domestic system in respect of the alleged breach, whether or not the provisions of the Convention are incorporated in national law. In this way, it is an important aspect of the principle that the machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16\xa0September 1996, § 65, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996IV).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '86.\xa0\xa0Under Article 35 an applicant should normally have recourse to remedies which are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged. There is no obligation to have recourse to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, §§\xa066 and 67).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '87.\xa0\xa0In the area of the exhaustion of domestic remedies there is a distribution of the burden of proof. It is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one, available in theory and in practice at the relevant time, that is to say that it was accessible, was capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant’s complaints and offered reasonable prospects of success. However, once this burden of proof has been satisfied it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case or that there existed special circumstances absolving him or her from the requirement (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, § 68).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '87.\xa0\xa0In the area of the exhaustion of domestic remedies there is a distribution of the burden of proof. It is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one, available in theory and in practice at the relevant time, that is to say that it was accessible, was capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant’s complaints and offered reasonable prospects of success. However, once this burden of proof has been satisfied it falls to the applicant to establish that the remedy advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted or was for some reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case or that there existed special circumstances absolving him or her from the requirement (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, § 68).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '88.\xa0\xa0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes at the outset that two of the applicants (Mr\xa0Zubkov and Mr\xa0Ippolitov) raised the issue of covert surveillance in the criminal proceedings against them. The Court has occasionally accepted that that remedy was apparently effective and sufficient and therefore the applicants who had pursued it complied with the exhaustion requirement (see Dragojević v. Croatia, no.\xa068955/11, §§ 35, 42, 47 and 72, 15 January 2015; Šantare and Labazņikovs v.\xa0Latvia, no. 34148/07, §§ 25 and 40-46, 31 March 2016; and Radzhab Magomedov v. Russia, no.\xa020933/08, §§ 20 and 77-79, 20\xa0December 2016, where the applicants had challenged the admissibility of the evidence obtained as a result of the allegedly unlawful covert surveillance measures in the criminal proceedings against them). On a closer examination, however, the Court has found that the courts in criminal proceedings were not capable of providing an effective remedy in the following situations: although they could consider questions of the fairness of admitting the evidence in the criminal proceedings, it was not open to them to deal with the substance of the Convention complaint that the interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private life and correspondence was not “in accordance with the law” or not “necessary in a democratic society”; still less was it open to them to grant appropriate relief in connection with the complaint (see Khan v. the United Kingdom, no.\xa035394/97, § 44, ECHR 2000V; P.G.\xa0and J.H. v.\xa0the United Kingdom, no. 44787/98, § 86, ECHR 2001IX; Goranova-Karaeneva v.\xa0Bulgaria, no.\xa012739/05, § 59, 8 March 2011; and İrfan Güzel v. Turkey, no. 35285/08, §§\xa0106-07, 7 February 2017). This also applies to Russia. The Court therefore agrees with the Government that raising the issue of covert surveillance in the criminal proceedings cannot be regarded as an effective remedy in respect of a complaint under Article 8.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '89.\xa0\xa0The Court will next assess whether the applicants had at their disposal an effective remedy which they were required to exhaust before applying to the Court. It has already found that Russian law did not provide for an effective remedy against covert surveillance measures in cases where no criminal proceedings had been brought against the subject of the surveillance, in particular because the remedies invoked by the Government were available (a) only to persons who had at least minimum information about the judicial decision authorising interception of their communications, such as its date and the court which issued it (in the case of a supervisory review application); (b) only to participants to criminal proceedings while a pre-trial investigation was pending (a complaint under Article 125 of the CCrP); or (c) due to the distribution of the burden of proof, only to persons who were in possession of information about the interception of their communications (a judicial review complaint under the Judicial Review Act, Chapter 25 of the CCP and the new Code of Administrative Procedure). It has, however, left open the question whether those remedies would be available and effective in cases where an individual learned about the interception of his or her communications in the course of criminal proceedings against him or her (see Roman Zakharov v.\xa0Russia [GC], no.\xa047143/06, §§ 294-98, ECHR 2015).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '90.\xa0\xa0By contrast to the applicant in the Roman Zakharov case, the applicants in the present case learned about the interception of their communications in the course of criminal proceedings against them. The Court’s findings concerning the effectiveness of the remedies in the Roman Zakharov case are therefore not directly applicable to the present case. Indeed, the applicants were provided with some information about the surveillance measures taken against them, such as the period during which the surveillance had been carried out; or the dates and registration numbers of the relevant judicial authorisations and the courts that had issued them; or copies of the data collected. Arguably, that information could permit them to discharge the burden of proof to show that the surveillance had taken place and that their rights had thereby been breached, and to transfer the burden of proof to the authorities to show that it had been lawful (see paragraph 71 above).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '91.\xa0\xa0That being said, it is significant that despite their requests, the applicants were not given copies of the judicial decisions authorising the covert surveillance measures and did not therefore know their contents. The Court considers that the non-communication of the factual and legal reasons for ordering covert surveillance measures must have undermined the applicants’ ability to exercise their right to bring legal proceedings in an effective manner. The Court will bear that in mind when assessing the effectiveness of remedies available under Russian law.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '92.\xa0\xa0The Government did not claim that the applicants should have appealed to a higher court against the judicial decisions authorising covert surveillance measures. Indeed, the OSAA does not provide for the possibility of lodging an appeal against such a decision, even after the individual concerned has come to know of its existence (see Avanesyan v.\xa0Russia, no.\xa041152/06, § 30, 18 September 2014). The Constitutional Court stated clearly that a surveillance subject had no right to participate in the authorisation proceedings, and therefore no right to appeal against the judicial decision authorising interception of his communications (see paragraph 50 above). At the same time, the Constitutional Court explained in 2008 – that is, after the facts of the present case – that a person who had been subjected to surveillance was entitled to apply for a supervisory review (see paragraph\xa051 above). The Court notes in this connection that, according to its constant practice, an application for a supervisory review in the context of criminal proceedings has so far not been considered as a remedy to be exhausted under Article 35 § 1 (see, among many others, Berdzenishvili v.\xa0Russia (dec.), no. 31697/03, ECHR 2004II (extracts); Maayevy v. Russia, no. 7964/07, § 81, 24 May 2011; and Chumakov v.\xa0Russia, no. 41794/04, §\xa0125, 24 April 2012).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '93.\xa0\xa0The Court further observes that section 5 of the OSAA provides that a surveillance subject may complain to a court about actions of State officials performing surveillance activities (see paragraphs 58 and 59 above). That provision, however, does not specify the procedure for the examination of such complaints. The Plenary Supreme Court later clarified that such complaints were to be examined under either Article 125 of the CCrP or the Judicial Review Act and Chapter 25 of the CCP. The procedure under Article 125 of the CCrP was to be used only while the criminal investigation was pending, that is until the criminal case was transmitted to a court for trial, whereas the procedure under the Judicial Review Act and Chapter 25 of the CCP was to be used in all other cases where a complaint under Article 125 of the CCrP was not possible (see paragraphs 62 and 66 above).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '94.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that the judicial review procedure under Article 125 of the CCrP was used by one of the applicants (Mr\xa0Gorbunov), but the Government claimed that it was ineffective and that all the applicants should have used the judicial review procedure under the Judicial Review Act and Chapter 25 of the CCP. Given the substitutability of the two procedures explained by the Plenary Supreme Court and their many common features, the Court will assess their effectiveness together.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '95.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that the scope of a judicial review complaint under section\xa05 of the OSAA – irrespective of whether it was lodged in proceedings under Article 125 of the CCrP or under the Judicial Review Act and Chapter 25 of the CCP – was limited to reviewing the actions of State officials performing surveillance activities, that is whether or not they had carried out the surveillance in a manner compatible with the applicable legal requirements and whether they had abided by the terms of the judicial authorisation. The review did not touch upon the legal and factual grounds for the underlying judicial authorisation, that is, whether there were relevant and sufficient reasons for authorising covert surveillance (see Avanesyan, cited above, §§\xa031-33, concerning an “inspection” of the applicant’s flat under the OSAA).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '96.\xa0\xa0Indeed, in accordance with Chapter 25 of the CCP and the Judicial Review Act, in force at the material time, the sole relevant issue before the domestic courts was whether the actions of the State officials performing covert surveillance were lawful (see paragraphs 72 to 73 above). It is clear from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the relevant provisions that “lawfulness” was understood as compliance with the rules of competence, procedure and contents (see paragraph 70 above). It follows that the courts were not required by law to examine the issues of “necessity in a democratic society”, in particular whether the contested actions answered a pressing social need and were proportionate to any legitimate aims pursued, principles which lie at the heart of the Court’s analysis of complaints under Article 8 of the Convention (see paragraph 124 below).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '97.\xa0\xa0As regards the judicial review procedure under Article 125 of the CCrP, in addition to the issue of lawfulness, the domestic courts are also required to examine whether the State officials’ actions were “well\xa0reasoned” (“обоснованный”) (see paragraph 65 above). However, the domestic law does not provide for any substantive criteria for determining whether the actions were “well reasoned”. The term “well reasoned” commonly means no more than based on “valid” or “sound” reasons (see Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, nos. 57818/09 and 14 others, § 419, 7\xa0February 2017). There is no requirement that the actions be considered “necessary in a democratic society”, and therefore no requirement of any assessment of the proportionality of the measure. In any event, the Court is not convinced that a judge would have competence to review the “necessity” of the actions based on a valid judicial authorisation that had become res judicata.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '98.\xa0\xa0The Court has already found on a number of occasions, in the context of Article 8, that a judicial review remedy incapable of examining whether the contested interference answered a pressing social need and was proportionate to the aims pursued could not be considered an effective remedy (see Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, §§\xa013539, ECHR 1999VI; Peck v. the United Kingdom, no.\xa044647/98, §§\xa0105-07, ECHR 2003I; and Keegan v. the United Kingdom, no.\xa028867/03, §§ 40-43, ECHR 2006X).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '99.\xa0\xa0In view of the above considerations, the Court finds that a judicial review complaint under section\xa05 of the OSAA – lodged in proceedings either under Article 125 of the CCrP or under the Judicial Review Act and Chapter 25 of the CCP – was not an effective remedy to be exhausted. It therefore dismisses the Government’s objection as to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '100.\xa0\xa0The Court reiterates that the purpose of the six-month rule is to promote security of law and to ensure that cases raising issues under the Convention are dealt with within a reasonable time. Furthermore, it ought to protect the authorities and other persons concerned from being under any uncertainty for a prolonged period of time. It marks out the temporal limits of supervision carried out by the Court and signals to both individuals and State authorities the period beyond which such supervision is no longer possible. The rule also affords the prospective applicant time to consider whether to lodge an application and, if so, to decide on the specific complaints and arguments to be raised. Lastly, the rule should ensure that it is possible to ascertain the facts of the case before that possibility fades away, making a fair examination of the question at issue next to impossible (see Sabri Güneş v. Turkey [GC], no. 27396/06, §§ 39-41, 29 June 2012).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '101.\xa0\xa0The requirements contained in Article 35 § 1 concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the six-month period are closely interrelated. As a rule, the six-month period runs from the date of the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Where it is clear from the outset, however, that no effective remedy is available to the applicant, the period runs from the date of the acts or measures complained of, or after the date of knowledge of that act or its effect on or prejudice toward the applicant. At the same time, Article 35 § 1 cannot be interpreted in a manner which would require an applicant to seize the Court of his complaint before his position in connection with the matter has been finally settled at the domestic level. Where, therefore, an applicant avails himself of an apparently existing remedy and only subsequently becomes aware of circumstances which render the remedy ineffective, the Court considers that it may be appropriate, for the purposes of Article 35 § 1, to take the start of the six-month period from the date when the applicant first became or ought to have become aware of those circumstances (see Varnava and Others v.\xa0Turkey [GC], nos.\xa016064/90 and 8 others, § 157, ECHR 2009; El-Masri v.\xa0the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630/09, § 136, ECHR 2012; and Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865/09 and\xa02 others, § 260, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). Also, if an extraordinary remedy is the only judicial remedy available to the applicant, the six-month time-limit may be calculated from the date of the decision given regarding that remedy (see Ahtinen v. Finland (dec.), no.\xa048907/99, 31 May 2005).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '102.\xa0\xa0In reply to the Government’s objection concerning Mr Gorbunov, the Court notes that it transpires from the documents in the case file that his application was dispatched on 3\xa0October 2007, that is within six months of the final decision in the judicial review proceedings.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '103.\xa0\xa0The Court further observes that Mr\xa0Zubkov and Mr\xa0Ippolitov introduced their applications within six months of the final judgments in the criminal proceedings against them, while Mr Gorbunov lodged his application within six months of the final decision in the judicial review proceedings under section 5 of the OSAA together with Article 125 of the CCrP. Given that the Court has found that neither of those sets of proceedings constituted effective remedies within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, they cannot as a rule be taken into account for the purpose of the six-month rule.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '104.\xa0\xa0The Court has also found that a judicial review complaint under section 5 of the OSAA together with the Judicial Review Act and Chapter 25 of the CCP, as invoked by the Government, was not an effective remedy either. The Government did not claim that the applicants had any other effective remedies at their disposal. It follows that, in the absence of an effective remedy, the six-month period should as a rule have started to run when the applicants first learned about the covert surveillance being carried out against them.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '105.\xa0\xa0However, the Court will examine whether, in the circumstances of the present case, there was a possibility that the applicants, unaware of circumstances which rendered the remedies used by them ineffective, still complied with the six-month rule by availing themselves of those remedies (see Skorobogatykh v. Russia, no. 4871/03, §§ 30-34, 22 December 2009; Artyomov v. Russia, no. 14146/02, §§ 109-18, 27 May 2010; Norkin v.\xa0Russia (dec.), no. 21056/11, 5 February 2013; Shishkov v. Russia, no.\xa026746/05, §§ 84-86, 20 February 2014; and Myalichev v. Russia, no.\xa09237/14, § 13, 8 November 2016).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '106.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that this is the first time that it has undertaken an examination of remedies existing in the Russian legal system for complaints about covert surveillance of which the subject of that surveillance has learned in the course of the criminal proceedings against him or her. Given the uncertainty as to the effectiveness of those remedies – and in particular given that at the material time it could not have been presumed that raising the issue of covert surveillance in the criminal proceedings was a clearly ineffective remedy (see paragraph 88 above) – it was not unreasonable for the applicants to attempt to use an available remedy in order to give the domestic courts an opportunity to put matters right through the national legal system, thereby respecting the principle that the machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights (see, for a similar reasoning, El-Masri, cited above, § 141).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '107.\xa0\xa0Indeed, the applicants only learned about the covert surveillance during the criminal proceedings, when the prosecution used the intercepted material as evidence to substantiate the cases against them. The Court considers that it was reasonable, in such circumstances, for the applicants to try to bring their grievances to the attention of the domestic courts through the remedies provided by the criminal procedural law: by lodging a judicial review complaint under Article 125 of the CCrP or by raising the issue at the trial. The Court discerns nothing in the parties’ submissions to suggest that the applicants were aware, or should have become aware, of the futility of such a course of action. Indeed, the domestic courts could, and did, examine whether the surveillance measures had been lawful and therefore addressed, in substance, part of the applicants’ Convention complaints. In those circumstances, the Court considers that the applicants cannot be reproached for their attempt to bring their grievances to the attention of the domestic courts through the remedies which they mistakenly considered effective (see, for a similar reasoning, Šantare and Labazņikovs, cited above, §§ 40-46, and Radzhab Magomedov, cited above, §§\xa077-79).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '108.\xa0\xa0Moreover, given the secret nature of surveillance, the Court takes note of the difficulties defendants may have in obtaining access to documents relating to it. This may prevent them from having a detailed understanding of the circumstances in which the surveillance had been carried out – such as the duration and dates of the surveillance, or the specific measures applied – and, most importantly, the grounds on which it had been ordered. It cannot therefore be regarded as unreasonable for an applicant to wait until he or she has received documents establishing the facts essential for an application to the Court before introducing such an application (see, mutatis mutandis, Younger v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no.\xa057420/00, ECHR 2003-I).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '109.\xa0\xa0The applicants in the present case were never given access to the judicial decisions authorising covert surveillance measures against them. It was not until the issue was examined by the courts in the criminal proceedings that the surveillance-related facts upon which the applicants based their complaints to the Court were established for the first time. It cannot therefore be regarded as unreasonable for them to have waited until they had received the conviction and appeal judgments before lodging their applications with the Court.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '110.\xa0\xa0The Court accordingly finds that the applicants complied with the six-month rule.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '111.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.',
'elements': []}]}]},
{'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Merits',
'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0Submissions by the parties',
'elements': [{'content': '112.\xa0\xa0The Government submitted at the outset that the flat rented by Mr\xa0Zubkov (application no. 29431/05) could not be considered his “home” within the meaning of the Russian Constitution (see paragraph 42 above). Under Russian law only residential premises were considered to be a “home”, which enjoyed special protection. Other premises, such as business premises, were not regarded as “home” and did not therefore enjoy any special protection. The applicant had not been living in the flat in question; he had been living at another address. He had rented the flat with the sole purpose of using it for his criminal activities, in particular for storing and packaging drugs, meeting his accomplices, discussing their criminal plans and distributing the profits obtained through drug-dealing. Accordingly, Article 8 did not apply to the video surveillance of the flat in question. There had therefore been no interference with his right to respect for his home.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '113.\xa0\xa0The Government further submitted that the interception of the telephone communications of all three applicants and the video surveillance of the flat rented by Mr Zubkov had been carried out on the basis of proper judicial authorisations, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by domestic law.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '114.\xa0\xa0The judicial authorisations had not been included in the criminal case files because, pursuant to the OSAA, they were confidential documents. Relying on the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 14 July 1998 (see paragraph 50 above), the Government submitted that, because of the need to keep the surveillance measures secret, the person whose communications were to be intercepted was not entitled to participate in the authorisation proceedings, to be informed about the decision taken or to receive a copy of the interception authorisation. The Government also submitted that Mr\xa0Ippolitov had never asked for copies of the judicial authorisations in his case. He could not therefore claim that he had been refused access to them.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '115.\xa0\xa0The Government further argued that Russian law met the Convention “quality of law” requirements. All legal provisions governing covert surveillance had been officially published and were accessible to the public. Russian law clearly set out the nature of offences which might give rise to a covert surveillance order; a definition of the categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped; a limit on the duration of such surveillance; the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; the precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other parties; and the circumstances in which recordings may or must be erased or destroyed.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '116.\xa0\xa0Lastly, the Government submitted that covert surveillance could only be carried out for the purposes specified in the OSAA (see section 44 above) and only on the basis of a court order. Those legal provisions guaranteed that covert surveillance, including that in the applicants’ cases, was ordered only when necessary in a democratic society.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '117.\xa0\xa0Mr Zubkov expressed a doubt as to the existence of the judicial authorisation in his case, given that he had never been given a copy of it.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '118.\xa0\xa0Mr Ippolitov submitted that he had claimed on many occasions that the audio recordings had been inadmissible as evidence because the case file did not contain copies of the judicial authorisations. Despite that, the trial court had not examined whether such judicial authorisations existed. He further argued that at that stage of the proceedings, there had no longer been any need to maintain the confidentiality of the judicial authorisations, as the surveillance measures had been terminated. Moreover, they were no longer secret as the data collected had been disclosed at the trial. In support of his position he referred to Order no. 9407 of 17\xa0April 2007, which explicitly stated that judicial decisions authorising the interception of communications had to be sent to the investigating or prosecuting authorities together with the data collected (see paragraph 55 above). The failure to produce a copy of the interception authorisation either to the applicant or to the Court had made it impossible to verify whether the interception of the applicant’s telephone communications had been carried out in accordance with the procedure prescribed by domestic law.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '119.\xa0\xa0Mr Gorbunov maintained his claims.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0The Court’s assessment',
'elements': [{'content': '120.\xa0\xa0The Court accepts, and it is not disputed by the parties, that the measures aimed at the interception of the applicants’ telephone communications amounted to an interference with the exercise of their rights set out in Article\xa08 of the Convention. The Court reiterates in this connection that telephone conversations are covered by the notions of “private life” and “correspondence” within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 (see, among many other authorities, Dumitru Popescu v. Romania (no. 2), no.\xa071525/01, § 61, 26\xa0April 2007, with further references).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '121.\xa0\xa0The Government disputed that the flat rented by Mr\xa0Zubkov (application no. 29431/05) could be considered his “home” and argued that the video surveillance of that flat did not amount to an interference with the applicant’s rights guaranteed by Article 8 § 1. The Court does not need to determine whether the flat in question was the applicant’s “home” within the meaning of that Article. It has already found on many occasions that a person’s private life may be concerned by measures effected outside his or her home. In that connection, the person’s reasonable expectations as to privacy may be a significant, although not necessarily conclusive, factor. Private-life considerations may arise once any systematic or permanent record comes into existence, even if an audio or video recording is made while the person is in a public place (see Uzun v.\xa0Germany, no. 35623/05, §\xa044, ECHR 2010 (extracts), with further references). The Court finds that the covert video surveillance of the applicant while on private premises where his expectations of privacy were high, the recording of personal data, the examination of the tapes by third parties without the applicant’s knowledge or consent, and the use of the videotapes as evidence in the criminal proceedings amounted to an interference with the applicant’s “private life” within the meaning of Article\xa08 § 1 (compare Khan, cited above, § 25, and Vetter v. France, no.\xa059842/00, § 20, 31 May 2005, which both concerned recording, by means of a hidden listening device, of the applicant’s conversations with a third person on that person’s premises).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '122.\xa0\xa0The Court reiterates that such interference will give rise to a breach of Article\xa08 of the Convention unless it can be shown that it was “in accordance with law”, pursued one or more legitimate aim or aims as defined in the second paragraph and was “necessary in a democratic society” to achieve those aims (see, among other authorities, GoranovaKaraeneva, cited above, §\xa045).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '123.\xa0\xa0The wording “in accordance with the law” requires the impugned measure both to have some basis in domestic law and to be compatible with the rule of law, which is expressly mentioned in the Preamble to the Convention and inherent in the object and purpose of Article 8. The law must thus meet quality requirements: it must be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects (see Roman Zakharov, cited above, § 228).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '123.\xa0\xa0The wording “in accordance with the law” requires the impugned measure both to have some basis in domestic law and to be compatible with the rule of law, which is expressly mentioned in the Preamble to the Convention and inherent in the object and purpose of Article 8. The law must thus meet quality requirements: it must be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects (see Roman Zakharov, cited above, § 228).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '124.\xa0\xa0An interference will be considered “necessary in a democratic society” for a legitimate aim if it answers a “pressing social need” and, in particular, if it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and if the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient”. While it is for the national authorities to make the initial assessment in all these respects, the final evaluation of whether the interference is necessary remains subject to review by the Court for conformity with the requirements of the Convention (see S. and Marper v.\xa0the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, § 101, ECHR\xa02008). In the context of covert surveillance, the assessment depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of the surveillance measures, the grounds for ordering them, the authorities competent to authorise, carry out and supervise them, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law. The Court has to determine whether the procedures for supervising the ordering and implementation of the restrictive measures are such as to keep the “interference” to what is “necessary in a democratic society” (see Roman Zakharov, cited above, §\xa0232).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '125.\xa0\xa0As regards the question of lawfulness, it has not been disputed by the parties that the covert surveillance of the applicants had a basis in domestic law, namely in the relevant provisions of the OSAA.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '126.\xa0\xa0Although the applicants have not complained that the quality of the domestic law fell short of the Convention standards, the Court must, when examining whether the interference complained of was “in accordance with the law”, inevitably assess the quality of the relevant domestic law in relation to the requirements of the fundamental principle of the rule of law (see Dragojević, cited above,, § 86). The Court notes in this connection that in the case of Roman Zakharov v. Russia it has already found that Russian law does not meet the “quality of law” requirement because the legal provisions governing the interception of communications do not provide for adequate and effective guarantees against arbitrariness and the risk of abuse. They are therefore incapable of keeping the “interference” to what is “necessary in a democratic society” (see Roman Zakharov, cited above, §§\xa0302-04). In the present case, however, where the applicants’ complaints were based on specific and undisputed instances of covert surveillance, the Court’s assessment of the “quality of law”, although it necessarily entails some degree of abstraction, cannot be of the same level of generality as in cases such as Roman Zakharov, which concern general complaints about the law permitting covert surveillance and in which the Court must, of necessity and by way of exception to its normal approach, carry out a completely abstract assessment of such law. In cases arising from individual applications, the Court must as a rule focus its attention not on the law as such but on the manner in which it was applied to the applicant in the particular circumstances (see Goranova-Karaeneva, cited above, § 48).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '127.\xa0\xa0In the Roman Zakharov case the Court has found, in particular, that the judicial authorisation procedures provided for by Russian law are not capable of ensuring that covert surveillance measures are not ordered haphazardly, irregularly or without due and proper consideration. In particular, the OSAA does not instruct judges ordering covert surveillance measures to verify the existence of a “reasonable suspicion” against the person concerned or to apply the “necessity” and “proportionality” tests. The Court has moreover found it established, on the basis of evidence submitted by the parties, that in their everyday practice the Russian courts do not verify whether there is a “reasonable suspicion” against the person concerned and do not apply the “necessity” and “proportionality” tests (see Roman Zakharov, cited above, §§ 260-67).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '128.\xa0\xa0The Government did not produce any evidence to demonstrate that the Russian courts acted differently in the present case. In particular, they failed to submit copies of the surveillance authorisations in respect of the applicants and thereby made it impossible for the Court to verify whether the authorisations were based on a reasonable suspicion that the applicants had committed criminal offences. Nor could the Court verify whether the reasons adduced to justify the surveillance measures were “relevant” and “sufficient”, that is to say that the interception of the applicants’ communications was necessary in a democratic society and, in particular, proportionate to any legitimate aim pursued.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '129.\xa0\xa0It is also significant that the applicants’ ability to challenge the legal and factual grounds for ordering surveillance measures against them was undermined by the refusal of access to the surveillance authorisations. The Court notes in this connection that there may be good reasons to keep a covert surveillance authorisation, or some parts of it, secret from its subject even after he or she has become aware of its existence. Indeed, a full disclosure of the authorisation may in some cases reveal the working methods and fields of operation of the police or intelligence services and even possibly to identify their agents (see, mutatis mutandis, Roman Zakharov, cited above, § 287). At the same time, the information contained in decisions authorising covert surveillance might be critical for the person’s ability to bring legal proceedings to challenge the legal and factual grounds for authorising covert surveillance (see Avanesyan, cited above, § 29). Accordingly, in the Court’s opinion, when dealing with a request for the disclosure of a covert surveillance authorisation, the domestic courts are required to ensure a proper balance of the interests of the surveillance subject and the public interests. The surveillance subject should be granted access to the documents in question, unless there are compelling concerns to prevent such a decision (see Radzhab Magomedov, cited above, § 82).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '130.\xa0\xa0In the present case, in response to the applicants’ requests for access to the judicial decisions authorising covert surveillance measures against them, the domestic authorities referred to the documents’ confidentiality as the sole reason for refusal of access. They did not carry out any balancing exercise between the applicants’ interests and those of the public, and did not specify why disclosure of the surveillance authorisations, after the surveillance had stopped and the audio and video recordings had already been disclosed to the applicants, would have jeopardised the effective administration of justice or any other legitimate public interests.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '131.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that the State agency performing the surveillance activities was to have exclusive possession of the judicial authorisations, which were to be held in respective operational-search files (see paragraph 49 above). There is no evidence that the domestic courts that examined the applicants’ complaints about the covert surveillance had access to the classified material in the applicants’ operational-search files and verified that the judicial authorisations to which the investigating authorities referred indeed existed and were part of the files, whether there had been relevant and sufficient reasons for authorising covert surveillance or whether the investigating authorities, while carrying out the surveillance, had complied with the terms of the judicial authorisations. The domestic courts did not, therefore, carry out an effective judicial review of the lawfulness and “necessity in a democratic society” of the contested surveillance measures and failed to furnish sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness within the meaning of Article\xa08\xa0§\xa02 of the Convention (see, for a similar reasoning, Šantare and Labazņikovs v. Latvia, no. 34148/07, §§\xa060-62, 31 March 2016).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '132.\xa0\xa0To sum up, the Government have not demonstrated to the Court’s satisfaction that the domestic courts which authorised the covert surveillance against the applicants verified whether there was a “reasonable suspicion” against them and applied the “necessity in a democratic society” and “proportionality” tests. Moreover, the refusal to disclose the surveillance authorisations to the applicants without any valid reason deprived them of any possibility to have the lawfulness of the measure, and its “necessity in a democratic society”, reviewed by an independent tribunal in the light of the relevant principles of Article 8 of the Convention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '133.\xa0\xa0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.',
'elements': []}]}]}]},
{'content': 'III.\xa0\xa0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS OF DETENTION AND TRANSPORT, AND OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF ABSENCE FROM A REMAND HEARING (APPLICATION No.\xa05402/07)',
'elements': [{'content': '134.\xa0\xa0The applicant in application no. 5402/07 (Mr Gorbunov) complained that the conditions of his detention and transport in the period from 14 September 2006 to 12 January 2007 had been inhuman and degrading in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, and that he had been absent from the remand hearing of 5 July 2006 in breach of Article 5 § 4.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '134.\xa0\xa0The applicant in application no. 5402/07 (Mr Gorbunov) complained that the conditions of his detention and transport in the period from 14 September 2006 to 12 January 2007 had been inhuman and degrading in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, and that he had been absent from the remand hearing of 5 July 2006 in breach of Article 5 § 4.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '135.\xa0\xa0On 23 May 2013 the Government submitted a unilateral declaration, inviting the Court to strike the case out of its list. They acknowledged that from 14 September 2006 to 12 January 2007 the applicant had been detained and transported in conditions which did not comply with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention, and that his absence from the hearing of 5 July 2006 had breached his rights under Article 5 § 4. They offered to pay the applicant 5,460 euros. The remainder of the declaration read:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“The sum referred to above, which is to cover any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, as well as costs and expenses, will be free of any taxes that may be applicable. It will be payable within three months from the date of notification of the decision taken by the Court pursuant to Article 37 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In the event of failure to pay this sum within the said three-month period, the Government undertake to pay simple interest on it, from expiry of that period until settlement, at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': '136.\xa0\xa0The applicant did not accept the Government’s offer.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '137.\xa0\xa0The Court reiterates that Article 37 of the Convention provides that it may, at any stage of the proceedings, decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to one of the conclusions specified under (a), (b) or (c) of paragraph 1 of that Article. In particular, Article\xa037\xa0§\xa01\xa0(c) enables the Court to strike an application out of its list of cases if “for any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application”.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '138.\xa0\xa0It also reiterates that in certain circumstances, it may strike out an application under Article 37 § 1\xa0(c) on the basis of a unilateral declaration by a respondent Government even if the applicant wishes the examination of the case to be continued. To this end, the Court will examine carefully the declaration in the light of the principles established in its case-law, in particular, the Tahsin Acar judgment (see Tahsin Acar v.\xa0Turkey [GC], no.\xa026307/95, §§\xa075-77, ECHR 2003-VI).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '139.\xa0\xa0Since its first judgment concerning the inhuman and degrading conditions of detention in Russian penal facilities (see Kalashnikov v.\xa0Russia, no.\xa047095/99, ECHR 2002VI), the Court has found similar violations in many cases against Russia which concerned the conditions of detention in remand prisons (see Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos.\xa042525/07 and 60800/08, 10 January 2012). The complaint relating to the absence from a remand hearing is also based on well-established caselaw of the Court (see G.O. v. Russia, no. 39249/03, §§ 93-97, 18\xa0October 2011).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '140.\xa0\xa0Turning next to the nature of the admissions contained in the Government’s declarations, the Court is satisfied that the Government did not dispute the allegations made by the applicant and acknowledged violations of Articles 3 and 5 § 4 of the Convention.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '141.\xa0\xa0As to the intended redress to be provided to the applicant, the Court notes that the proposed sum is not unreasonable either in absolute terms or in relation to awards in similar cases. The Government have committed themselves to effecting the payment of the sum within three months of the Court’s decision, with default interest to be payable in the event of any delay in settlement.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '142.\xa0\xa0The Court therefore considers that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the part of the case concerning the abovementioned complaints. As the Committee of Ministers remains competent to supervise, in accordance with Article 46 § 2 of the Convention, the implementation of judgments concerning the same issues, the Court is also satisfied that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention (Article 37 § 1 in fine) does not require it to continue the examination of this part of the case. In any event, the Court’s decision is without prejudice to any decision it might take to restore the application to its list of cases, pursuant to Article 37 § 2 of the Convention, should the Government fail to comply with the terms of their unilateral declaration (see Josipović v.\xa0Serbia (dec.), no.\xa018369/07, 4\xa0March 2008, and Aleksentseva and 28\xa0Others v. Russia (dec.), nos. 75025/01 and 28 others, 23 March 2006).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '143.\xa0\xa0In view of the above, it is appropriate to strike out of the list of cases the part of the application concerning the above-mentioned complaints.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'IV.\xa0\xa0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF LACK OF SPEED IN THE REVIEW PROCESS (APPLICATION No. 5402/07)',
'elements': [{'content': '144.\xa0\xa0The applicant in application no. 5402/07 (Mr Gorbunov) further complained that his appeal against the detention order of 3 November 2006 had not been examined speedily. He relied on Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, which reads as follows:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“4.\xa0\xa0Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Admissibility',
'elements': [{'content': '145.\xa0\xa0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Merits',
'elements': [{'content': '146.\xa0\xa0The Government did not make any submissions on that complaint.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '147.\xa0\xa0The Court reiterates that where an individual’s personal liberty is at stake, it has very strict standards concerning the State’s compliance with the requirement for a speedy review of the lawfulness of detention (see, for example, Kadem v. Malta, no. 55263/00, §§ 44-45, 9 January 2003, where the Court considered that seventeen days to decide on the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention was excessive). It has already found a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention in a number of cases against Russia, where, for instance, the proceedings by which the lawfulness of applicants’ detention was decided lasted twenty-six (see Mamedova v.\xa0Russia, no.\xa07064/05, § 96, 1 June 2006), twenty (see Butusov v. Russia, no. 7923/04, §§\xa032-35, 22 December 2009) or twenty-seven days (see Pichugin v.\xa0Russia, no. 38623/03, §§ 154-56, 23 October 2012), stressing that their entire duration was attributable to the authorities.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '148.\xa0\xa0In the present case it took the Russian courts twenty-eight days to examine the appeal lodged by the applicant against the detention order of 3\xa0November 2006 (see paragraph 26 above). The Government did not provide any justification for the time it had taken the domestic courts to examine the appeal. There is nothing in the material before the Court to suggest that either the applicant or his counsel contributed to the length of the appeal proceedings. Accordingly, the entire length of the appeal proceedings in the present case was attributable to the authorities.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '149.\xa0\xa0Having regard to the above, the Court considers that the appeal proceedings for the review of the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention pending trial cannot be considered compatible with the “speediness” requirement of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. There has therefore been a violation of that provision.',
'elements': []}]}]},
{'content': 'V.\xa0\xa0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXCESSIVE LENGTH OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (APPLICATION No. 29431/05)',
'elements': [{'content': '150.\xa0\xa0The applicant in application no. 29431/05 (Mr Zubkov) also complained that the criminal proceedings against him had been excessively long. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': '151.\xa0\xa0The applicant complained, in particular, of the delay between the arrival of the case file at the trial court on 18 July 2002 and the commencement of the trial on 20 November 2002.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '152.\xa0\xa0The Government submitted that the commencement of the trial had been delayed at the request of counsel of one of the co-defendants to adjourn the trial, and again because of the illness of the applicant’s counsel. Without submitting any supporting documents, the Government further submitted that several hearings scheduled in September, October and November 2002 had been adjourned because the defendants’ counsel had failed to attend for various reasons. The delay in the commencement of the trial had not therefore been attributable to the authorities. After the commencement of the trial, several more hearings had been adjourned because counsel had been ill or had failed to attend for other reasons, because defendants had requested additional time to study the case file and prepare their defence, and once because a prosecution witness had not attended. The trial had also been adjourned for a year and three months in order that expert examinations could be carried out. The length of the proceedings had not, therefore, been excessive.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '153.\xa0\xa0Having examined all the material before it, the Court considers that for the reasons stated below, the respondent Government cannot be held liable for the allegedly excessive length of the criminal proceedings against the applicant.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '154.\xa0\xa0In particular, the Court notes that having regard to the overall length of the proceeding (less than three years), the relevant complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and his co-defendants and that of the authorities, including the diligence they displayed while dealing with the case, and the levels of jurisdiction involved, the length of the proceedings was not excessive and met the “reasonable time” requirement (see, among other authorities, Khanov and Others v. Russia (dec.), nos. 15327/05 and\xa015\xa0others, 30 June 2016, with further references).',
'elements': []},
{'content': '155.\xa0\xa0In view of the above, the Court finds that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'VI.\xa0\xa0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION',
'elements': [{'content': '156.\xa0\xa0Lastly, the Court has examined the other complaints submitted by the applicants and, having regard to all the material in its possession and in so far as the complaints fall within the Court’s competence, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the applications must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article\xa035 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'VII.\xa0\xa0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION',
'elements': [{'content': '157.\xa0\xa0Article 41 of the Convention provides:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'A.\xa0\xa0Damage',
'elements': [{'content': '158.\xa0\xa0The applicants claimed the following amounts in respect of nonpecuniary damage: Mr Zubkov claimed 72,450 euros (EUR), Mr\xa0Ippolitov claimed EUR 105,000 and Mr Gorbunov claimed EUR\xa020,000. Mr\xa0Ippolitov also claimed EUR 6,000 in respect of pecuniary damage, representing loss of salary. He alleged that the unlawful criminal prosecution had resulted in his dismissal from the prosecutor’s office.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '159.\xa0\xa0The Government submitted that the claims for non-pecuniary damage were excessive. As regards the claim for pecuniary damage, they submitted that there was no causal link between the applicant’s complaints and the damage alleged.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '160.\xa0\xa0The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged by Mr Ippolitov; it therefore rejects this claim.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '161.\xa0\xa0As regards non-pecuniary damage, having regard to the nature of the violations found in respect of each applicant and to the sum payable to Mr Gorbunov under the unilateral declaration (see paragraph 135 above, and Urazov v. Russia, no. 42147/05, § 106, 14 June 2016), the Court awards the following amounts in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable: EUR 7,500 each to Mr Zubkov and Mr Ippolitov, and EUR 4,300 to Mr Gorbunov.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'B.\xa0\xa0Costs and expenses',
'elements': [{'content': '162.\xa0\xa0Mr Gorbunov also claimed EUR 7,000 for legal fees incurred before the Court. He presented the relevant legal-fee agreement.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '163.\xa0\xa0The Government submitted that the amount claimed was excessive. Moreover, there was no proof that the applicant had already paid the legal fees.',
'elements': []},
{'content': '164.\xa0\xa0According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,000 covering costs under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.',
'elements': []}]},
{'content': 'C.\xa0\xa0Default interest',
'elements': [{'content': '165.\xa0\xa0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.',
'elements': []}]}]}],
'section_name': 'law'},
{'content': 'FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,',
'elements': [{'content': '1.\xa0\xa0Decides to join the applications;',
'elements': []},
{'content': '2.\xa0\xa0Decides, having regard to the terms of the Government’s declaration, and the arrangements for ensuring compliance with the undertakings referred to therein, to strike Mr\xa0Gorbunov’s application out of its list of cases in accordance with Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention in so far as it concerns the complaints under Articles 3 of the Convention of the allegedly inhuman conditions of detention and transport and the complaint under 5 § 4 of the Convention about his absence from the remand hearing;',
'elements': []},
{'content': '3.\xa0\xa0Declares the complaints under Article 8 of the Convention of a breach of each applicant’s right to respect for his private life and correspondence and under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention of the insufficient speediness of review of Mr Gorbunov’s detention admissible and the remainder of the applications inadmissible;',
'elements': []},
{'content': '4.\xa0\xa0Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in respect of each applicant;',
'elements': []},
{'content': '5.\xa0\xa0Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention in respect of Mr Gorbunov;',
'elements': []},
{'content': '6.\xa0\xa0Holds', 'elements': []},
{'content': '(a)\xa0\xa0that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article\xa044\xa0§\xa02 of the Convention, the following amounts, plus any tax that may be chargeable, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:',
'elements': []},
{'content': '(b)\xa0\xa0that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement, simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period, plus three percentage points;',
'elements': []},
{'content': '7.\xa0\xa0Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'Done in English, and notified in writing on 7 November 2017, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judge Dedov is annexed to this judgment.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'I ought to point out that in the Bykov judgment (Bykov v. Russia [GC], no. 4378/02, § 111, 10 March 2009) the Grand Chamber considered that the applicant had suffered non-pecuniary damage which was not sufficiently compensated by the finding of a violation of the Convention. Considering the circumstances of the case and having made its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court has awarded the applicant EUR 1,000 under the head.',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'I believe that the above approach (involving a symbolic amount of compensation) is applicable to all other “surveillance” cases with similar circumstances, namely when the Court has found a violation of Article 8, but the surveillance measures were in fact necessary, and the domestic proceedings in the applicant’s case were not contrary to the requirements of a fair trial (see Bykov, § 104).',
'elements': []},
{'content': 'APPENDIX', 'elements': []},
{'content': 'table-0', 'elements': [], 'type': 'table'},
{'content': '', 'elements': []}],
'section_name': 'conclusion'}],
'parties': ['ZUBKOV AND OTHERS', 'RUSSIA']}]
JSON data can be contained in a list or dictionary at the top level. Let’s check which type we got:
type(cases)
list
Our data is a list of cases. Let’s check the type of case 0:
type(cases[0])
dict
The data about each case is in a dictionary.
We can print the keys using list():
keys = list(cases[0])
print(keys)
['itemid', 'docname', 'doctypebranch', 'ecli', 'importance', 'applicability', 'appno', 'decisiondate', 'introductiondate', 'judgementdate', 'kpdate', 'languageisocode', 'originatingbody_name', 'originatingbody_type', 'rank', 'respondent', 'separateopinion', 'typedescription', 'judgment', 'parties']
We can loop over the list to get the title of each case:
for case in cases:
print(case['docname'])
CASE OF POPOVIC v. SERBIA
CASE OF HANDZHIYSKI v. BULGARIA
CASE OF ZUBKOV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA
Each case has a decision or judgment date.
for case in cases:
print(case['docname'])
print(case.get('decisiondate'))
print(case.get('judgementdate'))
print()
CASE OF POPOVIC v. SERBIA
None
2009-11-24T00:00:00
CASE OF HANDZHIYSKI v. BULGARIA
None
2021-04-06T00:00:00
CASE OF ZUBKOV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA
None
2017-11-07T00:00:00
Using Harvard’s CAP API#
Again, we need to specify the URL to the data we want to fetch.
URL = "https://api.case.law/v1/cases/"
We include some parameters that specifies which cases we want to load:
parameters = {'jurisdiction': 'ill',
'full_case': 'true',
'decision_date_min': '2011-01-01',
'page_size': 3}
jurisdictionis Illinois in this examplefull_caseinclude the full text of each casedecision_date_minis the minimum date, we only want decisions later than this datepage_sizeis the number of items
More parameters are listed in the CAP documentation.
Now, let’s fetch the data.
request = requests.get(URL, params=parameters)
data = request.json()
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
JSONDecodeError Traceback (most recent call last)
File /opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.15/x64/lib/python3.10/site-packages/requests/models.py:974, in Response.json(self, **kwargs)
973 try:
--> 974 return complexjson.loads(self.text, **kwargs)
975 except JSONDecodeError as e:
976 # Catch JSON-related errors and raise as requests.JSONDecodeError
977 # This aliases json.JSONDecodeError and simplejson.JSONDecodeError
File /opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.15/x64/lib/python3.10/json/__init__.py:346, in loads(s, cls, object_hook, parse_float, parse_int, parse_constant, object_pairs_hook, **kw)
343 if (cls is None and object_hook is None and
344 parse_int is None and parse_float is None and
345 parse_constant is None and object_pairs_hook is None and not kw):
--> 346 return _default_decoder.decode(s)
347 if cls is None:
File /opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.15/x64/lib/python3.10/json/decoder.py:337, in JSONDecoder.decode(self, s, _w)
333 """Return the Python representation of ``s`` (a ``str`` instance
334 containing a JSON document).
335
336 """
--> 337 obj, end = self.raw_decode(s, idx=_w(s, 0).end())
338 end = _w(s, end).end()
File /opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.15/x64/lib/python3.10/json/decoder.py:355, in JSONDecoder.raw_decode(self, s, idx)
354 except StopIteration as err:
--> 355 raise JSONDecodeError("Expecting value", s, err.value) from None
356 return obj, end
JSONDecodeError: Expecting value: line 1 column 1 (char 0)
During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:
JSONDecodeError Traceback (most recent call last)
Cell In[17], line 2
1 request = requests.get(URL, params=parameters)
----> 2 data = request.json()
File /opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.15/x64/lib/python3.10/site-packages/requests/models.py:978, in Response.json(self, **kwargs)
974 return complexjson.loads(self.text, **kwargs)
975 except JSONDecodeError as e:
976 # Catch JSON-related errors and raise as requests.JSONDecodeError
977 # This aliases json.JSONDecodeError and simplejson.JSONDecodeError
--> 978 raise RequestsJSONDecodeError(e.msg, e.doc, e.pos)
JSONDecodeError: Expecting value: line 1 column 1 (char 0)
Inspecting the Data#
JSON data can be contained in a list or dictionary at the top level. Let’s check which type we got:
type(data)
list
Since our data is in a dictionary, we can print the keys using list():
keys = list(data)
print(keys)
[{'article': 'p1-1', 'count': 2, 'type': 'other'}, {'article': '10', 'count': 190, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': '10', 'count': 665, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': '11', 'count': 50, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': '11', 'count': 443, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': '12', 'count': 10, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': '12', 'count': 10, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': '13', 'count': 193, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': '13', 'count': 2422, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': '14', 'count': 304, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': '14', 'count': 280, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': '17', 'count': 1, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': '18', 'count': 39, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': '18', 'count': 24, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': '2', 'count': 238, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': '2', 'count': 1016, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': '25-1', 'count': 3, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': '25-1', 'count': 7, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': '3', 'count': 671, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': '3', 'count': 3376, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': '34', 'count': 92, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': '34', 'count': 159, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': '38', 'count': 21, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': '38', 'count': 44, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': '4', 'count': 12, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': '4', 'count': 11, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': '46', 'count': 1, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': '5', 'count': 506, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': '5', 'count': 3057, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': '6-1', 'count': 1047, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': '6-1', 'count': 7772, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': '7', 'count': 67, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': '7', 'count': 46, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': '8', 'count': 531, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': '8', 'count': 1549, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': '9', 'count': 44, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': '9', 'count': 91, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': 'p1-1', 'count': 185, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': 'p1-1', 'count': 1, 'type': 'other'}, {'article': 'p1-1', 'count': 1475, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': 'p1-2', 'count': 16, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': 'p1-2', 'count': 23, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': 'p1-3', 'count': 18, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': 'p1-3', 'count': 1, 'type': 'other'}, {'article': 'p1-3', 'count': 68, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': 'p12-1', 'count': 4, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': 'p12-1', 'count': 8, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': 'p4-2', 'count': 11, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': 'p4-2', 'count': 60, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': 'p4-3', 'count': 1, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': 'p4-4', 'count': 13, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': 'p4-4', 'count': 24, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': 'p6-1', 'count': 4, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': 'p7-1', 'count': 4, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': 'p7-1', 'count': 5, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': 'p7-2', 'count': 67, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': 'p7-3', 'count': 1, 'type': 'violation'}, {'article': 'p7-4', 'count': 12, 'type': 'no-violation'}, {'article': 'p7-4', 'count': 55, 'type': 'violation'}]
The field count contains the number of hits in the database.
This is usually different from the number of items we requested.
If the count is zero, we don’t have any results and need to check the URL and the parameters.
print(data["count"])
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TypeError Traceback (most recent call last)
Cell In[20], line 1
----> 1 print(data["count"])
TypeError: list indices must be integers or slices, not str
That looks good. Let’s fetch the list of cases, which are located in results:
cases = data["results"]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TypeError Traceback (most recent call last)
Cell In[21], line 1
----> 1 cases = data["results"]
TypeError: list indices must be integers or slices, not str
Now we can inspect each case. Let’s loop over the cases and get some of the information. The data contains various metadata about each case, such as the case name and the abbreviated case name.
for case in cases:
print("Case name:", case["name_abbreviation"])
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
KeyError Traceback (most recent call last)
Cell In[22], line 2
1 for case in cases:
----> 2 print("Case name:", case["name_abbreviation"])
KeyError: 'name_abbreviation'
It’s often useful to look at the data in a web browser to get an overview. We can do that by opening the full URL, including the parameters:
print(request.url)
https://case.law/docs/